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The Strange Career of Jane Crow:




In September 1977, hundreds of African American parents and students
picketed the Amite County courthouse in Liberty, Mississippi. Holding
banners that read "End Sex Discrimination," they launched a month-long
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boycott of area public schools.' The African American community of
Amite County was protesting a regime of sex segregation conceived in the
immediate aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education and implemented
fifteen years later, when the Supreme Court established school districts'
"affirmative duty" to abolish dual school systems for black and white
children.2 When whites in many parts of the South threatened to shut
down public schools rather than desegregate, sex segregation had offered a
promising antidote to fears of racial "amalgamation." Now, it was African
American families fed up with sex separation who kept their children
home. Their story, and the legal battles fought in their name, are the focus
of this article.
"Jane Crow,"3 the term I will use to refer to the use of sex segregation in
racial desegregation plans, represents a little-studied phenomenon in the
legal and social history of race and sex in the postwar southern United
States.4 Examining the theory and practice of Jane Crow helps to elucidate
the cultural ramifications of, and interactions among, racial integration,
shifting sexual mores, gender politics, and legal change during this period.
Debates and litigation over Jane Crow also exemplify a series of
transformations in antidiscrimination law and discourse between the 1950s
and the late 1970s. In particular, the sex segregation controversy reveals
profound shifts in the conceptualization of the constitutional harm of
discrimination and in the construction of the relationship between race and
sex inequality.
Before the Supreme Court declared racial segregation unconstitutional
in Brown v. Board of Education, Jim Crow's defenders often used the
unquestioned legitimacy of sex segregation to illustrate the absurdity of
outlawing racial segregation-keeping black from white was as natural as
separating male from female, the argument went. Brown permanently
1. Daniel Sheridan, School Boycott Leader Vows to Continue, NATCHEZ DEMOCRAT, Aug. 31,
1977 (on file with the Library of Congress, Records of the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People [hereinafter "Records of the NAACP"], V: 2570, Folder: Branches-States-
Mississippi: A-J Misc., 1956-81).
2. Green v. New Kent County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437 (1968).
3. I use "Jane Crow" as a shorthand because it neatly captures the interconnections and overlap
between sex segregation and Jim Crow. It should be noted, however, that the term "Jane Crow"
apparently originated in the writings of the pioneering civil rights lawyer and feminist Pauli Murray in
the 1940s, and referred to sex discrimination more generally. The term first achieved widespread
dissemination in 1965, when Murray, along with Justice Department attorney Mary 0. Eastwood,
published a pathbreaking article entitled, "Jane Crow and the Law." See Pauli Murray & Mary
Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232
(1965). For more on Murray and "Jane Crow," see, for example, Susan Ware, Dialogue: Pauli
Murray's Notable Connections, 14 J. WOMEN'S HIST. 54 (2002). On Murray's contributions to
feminist legal strategy in the 1960s and early 1970s, see Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal
Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change, 92 CAL. L. REV. 755 (2004).
4. Two recent articles have included brief discussions of these cases. See Jill E. Hasday, The
Principle and Practice of Women's 'Full Citizenship': A Case Study of Sex Segregated Public
Education, 101 MICH. L. REV. 755 (2002); Verna C. Williams, Reform or Retrenchment?: Single-Sex
Education and the Construction of Race and Gender, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 15; see also Jack Balkin, Is
There a Slippery Slope from Single-Sex Education to Single-Race Education?, 37 J. OF BLACKS IN
HIGHER EDUC. 126 (2002).
[Vol. 18:187
2
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol18/iss2/2
Mayeri
disrupted this neat syllogism. As Part I of this article describes, in the
wake of what some white Southerners called "Black Monday," sex
segregation struck many observers as the perfect answer to fears that racial
integration would lead inexorably to social intimacy and, ultimately, to
interracial marriage and the horrors of "amalgamation," or
"mongrelization." Many southern states passed laws authorizing the
separation of students by sex, and some of the very few school districts
that implemented desegregation in the first fifteen years after Brown
considered or employed sex segregation. While there certainly was
disagreement over the desirability and efficacy of the sex segregation
solution, few questioned its constitutionality during this period. After all,
anti-miscegenation laws remained on the books until 1967,' and civil
rights proponents were reluctant to vindicate segregationist propaganda by
even hinting that racial equality required black boys to attend school with
white girls. And though a few commentators suggested that sex
segregation might impose a racial "badge of inferiority," virtually no one
characterized Jane Crow as sex discrimination.
Part II chronicles the first shift in Jane Crow law and discourse, which
occurred in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's 1968 mandate that
Southern school districts expeditiously produce and implement
desegregation plans designed to create racially "unitary" school systems.6
A number of school districts in several Southern states included sex
segregation in these plans, prompting resistance from many African
American communities, and, in some cases, federal government
intervention. Objectors contended that sex segregation, in this context,
"perpetuate[d] racial segregation by subterfuge."7 The Fifth Circuit
responded by establishing a "racial motivation standard" to evaluate the
legality of sex segregation schemes: courts were to inquire into whether
the plans were motivated by "racial discrimination," or rather stemmed
from legitimate "educational purposes. ' Though everyone understood-
and many acknowledged outside of court-that fears about the social
implications of racial integration were the real impetus for sex separation,
the racial motivation standard encouraged school districts to manufacture
race-neutral justifications for Jane Crow. Many of the "educational
purposes" cited by school districts, such as the virtues of sex-specific
curricular specialization and the need to rescue boys from the "feminized"
classroom, reflected the failure of emerging anti-sex-discrimination norms
5. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
6. Green, 391 U.S. at 440.
7. Brief of Appellants at 9, Smith v. Concordia Parish Sch. Bd., No. 28342 (5th Cir. Oct. 1, 1969)
(on file with the National Archives and Records Administration [hereinafter "NARA"], Southwest
Regional Division [hereinafter "S.W. Reg. Div."], RG 276, United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit [hereinafter "Fifth Circuit"], Case Files, Box 4235, 28342-28349).
8. United States v. Amite County, No. 28030 (5th Cir. Dec. 19, 1969) ("[l]s racial discrimination
the motivation for the plan or does it have its basis in educational purposes?"). The term "racial
motivation standard" is my own shorthand.
2006]
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to penetrate Jane Crow discourse. While many had come to view Jane
Crow as racially discriminatory, neither litigants nor judges raised any
qualms relating to sex discrimination in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The women's rights revolution changed all that, as Part III relates. The
explosion in legal consciousness of sex discrimination between 1970 and
1977-the result of advocacy, legislation, and litigation-transformed the
debate over sex segregation. By 1974, a whole host of new legal tools and
theories were available to opponents of Jane Crow, including Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, 9 the Equal Educational Opportunity
Act of 1974,0 and a new constitutional equal protection jurisprudence.1"
Plaintiffs in some Jane Crow cases, and advocates from groups like the
American Civil Liberties Union, the National Organization for Women,
and the American Friends Service Committee, now argued that sex
segregation was not only race discrimination, but sex discrimination. The
school districts' defense of sex segregation, which emphasized the
benefits of single-sex schools to boys and the virtues of sex-specific
curricula that (to feminists) disadvantaged girls, made salient a particular
version of the sex discrimination argument. This argument emphasized the
psychological and material harms that sex segregation imposed upon girls,
and framed those harms as analogous to the injuries visited upon black
children by racial segregation.
Calling sex segregation sex discrimination provided advocates with a
new and compelling argument against Jane Crow, and offered the
women's rights movement a powerful example of invidiously motivated
separation of the sexes at a time when such separation largely was viewed
as benign. But this analogy-based sex discrimination model, for all of its
rhetorical and strategic advantages, failed to capture what was at stake for
those arguably most affected by Jane Crow: African American families in
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2005).
10. See Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974, § 202(a)(1), codified at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1701(a)(1) ("[A]Il children enrolled in public schools are entitled to equal educational opportunity
without regard to race, color, sex, or national origin"); id. § 203(a)(1), codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1702(a)
("The Congress finds that ... the maintenance of dual school systems in which students are assigned
to schools solely on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin denies to those students the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment"); id. § 204, codified at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1703 ("No State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her
race, color, sex, or national origin, by ... the assignment by an educational agency of a student to a
school, other than the one closest to his or her place of residence within the school district in which he
or she resides, if the assignment results in a greater degree of segregation of students on the basis of
race, color, sex, or national origin among the schools of such agency than would result if such students
were assigned to the school closest to his or her place of residence within the school district of such
agency providing the appropriate grade level and type of education for such student"); id. § 296,
codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1705 ("[T]he assignment by an educational agency of a student to the school
nearest his place of residence which provides the appropriate grade level and type of education for
such student is not a denial of equal educational opportunity or of equal protection of the laws unless
such assignment is for the purpose of segregating students on the basis of race, color, sex, or national
origin, or the school to which such student is assigned was located on its site for the purpose of
segregating students on such basis.").
11. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
[Vol. 18:187
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the sex-segregating school districts of Georgia, Louisiana, and
Mississippi. As I argue in Part IV, some African American communities
came to evaluate the efficacy of sex segregation in pragmatic terms, based
on its success in keeping white students and government funds in the
public schools. Where they perceived sex separation as retaining white
enrollment in, and financial contribution to, public schools, many African
Americans apparently were willing to put up with this "less than ideal"
policy. In contrast, in sex-segregating school districts where whites
abandoned the public schools in large numbers and withdrew their
financial support, black resentment and protest of Jane Crow increased
during the 1970s.
African Americans affected by Jane Crow also expressed the harm of
sex segregation in ways not captured by the dominant legal sex
discrimination paradigm. They did not emphasize psychological and
material damage inflicted on girls in particular, but rather voiced broader
concerns about the distribution of political power and the proper
socialization and education of children. They stressed the undemocratic
imposition of sex segregation by white officials on blacks; the insidious
implications of a policy intended to keep black boys away from white
girls; the arbitrary limitations on both male and female curricular choice;
the obstacles to healthy, heterosocial interaction between boys and girls;
and students' lack of preparation for a sex-integrated world.
Recovering the Jane Crow cases and the debates they adjudicated helps
us to see more concretely the stakes of school desegregation for black and
white Southern families, for school officials, for the civil rights and
women's rights movements, and for the relationship between legal
advocacy and grassroots protest. But the story of Jane Crow has thus far
been little more than a footnote to the history of sex-segregated education
and of white resistance to racial desegregation. Part V explores the reasons
for the Jane Crow cases' legal obscurity, describing their legal resolution
under a little-noticed statutory provision and explaining why the sex
discrimination argument against sex segregation narrowly failed in the
Supreme Court. Part VI concludes by reflecting upon each phase of the
Jane Crow debate and upon the consequences of the transformation of
anti-discrimination discourse that this controversy embodied.
I. "ONE FORM OF SEGREGATION THAT IS PERFECTLY LEGAL":
THE SEX SEPARATION SOLUTION
This Part locates the origins of sex segregation proposals in the
aftermath of the Brown decision and describes the politics and law of sex
segregation in the years before the Supreme Court required widespread
racial desegregation. As the first section describes, Brown revitalized a
longstanding discourse that linked racial integration to sexual disorder and
the decline of civilized humanity. Cries of "amalgamation" and
2006]
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"mongrelization" in Brown's wake prompted politicians, journalists, and
ordinary citizens to suggest sex segregation as a solution to the problem of
racial integration. Sex segregation proposals served a variety of political
purposes. Some expressed revulsion against interracial intimacy, while
others reflected a genuine desire to ease the transition to an integrated
society. But as the second section shows, whatever its underlying impetus,
sex segregation enjoyed virtually unquestioned constitutional validity in
the decade and a half after Brown. During this period, almost no one
suggested publicly that separate schools for male and female students
might constitute illegal discrimination.
A. "To Allay the Worst Fear": Sex Segregation Proposals in the Brown
Decade
In the century following the Civil War, courts and legal scholars often
used the "naturally" separate education of the sexes to rationalize the
legality of school segregation by race. In 1878, for instance, a federal
court in Louisiana rejected a challenge to racial segregation in the state's
public schools, declaring, "Equality of right does not necessarily imply
identity of rights."' 2 If the Constitution's equal protection guarantee
prohibited racial separation, the court went on to suggest, the equality
principle would also mandate "educating children of both sexes, or
children without regard to their attainments or age in the same school."' 3
Such a result was clearly absurd.' 4 Eight decades later, attorney John W.
Davis hoped the United States Supreme Court would see things the same
way: if the Court outlawed racial school segregation, he argued in 1952,
there would be no legal basis for separating students on any number of
perfectly legitimate grounds, such as age, ability--or sex. 15
The Brown decision did not put such arguments to rest; quite the
contrary.' 6 But in the post-Brown era, sex-segregated schooling became
12. Bertonneau v. Bd. of Directors, 3 F. Cas. 294, 295-96 (C.C.D. La. 1878).
13. Id.
14. Federal district Judge William B. Woods, later an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court, wrote in Bertonneau,
[T]he sole grievance . . . is that complainant's children, being of African descent, are not
allowed to attend the same public schools as those in which children of white parents are
educated. White children and colored children are compelled to attend different schools. That is
all. The state ... had the right to manage its schools in the manner which, in its judgment, will
best promote the interests of all. The state may be of the opinion that it is better to educate the
sexes apart. By such a policy can it be said that the equal rights of either sex are invaded?
Id. For more on the Bertonneau case, see LIVA BAKER, THE SECOND BATrLE OF NEW ORLEANS: THE
HUNDRED-YEAR STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE THE SCHOOLS 29-31 (1996).
15. Philip Dodd, Court Takes Up Segregation in Public Schools, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 10,
1952, at 6. The context for Davis's argument was the Supreme Court's first consideration of the school
segregation cases that would later be known as Brown v. Board of Education. For more on Davis, see
WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, LAWYER'S LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JOHN W. DAVIS (2d ed. 1990).
16. For instance, critics mocked Brown's holding that racial school segregation was
unconstitutional by suggesting that the ruling, by extension, would invalidate all-male colleges and
[Vol. 18:187
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salient in a different way: as a palliative for white Southern fears that
racially mixed schools would lead down a slippery slope toward
interracial marriage and social equality. "The ultimate aim and goal of
NAACP leaders in the present segregation fight," warned Georgia
Governor Herman E. "Eugene" Talmadge in 1955, "is the complete
intermingling of the races in housing, schools, churches, public parks,
public swimming pools and even in marriage."17 The unavoidable result of
such social integration would be a "mongrel race in which the strongest
and best features of both races have been destroyed," wrote Talmadge."8
Such proclamations, along with well-known sociological analyses that
linked segregation with fears of "miscegenation," convinced many
Americans that visceral discomfort with interracial intimacy lay at the
heart of Southern resistance to integration.' 9
Indeed, it is almost impossible to overstate the pervasiveness of this
discourse of "mongrelization" and "amalgamation" in the wake of
Brown.20 Virtually every issue of the segregationist Citizens' Council's
publication warned, in lurid terms, that desegregation would lead
inevitably to interracial marriage, and to the degeneration of the white
race. 21 Popular segregationist screeds like Judge Tom P. Brady's Black
Monday: Segregation or Amalgamation, America Has Its Choice and
Senator Theodore Bilbo's Take Your Choice: Separation or
Mongrelization minced no words in forecasting racial integration's
military academies, which seemed a patently ridiculous result. Lena H. Reynolds of Berkeley,
California, wrote to two major newspapers in 1956:
Since the Supreme Court has decreed that segregation in the public schools must end, and, since
the Military Academy at West Point and the Naval Academy at Annapolis most certainly are
public educational institutions, what will happen if militant females, relying on the politicians'
pledges of 'equal rights for women,' apply for but are refused admission to these public
schools? Will the Supreme Court decide that segregation of the sexes must end because of the
inferiority complex which this unequal treatment has been engendering in the women of the
United States? Who can tell what Joan of Arc is being denied her 'equal opportunity' for a
military career?
Lena H. Reynolds, Letter to the Editor, Discrimination?, LATIMES, Sept. 9, 1956, at B4; Lena H.
Reynolds, Letter to the Editor, Unequal Treatment, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1956, at 10. See also infra
note 77.
17. Herman E. Talmadge, Intermingling and Intermarriage, in YOU AND SEGREGATION 42
(1955). For more on Talmadge, see WILLIAM ANDERSON, THE WILD MAN FROM SUGAR CREEK: THE
POLITICAL CAREER OF EUGENE TALMADGE (1975).
18. Talmadge, supra note 17, at 44. See also Editorial, To Allay the Worst Fear, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, July 7, 1954, at E-2 ("When the widely respected Governor of South Carolina, James F.
Byrnes, told a correspondent of this newspaper he opposes ending racial segregation in the public
schools chiefly because it 'will lead to mongrelization' he was voicing the great underlying fear that
besets many of the white people of the South.").
19. See, e.g., GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944).
20. On the prominence of "amalgamation" fears in the theological debate over segregation, see
Jane Dailey, Sex, Segregation, and the Sacred after Brown, 91 J. AM. HIST. 119 (2004). One state
legislator succinctly summed up the stance of numerous white Southern politicians in 1958: "All laws
for the separation of races are largely a defense ... protecting the law against intermarriage. The real
leaders of the [anti-segregation] movement know what they want: intermarriage." Quoted in Paul
Simon, A Southern Survey, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 26, 1958, at 9.
21. For more on the Citizens' Council's first decade, see NEIL R. MCMILLEN, THE CITIZENS'
COUNCIL: ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION, 1954-64 (1971).
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ultimate result-intermarriage culminating in the irreversible decline of
civilization.22 The specter of interracial sex served as a reliable rhetorical
weapon. For instance, the powerful Louisiana machine politician Leander
Perez declared to thunderous applause at a 1960 Citizens' Council rally in
New Orleans, "Don't wait for your daughters to be raped by these
Congolese. Don't wait until the burr-heads are forced into your schools.
Do something about it now!"23 It became an article of faith among many
journalists that Southern resistance to desegregation was rooted in fears of
interracial social intimacy; Northern press coverage of Southern white
reaction often emphasized this dynamic.24  President Dwight D.
Eisenhower is said to have remarked to Chief Justice Earl Warren while
the Court was considering Brown and its companion cases that white
Southerners were "not bad people. All they are concerned about is to see
that their sweet little girls are not required to sit in school alongside some
big overgrown Negroes. '"25 Even those who disparaged the
"amalgamation" rhetoric as a political trick designed to avoid reasoned
discussion by inflaming passions acknowledged its power to do just that.26
Such rhetoric was nothing new, of course: cries of "amalgamation," and
later, "miscegenation," had accompanied virtually every attempt at racial
progress in the United States. Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma,
published in 1944, was only the most famous of many pre-Brown works
that analyzed the appeal of these arguments to white Southerners in
22. THEODORE G. BILBO, TAKE YOUR CHOICE: SEPARATION OR MONGRELIZATION (1947); TOM
P. BRADY, BLACK MONDAY: SEGREGATION OR AMALGAMATION, AMERICA HAS ITS CHOICE (1955).
Brady was a circuit court judge in Mississippi; Bilbo was Mississippi's Governor in 1916-20 and
1928-32, and a U.S. Senator from 1935 until his death in 1947. For more on Bilbo's political career,
see CHESTER M. MORGAN, REDNECK LIBERAL: THEODORE G. BILBO AND THE NEW DEAL (1985).
23. Louisiana: New Orleans Desegregates Schools; Federal Court Bans State Interference,
SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS, Dec. 1960, at 1, 9. In 1954, Perez had described how integration would
lead inevitably to "amalgamation":
Beginning at the age of six, little white and Negro children-boys and girls-would be forced
into continuous physical contact with each other in public schools and public school activities.
'They would study together, recite together, sing together, play together, sit together, talk
together, and dance together. They would eat lunch together from food provided by the federal
government . . . . The social theory behind this procedure is that the close and intimate
association during the entire formative period of their lives would, in itself, produce integration
or, in other words, amalgamation of the races. Fantastic as it may appear, the social aim is a
Negroid South.
Quoted in JAMES CONAWAY, JUDGE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LEANDER PEREZ 105 (1973). For more
on Perez, see generally BAKER, supra note 14; ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, RACE & DEMOCRACY: THE CIvIL
RIGHTS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA, 1915-1972 (1995); and GLEN JEANSONNE, LEANDER PEREZ, BOSS
OF THE DELTA (1977).
24. See, e.g., Jim Bishop, Racial Tug-of-War Jolts New Orleans, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 1956, at
1; Wilma Dykeman & James Stokely, Inquiry Into the Southern Tensions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1957,
at 221 (describing the centrality of sex to the furor over racial desegregation).
25. EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN 291 (1977).
26. See, e.g., Editorial, Resistance Rising Throughout the South, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1955, at
12 ("By preying on sex fears-'mongrelization' is their favorite term-[the Citizens' Councils] have
succeeded in arresting calm discussion of the issue.").
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particular. 7 Still, as Renee Romano describes, Brown brought fears of
"race-mixing" to the forefront of popular discourse once more.28 The
prospect of school desegregation was especially threatening to white
Southerners, because it entailed a particular kind of social equality not as
clearly implicated in other public settings. 9 Many saw children as
especially susceptible to the corruption of interracial contact: if white
children went to school alongside black children, how would they learn
the etiquette of racial hierarchy?3 ° Orators sentimentalized white
children's racial purity as they demonized "race mixing." Governor Ross
Barnett told Mississippians in a 1962 televised address, "There is no cause
which is more moral and just than the protection of the integrity of our
races. To this end, we as parents will do whatever is necessary to defend
those who are most dear to us."31
27. MYRDAL, supra note 19. Jane Dailey writes that "state antimiseegenation laws underpinned
the edifice of racial segregation and discrimination in America, a fact advertised by students of
southern social relations since the 1920s." Jane Dailey, The Theology of Massive Resistance: Sex,
Segregation, and the Sacred after Brown, in MASSIVE RESISTANCE, SOUTHERN OPPOSITION TO THE
SECOND RECONSTRUCTION (Clive Webb ed., 2005) 151, 158. Other early works explicating the
connection between anti-miscegenation fervor and white supremacy included JAMES WELDON
JOHNSON, ALONG THIS WAY (1933); JOHN DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TOWN
(1937); and LILLIAN SMITH, KILLERS OF THE DREAM (1949). Dailey, supra, at 158-59 & 176 n.30.
On the origins of the term "miscegenation," see Sidney Kaplan, The Miscegenation Issue in the
Election of 1864, 24 J. NEGRO HIST. 274 (1949). For more on the twentieth-century history of
opposition to interracial intimacy, see, for example, INTERRACIALISM: BLACK-WHITE
INTERMARRIAGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY, LITERATURE, AND LAW (Werner Sollors ed., 2000); JOHN P.
JOHNSON, JR., SCIENCE FOR SEGREGATION: RACE, LAW, AND THE CASE AGAINST BROWN v. BOARD OF
EDUCATION (2005); ALEX LUBIN, ROMANCE AND RIGHTS: THE POLITICS OF INTERRACIAL INTIMACY,
1945-1954 (2005); RENEE ROMANO, RACE MIXING: BLACK-WHITE MARRIAGE IN POSTWAR AMERICA
(2003); Julie Novkov, Racial Constructions: The Legal Regulation of Interracial Marriage in
Alabama, 1890-1934, 20 L. & HIST. REV. 225 (2002); and Peggy Pascoe, Miscegenation Law, Court
Cases, and the Ideology of "Race " in Twentieth-Century America, 83 J. AM. HIST. 44 (1996).
28. ROMANO, supra note 27, at 146.
29. On the particular threat posed by school desegregation, as opposed to other types of
desegregation, see ROMANO, supra note 27, at 156; and CHARLES BOLTON, THE HARDEST DEAL OF
ALL: THE BATTLE OVER SCHOOL INTEGRATION IN MISSISSIPPI, 1870-1980 xvii, 108 (2005). Book-
length defenses of racial segregation in education included JAMES JACKSON KILPATRICK, THE
SOUTHERN CASE FOR SCHOOL SEGREGATION (1962); WILLIAM D. WORKMAN, JR., THE CASE FOR THE
SOUTH (1960); and EDWARD P. LAWTON, THE SOUTH AND THE NATION (1963).
30. See ROMANO, supra note 27, at 159 ("[S]outhern parents were ultimately more concerned that
white students in integrated schools would be taught that the races were equal. This 'miseducation,' as
segregationists described it, would counter the inherent instinct of 'race preference' and would
undermine whites' instinctual propensity not to marry across the color line.").
31. Ross Barnett, Mississippi Still Says 'Never'., THE CITIZEN, Sept. 1962, at 6 (transcript of
television and radio address to the people of Mississippi, delivered Sept 13, 1962). Barnett continued,
"There is no case in history where the Caucasian race has survived social integration. We will not
drink from the cup of genocide!" Id. According to Karen Anderson, the fear "that desegregation
portended a loss of patriarchal control so serious that it could lead to consensual interracial sex on the
part of one's own children" was "broadly shared" among segregationists." Karen S. Anderson,
Massive Resistance, Violence, and Southern Social Relations: The Little Rock, Arkansas, School
Integration Crisis, 1954-1960, in MASSIVE RESISTANCE, supra note 27, at 203, 205.
As Elizabeth Gillespie McRae has demonstrated, white Southern women could also appeal to
maternal prerogatives and responsibilities to bolster segregationist resistance. McRae describes how
Florence Sillers Ogden of Mississippi "exploited the duties of white femininity for the cause of white
supremacy and stoked the fires of massive resistance .... present[ing] white women's resistance to
the Brown decision as a maternal responsibility to future generations, to public schools, and to
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This palpable terror of interracial social contact and its apotheosis,
interracial marriage, motivated many observers, North and South, to
suggest sex separation as a solution to the desegregation dilemma.
Southern governors and legislators of various political stripes embraced
the idea that schools faced with the prospect of racial integration should be
free to establish separate schools for boys and girls. Anticipating the
imminent demise of Jim Crow laws, the Alabama legislature authorized
sex separation in public schools in 1953.32 Over the next few years, Texas,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Florida, and Louisiana followed suit, passing
permissive legislation of various kinds.33
The impulse to propose sex segregation as an antidote to the ills of racial
integration reflected a complicated mixture of political posturing and
pragmatism. The passage of laws authorizing sex separation in racially
desegregated schools and classrooms often accompanied extremist
"massive resistance" measures such as the mandatory closing of any
school that allowed "race mixing. '34 For instance, when the New Orleans
school system faced desegregation in 1960, the Louisiana legislature met
in special sessions to pass a flurry of laws designed to preserve racial
segregation.35 A bill authorizing school segregation by sex was among the
more moderate of these measures, and one of the few that escaped
immediate federal judicial invalidation. 36
But while sex segregation proposals often appeared alongside extremist
rhetoric and blunter tools of legal obfuscation, in some ways sex-
segregated racial integration was the ultimate middle-ground position.
Though sex segregation proposals often had an aura of panic about them,
by definition they countenanced the inevitability of some racial
politics" and using "the image of black boys attending schools with white girls." Elizabeth Gillespie
McRae, White Womanhood, White Supremacy, and the Rise of Massive Resistance, in MASSIVE
RESISTANCE, supra note 27, at 181, 188.
32. See Robert Alden, South Trying Out New School Plan: Separation of Sexes in High Schools
Tested as an Aid in Eventual Integration, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1957, at 55. Other sex segregation
measures were also proposed in Alabama, including a 1957 bill that would have required female train
passengers to consent to any male seatmate. That measure was vetoed by Governor Jim Folsom.
Segregation Bills Vetoed by Folsom, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1957, at A8.
33. Joseph Ator, Rash of Laws in South Seeks to Circumvent High Court, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Nov.
23, 1957, at 9; Florida Passes Law to Segregate Sexes, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1959, at 29.
34. On "massive resistance," see, for example, MASSIVE RESISTANCE, supra note 27; NUMAN V.
BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950S
(1969); MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); and THE MODERATES' DILEMMA: MASSIVE RESISTANCE
TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN VIRGINIA (Matthew D. Lassiter & Andrew B. Lewis eds., 1998).
35. FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 23, at 242-43.
36. Federal district court Judge J. Skelly Wright, a steadfast opponent of Southern defiance,
struck down most of these measures shortly after their passage. For more on Judge Wright, see
BAKER, supra note 14; and ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER, A "CAPACITY FOR OUTRAGE": THE JUDICIAL
ODYSSEY OF J. SKELLY WRIGHT (1984).
37. Florida's assistant attorney general Ralph Odum presented it as such. He proposed sex
segregation as one of three alternatives available to the state if it was to maintain viable public
schools-the others being state subsidies for private segregated schools, and voluntary integration.
Ator, supra note 33, at 9.
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desegregation, without embracing its most unsettling social implications. 38
State Representative Jack Inman, who introduced Florida's sex
segregation bill, called the proposal a "safety valve"-an emergency
measure designed for the worst-case scenario.39 Because it acknowledged
racial desegregation as political reality, sex segregation appealed to some
moderates as a realistic alternative to what they viewed as debilitating
denial and defiance. For example, longtime Georgia state legislator
Herschel Lovett warned his colleagues in 1961, "The die has been cast
.... The more we take a posture of defiance, the worse shape we will be
in."'40 Sex segregation could help Georgians accept racial desegregation in
public schools, Lovett suggested.41
Sex separation proposals flourished not merely as popular symbolic
gestures for state legislators seeking to burnish their segregationist
credentials, or as last-ditch efforts to "soften the blow" of unavoidable
desegregation, 4  but also as sincere attempts to counteract Southern
resistance to Brown and to smooth the way toward peaceful integration. In
a July 1954 editorial, the Christian Science Monitor recommended sex
separation in secondary schools in order to "allay the worst fear" of many
white Southerners-that "placing white and Negro young people in the
same schools will accelerate amalgamation by making social relationships
between them so matter of course that interracial marriages might become
acceptable.'43 The sex separation solution "should be acceptable to much
38. One Charlottesville, Virginia school board member objected to a sex segregation proposal on
the ground that "The public is likely to ... think we are panicking and anticipating much more
desegregation than we are." Charlottesville Schools to Segregate the Sexes, WASH. POST, July 10,
1959, at C2. For discussions of shifting Southern perceptions about the inevitability-or lack
thereof-of racial desegregation, see Michael J. Klarman, Why Massive Resistance?, in MASSIVE
RESISTANCE, supra note 27, at 21, 29-33; and Tony Badger, Brown and Backlash, in MASSIVE
RESISTANCE, supra note 27, at 39, 51-52.
39. "Mild" School Bills Given Legislative Sanction, SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS, July 1959, at 6.
Florida's permissive law passed with little debate, and had the support of Governor Leroy Collins,
who enjoyed a reputation for moderation.
40. Joseph H. Baird, Georgia Grapples with Larger Issue, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 17,
1961, at 3.
41. Id. A Virginia congressional candidate told the Washington Post in 1956 that Brown was "the
law of the land," but that the separation of students by sex would avoid integration "problems" like
those he observed in the newly desegregated Washington, DC public schools. Brenner Visits Schools
Here, Scores Integration, WASH. POST, June 16, 1956, at 19. An anonymous Virginia resident writing
to the Christian Science Monitor in 1956 opined that "subconsciously ... individual Virginians have
accepted the idea of future integration." While the writer admitted that desegregation could not "take
place successfully and at once throughout either Virginia or the South," a grade-by-grade, sex-
segregated approach would help "to blunt the hard edges of resistance to integration." A Virginian,
Letter to the Editor, Integration Straws, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 27, 1956, at 20. As Col. Perry
W. Thompson, a candidate for Florida secretary of state in 1960, put it, "We in the South must realize
that our school segregation laws are in conflict with a Supreme Court decision." "But," he added, "this
does not prevent separation of the sexes." Florida: Political Activity, SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS, Oct.
1960, at 8. Incidentally, Col. Thompson was the father of President Eisenhower's daughter-in-law. Id.
42. Judge L.A. Grayson of the Hillsborough County, Florida Criminal Court suggested the
complete abolition of coeducation in public schools to "soften the blow" of race mixing, and
"indefinitely" to "postpone the evil day" when racial barriers would fall. Florida: What They Say,
SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS, Nov. 1958, at 10, 11.
43. To Allay the Worst Fear, supra note 18, at E-2.
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of the Negro leadership, too," the Monitor argued, since those leaders
were "no more eager to accelerate amalgamation than are their white
brothers. They ask simply that the individual be not shackled by an
inferiority imposed upon a whole race."44
The Monitor had many allies: prominent Northern politicians and
journalists frequently suggested the replacement of racial segregation with
sex segregation.45 In 1955, former Connecticut Senator Hiram Bingham
wrote a much-publicized letter to South Carolina Governor James F.
Byrnes proposing sex separation as an alternative to appease those who
urged the abolition of public education if the state were forced to
desegregate.46 Liberal social commentator Walter Lippmann observed in
1956 that effective desegregation in the South might require "radical
changes in school policy, say in the policy of coeducation. "'  Two years
later, Lippmann opined that "in the Deep South, integration, plus
coeducation, especially for teenagers, is impossible within the foreseeable
future. 48 Ordinary citizens also trumpeted sex segregation as the perfect
solution to the desegregation impasse. The analysis offered by Albert
Jason of Oakland, California, was typical of numerous letters to the editor
in the several years after Brown: sex separation, Jason argued, "certainly
would eliminate the fear of parents that integration may cause problems of
intermarriage and/or promiscuity .... [P]arents throughout the South as
well as in other parts of our country, whether white or colored, would not
object to integration, as long as the cause of moral turpitude has been
removed."49
44. Id.
45. In the summer of 1954, Washington Post columnist Malvina Lindsay noted a widespread
movement to reconsider the benefits of coeducation in the wake of Brown. Malvina Lindsay,
Coeducation, Focus of New Questions, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1954, at 16.
46. Pupil Separation By Sex Suggested. Ex-Senator Bingham Writes Byrnes This Would Help
Solve Segregation Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1955, at 33. Immediately after Brown, Byrnes had
identified sex as the heart of the problem with racial integration. "The pattern, Byrnes contended, is
familiar-white girl in shorts plays tennis in the yard of a segregated school; Negro boy enters
playground; the basic wall between the species begins to crumble, and social chaos has begun to
envelope humanity." Edwin A. Lahey, Byrnes on Integration, WASH. POST, May 22, 1954, at 18.
Bymes may have been an ideal audience for sex segregation proposals, as he had urged his former
colleagues on the Supreme Court to pursue desegregation implementation in a way that encouraged,
rather than alienated, moderate leadership. See Badger, supra note 38, at 39, 44. For more on Byrnes,
see DAVID W. ROBERTSON, SLY AND ABLE: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF JAMES F. BYRNES (1994).
47. Walter Lippmann, The Platform and Segregation, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1956, at 23.
48. Walter Lippmann, Fundamental Issues on Integration Remain, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1958, at
B4.
49. Albert Jason, Letter to the Editor, Segregate the Sexes, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1957, at A10.
One sex segregation proponent from Maryland suggested, a few weeks after Brown, that
[t]he problem is to find an action which complies with the letter and spirit of the law and still
minimizes [white Southerners'] fear and distress. Segregation by sex ... should fit that bill in
many areas. It would eliminate racial discrimination without providing a basis for the
miscegenation which is so feared in the South.
C.C. Van Vechten, Letter to the Editor, Segregating Sexes, WASH. POST, June 2, 1954, at 18. "As
everybody knows," wrote Mitchell Rawson to the New York Times a few months later,
the historic position of the South is that the problem of the close association of the races is
basically a biological one. Complete separation of the sexes, in separate buildings, would
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Some sex segregation proponents euphemistically referred to "sex
problems" or "adolescent problems" as barriers to students "applying
themselves" in racially integrated schools.5" But few failed to observe that
fear of "amalgamation" lay at the root of the sudden enthusiasm for sex
separation. New York Times columnist Arthur Krock wrote in 1956,
"Apprehension that steady expansion of. . .interbreeding would be the
result of propinquity in mixed schools of adolescents is the basic cause of
the Southern resistance.",5' Therefore, Krock asserted, "the suggestion of
separation by sexes goes to the heart of the controversy" over
integration.52 When Florida's governor signed that state's sex separation
bill in 1959, the wire service headline read, "Segregation by Sex: Florida
prevent the very worst results of the decision which are foreseen by many people of good will,
white and black.
Mitchell Rawson, Letter to the Editor, Segregation by Sexes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1954, at 33. Alex T.
Deutsch of Washington, D.C., agreed. "[S]eparating of the sexes may take ...the curse out of
integration," he wrote in 1957, "since intermarriage is feared more than anything else as its
consequence." Alex T. Deutsch, Letter to the Editor, Segregate the Sexes, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1957,
at A10. Donald Traylor of Norfolk, Virginia, wrote the following year that "the chief underlying
objection to integration in the public schools is that it will lead to association of races in the schools,
then on a social level, and hence, marriage between the races." Sex separation would solve the
problem, because "there would be no need for Negro and white students of the opposite sex to have
any more association than they now have." Donald H. Traylor, Letter to the Editor, Partial Solution,
WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1958, at A8. Sidney Rheinstein concurred:
Having been born and raised in the South, I think one of the main objections many Southerners
have to integration is that they do not wish children of different sexes to mingle. It took a long
time to have coeducation in this country. I cannot remember any coeducationtal] schools in my
boyhood, except perhaps a few kindergartens. It is a fact that people in southern climates mature
much faster sexually. Sex is an ever-present force in everyone's life. I think it goes to the very
basis of the integration question.
Sidney Rheinstein, Letter to the Editor, Integration Without Coeducation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1958,
at 14. See also D.M. Gancher, Letter to the Editor, For Dividing Sexes in Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
27, 1959, at 32 (arguing that "the educational problem in the South and elsewhere may be largely and
more beneficially disposed of by simply resorting to segregation by sex instead of color."); D.M.
Gancher, Letter to the Editor, Segregation by Sex, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1954, at SM6 (similar).
50. Alden, supra note 32, at 55; United Press International, Segregation by Sex: Florida School
Bill Seeks to Bar Racial Intermarriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1959, at 18; Associated Press,
Segregation by Sex Voted for Florida, CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 27, 1959, at A6 ("The idea, said Rep.
Jack Inman of Orlando, is to provide a means of heading off any sex problems which might arise in
the event of race mixing in the schools.").
51. Arthur Krock, In the Nation: 'Gradual' in the Frame of History: II, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27,
1956, at 34.
52. Id. Krock continued:
These Southerners oppose, and fear with the deepest emotions of which human beings are
capable, amalgamation of the Caucasian and African races. Though certain of their ancestors
were responsible for the infusion of white blood in the race enchained by slavery, this has only
intensified their conviction that the anthropological consequences of this interbreeding is the
lowering of both racial strains.
Id. Robert Alden also wrote in the New York Times,
The South is beginning to experiment with a legal type of segregation, based on gender, in an
effort to make racial integration of the schools more acceptable. Much of the South's worry
about integration is based on a dislike of the intermingling of the sexes of Negro and white
students. Therefore some educators and other students of the desegregation problem have
decided that the solution might lie in first segregating the sexes in the schools.
Alden, supra note 32, at 55. See also John H. Lever, Letter to the Editor, Segregation by Sexes, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 1956, at 28 (endorsing Krock's suggestion of sex segregation as a solution).
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School Bill Seeks to Bar Racial Intermarriage."" The sexual anxiety
motivating sex segregation proposals was no secret-in fact, proponents
invariably cited white Southerners' fears about race-mixing as the primary
rationale for separating students by sex.
Over the next several years, sex segregation continued to intrigue
Southern legislators, and, especially, officials in the relatively few school
districts under orders to racially desegregate. In 1959, segregationists in
the Virginia House of Delegates proposed bills that would mandate the
permanent discharge of any teacher who allowed coeducational
classrooms,54 or, alternatively, would require sex segregation in all public
schools. 5" They apparently were heeding Governor J. Lindsay Almond's
earlier warning that a "livid stench of sadism, sex immorality and juvenile
pregnancy" was "infesting the mixed schools."56 These extremist
approaches did not win legislative approval, in large measure because
Almond eventually retreated from the massive resistance agenda. Instead,
sex segregation became a moderate alternative to the drastic measures
taken by school districts like Prince Edward County, which closed its
public schools for four years rather than desegregate. For instance, the
Charlottesville schools initiated a sex separation "experiment" for the
1959-60 school year, and other districts in Virginia would later follow
suit.57 In 1960, several prominent Atlantans and a Fulton County, Georgia
grand jury charged with studying the racial desegregation problem
recommended that Atlanta reestablish sex segregation in its high schools,
a policy the city had abandoned in 1947.58
For some states and localities, sex segregation was more a desperate last
resort than a carefully considered policy. Two years after the Little Rock
school crisis, Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus attempted, unsuccessfully,
53. United Press International, Segregation by Sex, supra note 50, at 18.
54. Homer Bigart, Virginia Passes Key School Bills: Almond's Plan for Easing Integration is
Approved - Extremists Active, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1959, at 48.
55. Robert E. Baker, Virginia's Die-Hards Agree to Vote on Bills, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1959, at
Al.
56. Homer Bigart, Almond to Fight for Segregation: Governor Calls on Virginians to Support
Him Despite Court's Adverse Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1959, at 16. For fascinating explorations of
white Southern resistance to desegregation through state-level legislative initiatives relating to
sexuality, family, and public benefits, see Anders Walker, Note, Legislating Virtue: How
Segregationists Disguised Racial Discrimination as Moral Reform Following Brown v. Board of
Education, 47 DUKE L.J. 399 (1997); and Anders Walker, The Ghost of Jim Crow: Law, Culture, and
the Subversion of Civil Rights, 1954-1965 (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University)
(on file with Sterling Memorial Library, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University).
57. Associated Press, Schools Planning Sex Segregation: Charlottesville Will Separate Boys and
Girls as Racial Integration Begins, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 10, 1959, at 8; see also Arthur Krock, The
Choices that Remain for Virginia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1959, at 34 (suggesting sex segregation as an
option).
58. Georgia: Propose Separate Schools for Atlanta's Girls, Boys, SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS,
Aug. 1960, at 10; 'Don't Mix Sexes'-Atlanta, CHICAGO DEFENDER, July 13, 1960, at A23. Such
experiments were endorsed heartily by the Christian Science Monitor, which had been one of the first
publications to editorialize in favor of sex segregation in the wake of Brown and continued to promote
the idea throughout the 1950s. See, e.g., Editorial, Straws in the Wind, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jul.
22, 1959, at 16.
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to convince that city's school board to adopt sex segregation as part of its
racial desegregation plan.59 In New Orleans, where opposition to school
desegregation was characterized not only by vehemence, but also by
vulgarity and violence, embattled school officials announced in 1960 that
any racial desegregation in public schools would be accompanied by the
segregation of classrooms by sex. 6° When a 1964 Fifth Circuit court order
forced Mississippi to face the prospect of actual school desegregation after
a decade of foot-dragging, a group of legislators proposed a bill
authorizing school boards "to provide ... for the separation of students
according to sex, separately by classrooms or schools, when such board..
. determines such separation will promote or preserve the public peace,
order, or tranquility of the school district, or the health, morals, or
education of the students.' 6 As it turned out, it would be several more
years before racial desegregation became a reality in Mississippi,62 but the
New Orleans sex segregation idea spread to its suburbs and to other
Louisiana parishes forced to racially desegregate in the mid-1960s.63 For
states and localities that succeeded in postponing desegregation, sex
segregation remained until 1969 a hypothetical "safeguard" to be
"throw[n] up when and if all other means to prevent integration are
exhausted." 64
B. "Not Even the Present Court Can Call It Unconstitutional": The
Presumed Legitimacy of Sex Segregation
Fueling the post-Brown sex separation renaissance was the pervasive
perception that the constitutional encumbrances placed upon racial
segregation were inapplicable to sex separation. Though the legality of
racial segregation had come under escalating attack since the 1930s, and
coeducation increasingly pervaded American schools, sex separation's
constitutional pedigree remained unblemished. As Mitchell Rawson put it
in 1954, there was "one form of segregation which is perfectly legal ....
This is segregation of the sexes. Not even the present court can call it
59. Faubus Urges Board to Segregate Two Schools, WASH. POST, Jul. 29, 1959, at B8;
Segregation Effort Seen at Little Rock, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1959, at B7.
60. Louisiana: Governor Calls Special Session of Legislature, SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS, Nov.
1960, at 1, 14. Superintendent James F. Redmond, under fire for attempting to cooperate with Judge
Wright's desegregation order, hoped that the sex segregation policy would "tone down public
reaction." Id. Redmond emphasized that the sex separation would apply in all school activities, "on the
playground as well as in the classroom," and predicted that "eventually, most of [the] public school
system would be operating on a noncoeducational basis." Mixed Classes' Separation by Sex
Scheduled, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 13, 1960, at 1; see also In Mixed Classes: NO.
Schools Plan Separation by Sex, NEW PITTSBURGH COURIER, Oct. 22, 1960, at 9.
61. Legislator Proposes Law to Authorize Segregation by Sex, SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS, Mar.
1964, at 11.
62. For more on the struggle over school desegregation in Mississippi, see BOLTON, supra note
29.
63. For more, see infra Parts II and Ill.
64. United Press International, Desperation Move, CHI. DEFENDER, Mar. 18, 1961, at 2 (quoting
Alabama state legislator Alonzo Shumate).
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unconstitutional."65  Similarly, Senator Bingham harkened back to
nineteenth-century traditions of sex segregation in his letter to Governor
Byrnes, asserting confidently: "No one could claim that was
unconstitutional."66 When federal Judge J. Skelly Wright invalidated
dozens of anti-desegregation measures passed by the Louisiana legislature
in 1960, no one suggested that the segregation of students by sex should
fall under his constitutional ax.67 Krock perceived that Brown's "badge of
inferiority" argument might extend to sex segregation, noting that, "The
Supreme Court conceivably might outlaw [sex separation] on its 1954
reasoning that (since its motive would be obvious) this arrangement also
would 'generate a feeling of inferiority [among Negroes] ...in many
ways unlikely ever to be undone."' 68 But Krock's acknowledgement that
sex separation might violate equal protection guarantees was highly
unusual.
If recognition that sex segregation might pose a constitutional race
discrimination problem was rare, the notion that it could constitute sex
discrimination seemed even more far-fetched. To be sure, single-sex
institutions were not immune from constitutional challenge in the 1950s.
Some women's rights advocates saw parallels between the exclusion of
women and the exclusion of African Americans from institutions of higher
education. The African American attorney Pauli Murray, who had made
just such an argument in her unsuccessful bid to attend Harvard Law
School in 1944, saw a 1958 suit seeking to overturn the bar on admitting
women to Texas Agricultural and Mechanical (A & M) University as an
opportunity to renew women's legal quest for equal educational
opportunity. 69 ACLU attorney Rowland Watts viewed the Texas case as a
chance "to build up a 'sociological' record-insofar as time and our
research facilities permit--comparable to that done in the racial
segregation cases. '  John Barron, who argued the Texas A & M
challenge before the state's highest court, hoped that the women's lawsuit
65. Mitchell Rawson, Letter to the Editor, Segregation by Sexes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1954, at
33.
66. Pupil Separation By Sex Suggested: Ex-Senator Bingham Writes Byrnes This Would Help
Solve Segregation Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1955, at 33 (emphasis added).
67. See text accompanying supra note 36.
68. Krock, supra note 57, at 34 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). See
also Brooks Hays, A Southern Moderate Predicts Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1959, at SM17
(reporting view that a recent Alabama court ruling "opens for the most difficult age group, the high
schoolers, the perfectly valid possibility of segregation by sex").
69. Presentation by Pauli Murray to the President's Commission on the Status of Women (1962)
(transcript on file with Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Pauli Murray
Papers, Box 49, Folder 885). On Murray's attempt to gain admission to Harvard Law School, see
REBELS IN LAW: VOICES IN HISTORY OF BLACK WOMEN LAWYERS (J. Clay Smith, Jr. ed., 1998).
70. Letter from Rowland Watts, Staff Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), to
John M. Barron (attorney for Bristol, et al), June 25, 1959 (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton
University, American Civil Liberties Union [hereinafter "ACLU"] Records, Box 1142, Folder 22).
National Woman's Party officials, some of whom were less than friendly to the cause of racial
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would, on the one hand, evade the "explosive ingredients" of the sensitive
race issue, and on the other, facilitate challenges to sex separation as a tool
of racial desegregation. In a letter to Watts in July 1959, Barron expressed
optimism that "The fact that many-and increasing numbers-of school
boards are using and are going to use segregation by sex to confute the
segregation decisions, should cause the Court to see that this is a serious
and important issue with far-reaching results."71 Publicly, Barron could
not be so candid; he claimed in court to dislike the Brown decision, but
argued that if "separate but equal" was illegal in the context of racial
segregation, it must also be illegal for the sexes.7
But the outcome of the Texas A&M case did not bode well for those
who would challenge sex segregation as "inherently unequal." In Heaton
v. Bristol, Judge W. T. McDonald of the Brazos County District Court, a
Texas A&M graduate himself, found that "as a matter of law separate but
equal facilities are inherently unequal as applied to males and females, and
as a matter of law any attempt at classification of males and females for
educational purposes at the [university] is irrational and immaterial to the
educational objectives sought, and does violence" to both the Texas and
United States Constitutions.73 However, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
overruled McDonald, 74 and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the
women's petition. 75 Equal Rights Amendment proponent Alma Lutz cited
the Bristol decision as evidence of the need for constitutional change.
"[S]egregation by sex," she argued, "is as much out of line in a democracy
as segregation by color, race, or religion., 76 The Texas A&M case, of
course, concerned the outright exclusion of women, rather than the
separation of the sexes, so the Supreme Court's denial of the women's
appeal clearly signaled that even the pre-Brown precedents requiring the
71. Letter from John M. Barron, District Attorney, Brazos County, Bryan, Texas, to Rowland
Watts, Staff Attorney, ACLU, July 14, 1959 (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University, ACLU
Records, MC #001, Box 1142, Folder 22). Barron also hoped that, as in the racial segregation cases,
"A case at college or university level should be stronger than one at grade-school level, and the 'ice'
should be broken more easily." Id.
72. Bicknell Eubanks, Texas Aggie Ramparts Dented, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 29, 1958,
at 14.
73. Quoted in Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86, 91 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
74. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals noted that Texas A&M was the only public institution of
higher education in the state that did not admit women:
[Wie must view the system as a whole in order to ascertain whether there is discrimination
between the sexes, the entire system must be viewed, and not a single institution standing alone.
This record shows that the system does not discriminate but makes ample and substantially
equal provision for the education of both sexes.
Id. at 99.
75. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86, appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 230 (1959), petition for
rehearing denied, 359 U.S. 999 (1959). Justice Douglas dissented from the denial of the petition for
rehearing. Id. at 999.
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admission of African Americans to all-white graduate and professional
schools were inapplicable to women.77
It would be another decade before any substantial legal challenges to sex
segregation in school desegregation plans arose. Most likely, this delay
reflected the paucity of actual desegregation in the first decade after
Brown, as well as the civil rights movement's desire to focus on
persuading the reluctant executive and judicial branches to enforce
Brown's mandate in the face of legislative and popular resistance. If sex
segregation was what it took to accomplish even token integration,
perhaps few advocates of desegregation were inclined to oppose the tactic.
Sex segregation may have seemed relatively innocuous when the
alternatives on the table included school closing and white brutality.
Prominent African American leaders like Atlanta University President
Rufus Clement, the only black member of the Atlanta school board,
apparently concluded that sex segregation was, at best, a useful tool, and
at worst, a necessary evil. Clement told the Washington Post in 1959 that
African Americans should accept segregation by sex if, as the newspaper
put it, "such programs allay fears and do not bar entry to schools because
of race."78 The following year, Clement declared himself "not at all ...
opposed to separate high schools for boys and girls if it will ease the
situation and permit us to keep our [public] schools."'7 9
The political and constitutional climate also supported reticence on the
subject of sex and its relationship to school desegregation. Given the
strong and oft-noted association of integrated schools with
"amalgamation," and the almost universal public opposition to interracial
marriage in 1950s America, 80 the Supreme Court assiduously sidestepped
77. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding that the state of Texas could not provide
substantially equal legal education to African American students at a separate, segregated law school,
and that the University of Texas law school must admit Heman Sweatt); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (holding that admitting an African American student to a University of
Oklahoma graduate program but requiring him to sit apart from white students in classrooms, libraries,
and other school facilities violated equal protection).
The Dallas Morning News editorialized in 1959 that the only way to rationalize the courts' refusal
to mandate the admission of women to Texas A&M on the grounds that the state provided adequate
coeducational alternatives, was to permit states to provide racially integrated and segregated
educational options. "If the court is consistent, which has never been proved, this decision is important
to states that desire educational segregation at the will of the educated," the editors wrote. Editorial, If
the Court is Consistent, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 8, 1959 (Mudd Library, Princeton University,
ACLU Records, MC #001, Box 1142, Folder 22).
78. Robert E. Baker, Biracial School Plan Offered, WASH. POST, May 10, 1959, at D19.
79. Georgia: Propose Separate Schools, supra note 58, at 10. Clement, the first-ever African
American member of the Atlanta school board, had won election in 1953. African Americans in Little
Rock apparently expressed similar views in a 1959 survey, conducted by Little Rock's Inter-Racial
Emergency Committee, which included a question regarding sex separation as a compromise means of
achieving racial integration. The Tri-State Defender reported that "the rank-and-file Negro in the city
was willing to compromise on the means to achieve integration in the city," and that "Negro teachers
were said to have favored all of the [compromise] provisions by slight to overwhelming margins."
Little Rock 'Mob Leader' Issues Report, TRI-STATE DEFENDER (Memphis, Tenn.), Feb. 28, 1959, at 1.
80. A 1958 Gallup poll found that only one percent of white Southerners and five percent of non-
Southern whites approved of marriages between blacks and whites. ROMANO, supra note 27, at 45.
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any ruling on the constitutionality of laws restricting interracial intimacy
until a decade after Brown. The Justices engaged in procedural gymnastics
to avoid reaching the merits in Naim v. Naim, a challenge to Virginia's
anti-miscegenation law that reached the Court in 1955. 8 1 As Michael
Klarman explains, "To strike down antimiscegenation laws so soon after
Brown risked appearing to validate [the] suspicions" of those who
"charged that the real goal of the NAACP's school desegregation
campaign was 'to open the bedroom doors of our white women to the
Negro men' and 'to mongrelize the white race."' 82 It was not until 1964
that the Court struck down a law prohibiting interracial cohabitation, in
McLaughlin v. Florida,83 and only in 1967 did laws prohibiting interracial
marriage meet their demise in Loving v. Virginia.84 Until the mid-1960s, it
was far from clear that government action restricting interracial sexual
relationships fell into the category of race discrimination prohibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In sum, before the late 1960s, virtually no one perceived sex segregation
as a problem of sex discrimination, and few even raised objections on race
discrimination grounds. Very little actual school desegregation occurred in
the decade after Brown, and advocates of integration apparently felt that
sex segregation was a small price to pay for the incremental gains they
were able to make in a smattering of Southern school districts. Objecting
to sex segregation also could play into the hands of segregationists who
insisted that "mongrelization" was the object and inevitable result of
school desegregation. Nor did a legal vocabulary exist with which to
describe sex segregation as sex discrimination. Those who dared to
challenge single-sex public education did so in the context of post-
secondary institutions that did not provide any alternative to female
students, and they were unsuccessful. As the next Part describes, however,
when racial desegregation fimally gained momentum at the end of the
1960s, litigants and judges began to characterize sex segregation as, at
least in some cases, a form of race discrimination.
II. "RACIAL SEGREGATION BY SUBTERFUGE":
SEX SEGREGATION As RACE DISCRIMINATION
Despite the enormous political and cultural changes that occurred
between May 1954 and May 1968, very little effective racial
81. Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80 (1955), vacated and remanded, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), reinstated
and aff'd, 197 Va. 734 (1956), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
82. Klarman, supra note 38, at 321. See also Dailey, supra note 27, at 159 ("Everyone connected
with the school cases that became known collectively as Brown v. Board of Education understood how
vital it was that they not be linked with sex."). For a description of internal Court deliberations on
Naim, see Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme
Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 62-67 (1979).
83. 379U.S. 184(1964).
84. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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desegregation took place between Brown and the Supreme Court's ruling
in Green v. New Kent County School Board.85 When confronted with the
reality of integration in 1969-70, a number of Southern school districts
turned to sex segregation. Judges often embraced or tolerated these
proposals as a means of easing the transition to racial integration. For
many African American communities, however, sex segregation added
insult to injury, and their protests prompted courts to scrutinize the
motivations behind sex segregation more closely. The Fifth Circuit's
standard, which required judges to determine whether sex separation was
motivated by "racial discrimination" or by legitimate "educational
purposes," marked a shift in Jane Crow discourse. This inquiry prompted
many school districts to invent race-neutral explanations for sex
segregation, including sex differences in curricular, vocational, and
athletic interests; the benefits of single-sex education to boys; the
economic advantages of avoiding the "needless duplication" of facilities;
and the prevention of "disciplinary" and "sex problems." Still, though race
discrimination had become a primary concern, no one attacked sex
segregation as sex discrimination.
A. "Educational Decisions Are For the School Board Alone ": Revitalizing
the Sex Separation Solution
Only token desegregation had occurred in formerly all-white schools
under "freedom-of-choice" plans, and hardly any white children attended
historically black schools in 1968. The Supreme Court's decision in Green
was the epitaph for this particular incarnation of foot-dragging. Green
imposed upon school boards "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps
might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch,"86 In the decision's
wake, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals instituted expedited procedures
for school desegregation cases that resulted in a flood of court orders:
between December 1969 and October 1970, the court handed down no
fewer than 166 opinions involving 89 different school districts.
87
85. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
86. Id. at 437-38.
87. FRANK T. READ & LUCY S. McGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGRATION
OF THE DEEP SOUTH 469 (1978). Ironically, this sudden acceleration of desegregation was driven in
part by the impending trend toward conservatism in the executive branch. Concerned that the Nixon
White House's commitment to school desegregation would not match their own, officials in the
Departments of Justice and Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) made sure to file Green-inspired
desegregation suits throughout the South before Johnson left office.
Although Nixon appointed a HEW secretary with a strong record on civil rights, Robert Finch,
Southern conservatives led by South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond besieged Finch's department
and the Department of Justice almost immediately. As historians Frank T. Read and Lucy S. McGough
recount, the ultimate result of their battle was an unprecedented split between the Justice Department
and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, which had for many years counted federal government lawyers
as crucial allies. Under tremendous pressure, Finch had issued a directive interpreted across the South
as a reprieve for recalcitrant school districts, countenancing delays that the Supreme Court would
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Meanwhile, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)
initiated a new policy whereby staffers from the Office of Education
would assist school districts in developing desegregation plans, on the
theory that local consultation would make for more expeditious and
mutually satisfactory results. As it turned out, many school districts
showed little interest in seeking the advice of HEW's education experts.
Often, HEW's recommendations were met with school board
counterproposals characterized by varying levels of evasion,
circumvention, and delay. Sometimes, those counterproposals included
sex segregation schemes.
Just as they had before court-ordered desegregation's expanded
mandate, post-Green sex separation plans took a variety of forms. Some
school boards proposed sex segregation as a temporary measure designed
to ease white parents into the frightening world of integration; others
viewed sex segregation as a permanent solution to the evils of interracial
contact. In some schemes, classrooms were segregated by sex. More
commonly, at least in the cases challenged in court, entire school
campuses would be designated all-male or all-female. In many of the
school districts that desegregated by race and segregated by sex prior to
1968, such as Jefferson and St. Bernard Parishes in Louisiana, a majority
of the student population was white. After 1968, sex segregation appealed
particularly to school boards in districts where black students constituted a
majority, or close to it, or where African Americans were concentrated in
a particular geographic area.8" In Concordia Parish, Louisiana, for
instance, where the total population of school-age children was
approximately fifty-five percent white and forty-five percent black, a
higher concentration of African American students lived in one particular
area of the district. Citing the "exceptional" nature of the predominantly
black schools in that area, District Court Judge Ben Dawkins, Jr. approved
a multi-step desegregation plan. In the first stage, a cohort of African
explicitly prohibit in the Mississippi case Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, in
October 1969. See READ & McGOUGH, supra, at 485-88.
88. On the differences between majority-white and majority-black school districts, see BOLTON,
supra note 29, at 131; and Charles C. Bolton, The Last Stand of Massive Resistance: Mississippi
Public School Integration, 1970, 61 J. OF MISS. HIST. 329, 341 (1999) ("Fewer whites fled from public
schools in white-majority districts, not only because white fears of integrated schools were not as
pronounced in places where they had numerical superiority, but also because whites in these areas
generally had fewer resources to support a private system of education."). As Michael Klarman
explains, "Ardent segregationists tended to come from rural areas with large black populations or from
working-class urban neighborhoods without rigid residential segregation." Klarman, supra note 38, at
21, 24; see also John A. Kirk, Massive Resistance and Minimum Compliance: The Origins of the 1957
Little Rock School Crisis and the Failure of School Desegregation in the South, in MASSIVE
RESISTANCE, supra note 27, at 76, 77 ("Different parts of the South offered different levels of
resistance to school desegregation, and that resistance often developed more quickly and determinedly
in places that had larger black populations, where whites felt more threatened by racial change.").
Adam Fairclough argues, however, that in Louisiana, "Support for massive resistance did not always
increase in proportion to the black population." Adam Fairclough, A Political Coup d'Etat?: How the
Enemies of Earl Long Overwhelmed Racial Moderation in Louisiana, in MASSIVE RESISTANCE, supra
note 27, at 56, 57.
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American students would be transferred to formerly all-white schools, or
schools in which some token desegregation had already occurred; then, in
the second stage, white students would begin to integrate formerly all-
black schools. It was in this second pivotal phase that sex separation
would occur, in grades seven and above.89 In Taylor and Baker Counties,
Georgia, African Americans constituted just under and just over fifty
percent, respectively, of the population. These small, rural communities
had just one secondary school for each race; in those districts boys would
attend the formerly black school, and girls would use the formerly white
campus.90 Similarly, in Amite County, Mississippi, where African
Americans constituted approximately sixty percent of the district's seven
thousand students and where schools were few in number, white students
would have to attend all-black schools immediately if desegregation was
to be practicable. Coincident with racial desegregation, two of the
district's secondary schools would become all-male, and two all-female.9
District court judges responded to sex segregation proposals in a variety
of ways in the early and sometimes chaotic months of large-scale
desegregation. Some, like Judge Dawkins, approved the separation of
boys and girls with little commentary, either deferring wordlessly to the
school district's assessment of necessity or mentioning sex segregation
matter-of-factly as an unexceptional element of the desegregation plan.92
Others dismissed plaintiffs' objections to the sex separation, deferring to
the local school boards' judgment that such an arrangement was desirable.
89. Opinion and Order, Smith v. Concordia Parish Sch. Bd. No. 11577 (W.D. La. Aug. 1, 1969)
(NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 4235, 28342-28349). One year later,
however, Judge Dawkins rejected Concordia Parish's sex separation scheme. See 2 RACE REL. L.
SURV. 174 (Jan. 1971). Other Louisiana districts maintained sex segregated schools well into the
1970s. St. James Parish, Louisiana, for example, retained the sex segregation scheme instituted in
1969 until the 1974-75 school year. See Order, Banks v. St. James Parish Sch. Bd., No. 16173-C (E.D.
La. June 10, 1969) (describing sex segregation plan), and Order, Banks v. St. James Parish Sch. Bd.,
No. 16173 (E.D. La. June 25, 1974) (describing plan for reinstating coeducation) (NARA, S.W. Reg.
Div., RG 21, U.S. Dist. Ct. Eastern Dist. La.-New Orleans Civil Cases, Deseg. Cases). For an in-
depth discussion of one long-term Louisiana sex segregation plan, see infra Part IlI.B.
90. Stanford Maxwell Brown, Equalization, Freedom of Choice, and Sex Segregation: School
Desegregation in Taylor and Baker Counties (1994) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Georgia)
(on file with the Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript Library, University of Georgia).
91. Logistics sometimes overcame school boards' desires to institute sex segregation; for
instance, Little Rock rejected a sex separation proposal in part because the district contained an odd
number of high schools.
92. Judge Dawkins did not discuss the merits of sex segregation specifically in his initial
Concordia Parish order. Tacitly approving the delay and the sex segregation aspects of the school
district's plan, the judge rejected HEW's proposal for Concordia Parish as "unworkable and
impractical. If adopted," Dawkins declared, "there is grave danger that it would create an all Negro, or
substantially all Negro, public school system and thwart the objectives enumerated in the
desegregation cases." Opinion and Order at 3, Smith, No. 11577 (W.D. La. Aug. 1, 1969).
Judge Dawkins had never been a full-throated supporter of desegregation. According to Liva Baker,
he admitted in one court hearing that his preferred legal regime was "Plessy v. Ferguson, separate but
equal." BAKER, supra note 14, at 263. Adam Fairclough notes, however, that while he applauded
desegregation delays because he worried about white flight, Judge Dawkins was not an extreme
segregationist. FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 23, at 311, 442. Indeed, Dawkins eventually rejected
Concordia Parish's sex segregation scheme. See infra note 136.
[Vol. 18:187
22
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol18/iss2/2
2006] Mayeri
For instance, in a pair of 1969 Louisiana cases, Judge Alvin Rubin upheld
several sex-segregated school assignments over plaintiffs' complaints that
the plans were motivated by racial hostility.93 Noting that many school
districts throughout the country had long maintained separate schools for
boys and girls despite the pervasiveness of coeducation, Judge Rubin
emphasized that "educational decisions are for the school board alone." 94
Since the school board was "convinced that in this transitional period
separate education based on sex would provide the atmosphere most
conducive for learning in these schools," separation was "not a denial of
equal protection of the law." 95 District Court Judge William Keady,
considering a sex separation plan in Carroll County, Mississippi, remarked
that "the philosophy of teaching young people on a basis of separation by
sex is respectable and has behind it a certain wisdom of the ages," noting
also that no federal court had found the practice objectionable.96 To jurists
with varying levels of enthusiasm for racial desegregation, then, sex
separation seemed a useful desegregation technique and offended no
constitutional principle.
B. "Some Feeling of Inferiority and a Vivid Imagination ": The
Racial Motivation Standard
Under increasing pressure from African American communities and,
sometimes, the federal government, courts soon began to shift the burden
of proof in sex segregation cases to school districts. At least in theory, the
93. "Plaintiffs contend that this proposal is racially motivated, and point out that separate
education on the basis of sex was not considered until the schools were ordered to desegregate."
Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 304 F. Supp. 244, 249 (E.D. La. 1969).
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id.; see also 1 RACE REL. L. SURV. 163-64 (Nov. 1969) (describing Judge Rubin's order that
St. Tammany Parish implement a "plan for total desegregation" and noting that "[a]pproval was given
to segregating six of the schools by sex, this being a 'transitory measure designed to ease the
conversion to a unitary school system'); I RACE REL. L. SURV. 205-06 (Jan. 1970) (describing Judge
Rubin's finding that the Tangipahoa Parish schools were "still largely segregated," and his conviction
that "the law no longer allows deliberate speed in desegregation," but noting that "assignment of
students to different schools on the basis of sex, during a transitional period, was regarded [by Judge
Rubin] as a legitimate educational experiment not denying equal protection of the law to any
student.").
Judge Rubin, a Johnson appointee whom President Carter would later elevate to the Fifth Circuit,
earned a reputation as an eminently fair and compassionate judge sympathetic to the rights of African
Americans and women. In 1973, he ruled in Healy v. Edwards that Louisiana's system of exempting
women from jury service violated the equal protection clause by depriving women of equal citizenship
status. The Supreme Court later agreed. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who argued the Healy case, later paid
tribute to Judge Rubin as a paragon of good judging. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Judge Robert A.
Ainsworth, Jr. Memorial Lecture: Four Louisiana Giants in the Law, 48 Loy. L. REV. 253 (2002).
96. United States v. Carroll County, No. 6541K (N.D. Miss. 1969), quoted in Order, United
States v. Lincoln County. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 1400 and 1420 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 27, 1970) (Library of
Congress, Records of the NAACP, V:2819, Folder: Schools, Georgia, Legal Cases, 1970-1978). See
also I RACE REL. L. SuRv. 112 (Sept. 1969) ("On May 19 Judge Keady ordered the Carroll County
school board to implement a two-year desegregation program, which will.., separate the students on
the basis of sex in all grades."); United States v. Richmond County Sch. Bd. (E.D. Va. June 10, 1970),
discussed in 2 RACE REL. L. SURV. 90 (Sept. 1970) (noting that sex separation was a practice long
followed in other areas).
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Fifth Circuit required school boards to show that sex segregation was not
merely a new instrument of racial discrimination and humiliation, but
rather a product of legitimate educational purposes.97 Initially, many
school districts responded by arguing that sex separation had its roots not
in discriminatory animus but in well-intentioned pragmatism designed to
ease the transition to racially integrated education and prevent white
abandonment of the public schools. Ultimately, though, the racial
motivation standard encouraged local school officials to emphasize the
purported educational benefits of sex separation rather than focusing on its
racial context.
By the end of 1969, the Fifth Circuit had established a vague but
uniform standard for addressing sex segregation schemes proposed and
implemented by school districts in their racial desegregation plans. In
December, a panel of that court declared racially discriminatory intent to
be the determining factor, calling on trial courts to distinguish between
plans motivated by "racial discrimination" and those based on
"educational purposes,"98 a standard the circuit reaffirmed in 1972.99
Defending sex separation plans against charges of racial motivation could
be a tricky business for school districts where white attitudes toward
desegregation ran the gamut from profound reluctance to violent
intransigence. But the tremendous attitudinal and logistical difficulties
associated with desegregation put a premium on proposals that promised a
racially unitary system, regardless of the plans' other characteristics. For
many courts, achieving this objective outweighed any countervailing
concerns about sex separation: judges frequently "pretermitted" the
question of sex separation pending the establishment of a racially unitary
system,100 and sometimes the federal government supported such
97. The Fifth Circuit was the only circuit to establish, in a published opinion, a uniform standard
for addressing sex separation schemes; however, such plans did appear in other circuits, where judges
sometimes inquired into their purpose and effect. On the Fourth Circuit's treatment of sex separation
plans, see, for example, 2 RACE REL. L. SURVEY 50 (July 1970) (noting rejection by federal district
Judge James R. Martin, Jr. of a Barnwell, South Carolina school district plan to separate students by
sex on the ground that "defendants had not met their burden of proving that the plan was free from
racial purpose or effect"); and United States v. Richmond County Sch. Bd. (E.D. Va. June 10, 1970),
discussed in 2 RACE REL. L. SURv. 90 (Sept. 1970) (ruling that evidence did not show illegitimate
racial motive in sex separation case).
98. United States v. Amite County, No. 28030 (5th Cir. Dec. 19, 1969) ("[lI]s racial
discrimination the motivation for the plan or does it have its basis in educational purposes?").
99. United States v. Georgia, 466 F.2d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that school boards had
"a duty where sex separation is maintained in the school system to provide proof that the plan was
devised and is to be promulgated for educational purposes only; therefore, the Board must show that
the plan was implemented for educational rather than racially discriminatory purposes."). The court
was overruling a three-judge district court, which had previously ruled that "the doctrine of equal
protection applies to racial content or effect, and not to the motives or purposes behind the acts of the
state." United States v. Georgia, No. 71-2563 (N.D. Ga. July 16, 1971), quoted in 2 RACE REL. L.
SURV. 133 (Nov. 1971).
100. See, e.g., Motion for New Plan of Pupil Assignment, United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd.
and Amite County Sch. Dist., Nos. 28030 & 28042 (5th Cir. Oct. 25, 1973) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div.,
RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 4167, 28030 & 28042, Sept. 1972-1973); Williams v. Iberville
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postponements.' 0 ' Some courts implicitly placed the burden of proving
racial hostility on those who objected to a school district's sex separation
scheme. For instance, in approving six Georgia plans that involved some
sex segregation, a federal judicial panel focused on the lack of evidence
that separate schools for boys and girls produced "any educationally
unsound consequences or inequities resulting in racial discrimination."' 1 2
Especially in the early months of court-ordered desegregation, school
districts often relied on judges' sympathy for expedient measures designed
to effectuate a smooth transition and avoid a white exodus from the public
schools. Attorneys for Jane Crow school districts frequently insisted that
the alternative was not coeducational biracial schools, but rather an all-
black public school system, which, they alleged, the HEW proposals were
certain to produce. Representing the Concordia Parish, Louisiana School
Board, W.C. Falkenheiner urged a Fifth Circuit panel to
ask itself whether it is realistic to adopt a plan which would
adversely affect the education of all children, both black and white,
and whether it is realistic to adopt a plan which, in the opinion of
those best in a position to know, has real prospects of converting the
public school system to a substantially all black system. 3
Other sex segregation proponents had more apocalyptic visions,
foreseeing the widespread abolition of public education if boys and girls
of different races attended school together. Wilkinson County,
Mississippi's school superintendent, Bernard Waites, signed an affidavit
asserting that he had "absolutely no doubt that if the plans as formulated
by HEW are put into effect, such plans will result in the abolishment of
the Public Educational System in the County and create a state of chaos
inasmuch as the County pupil ratio is approximately 22% White and 78%
Negro students."'0 4 Similarly, the school board in neighboring Amite
Parish Sch. Bd., No. 28571 (5th Cir. Dec. 13, 1969) (per curiam) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., RG 276,
Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 4290, 28569-28571).
101. See, e.g., Brief for the United States, Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., No.
2842 (5th Cir. [1969]) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 3775,
26285(pt.)-26290). ("We believe that, in the present state of the record this Court may wish to defer
consideration of the issue until racial segregation has been eliminated in Concordia Parish.").
102. Order, Georgia, No. 71-2563 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 1970), quoted in Brown, supra note 90, at
106 n.l.
103. Brief of Appellees at 4-5, Smith v. Concordia Parish Sch. Bd., No. 28342 (5th Cir. Nov. 13,
1969) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 4235, 28342-28349).
104. Exhibit "A" (Affidavit of Bernard Waites) (Aug. 14, 1969), appended to Objections to
H.E.W. Plans, United States v. Wilkinson County Bd. of Educ., No. 1160 (S.D. Miss.) (NARA, S.W.
Reg. Div., RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 4163, Nov. 1969(pt.)-March 1970). Lawyers for the
Wilkinson County, Mississippi school district also warned of a "mass exodus" of white teachers from
county schools if immediate desegregation were pursued. Objections to H.E.W. Plans, supra, at 2; see
also 2 RACE REL. L. SURV. 137 (Nov. 1970) (noting that "after the [desegregation] plan was put into
effect all of the white students and all but 6 of the white teachers withdrew from the public school
system," and that the school board petitioned the district court for permission to close the high school
and send remaining students to the school serving grades 1-9).
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County declared in a motion before the Fifth Circuit, "[S]eparation of the
sexes is absolutely necessary if Defendants-Appellees are to maintain a
public education system within their school district.""1 5
These dire predictions reflected the continued vehemence of white
resistance to integrated schools, even though the abolition of public
education remained highly unlikely.' 0 6 Across the Deep South, "seg
academies"--private schools serving white students-had appeared in the
1950s and proliferated in the wake of court-ordered desegregation at the
close of the 1960s. 10 7 In Mississippi, state superintendent of schools
Garvis Johnson appealed to white citizens to "help us preserve our public
education," but his pleas placed hardly a dent in the "mass matriculation"
of white children at private schools in 1969-70.108 In early 1970, a
Mississippi state legislator could credibly, if crudely, declare, "What
we're going to wind up with eventually is private schools for the white
kids and a state-subsidized system for the niggers."109 White business and
community leaders fretted that without affordable, segregated private
schools, poorer white parents would keep their children at home or worse,
resort to violence.110 Some wondered aloud whether public education had
any future in Mississippi, given the recent repeal of the compulsory school
105. Motion of Defendants-Appellees to Amend Desegregation Order, United States v. Amite
County Sch. Dist., Nos. 28030 & 28042 (5th Cir. Nov. 10, 1969) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., RG 276,
Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 4163, Nov. 1969 (pt.)-March 1970).
106. While most white Southerners supported segregation, a majority preferred token integration
to school closings, even in the late 1950s. See Klarman, supra note 38, at 29. Of course, school
closings were not unheard of: Prince Edward County, Virginia had closed its public schools when
faced with court-ordered desegregation in 1959, leaving most African American children in the county
without formal education for more than four years. J. HARVIE WILKINSON I1, FROM BROWN TO
BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 98-99 (1979). Most white
students were able to attend private schools founded to maintain educational segregation. Id. But
massive resistance met its demise in large part because Southerners were not willing to sacrifice public
education at the altar of de jure segregation. See Klarman, supra note 38, at 29. However, historian
Charles Bolton has called Mississippi whites' reaction to desegregation in the 1970s "the last stand of
massive resistance." See Bolton, supra note 88, at 329.
107. Between 1966 and 1970, the number of private schools in Mississippi climbed from 121 to
236, and the number of students attending private schools increased threefold. Much of the exodus
occurred in black-majority districts. Bolton, supra note 88, at 341.
108. James T. Wooten, U.S. Forms Panelfor Mississippi: Agents to Help Transition to Integrated
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1970, at 21. Rallies attended by thousands of white parents featured die-
hard segregationists like former gubernatorial candidate and country-music singer Jimmy Swann, who
campaigned for "private" segregated schools financed with state monies. Id. While Governor John
Bell Williams counseled white Mississippians against violent resistance to desegregation, he supported
the state legislature's attempts to provide parents with private school vouchers, or, alternatively, to
allow tax deductions for private school expenses. He also supported continued compensation for
teachers who refused to comply with desegregation. Id. Charles Bolton argues that while Governor
Williams supported the use of public funds for private schools, he "clearly saw private schools as a
temporary solution. Along with most state political and business leaders, he recognized that
abandoning the public schools permanently would damage the state's continuing effort to attract
industry to the state." Bolton, supra note 88, at 340.
109. James T. Wooten, Exodus Seen as Threat to the System on Eve of Integration Move, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 1970, at 1.
110. Id. "These are the folks I'm worried about," one white teacher from Canton told the New
York Times. "They have no alternative except no school or integrated school-and they're just the
ones who might start trouble." Id.
26
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attendance law"' and the massive withdrawal of funding from public
schools in some districts. 1
2
As in Brown's immediate wake, the true purpose of sex separation in the
post-Green era was hardly in doubt. School officials, parents, and students
in Jane Crow districts more or less freely admitted to reporters that the
specter of "amalgamation" and its effect on white support for public
education drove the demand for sex segregation. The Wall Street Journal
reported in 1970 that "when pressed," school officials "explain[ed] their
real motive [for sex separation]: To keep black boys from white girls: the
fear of interracial dating has long haunted even moderate Southerners."" 
3
In Taylor County, Georgia, "just about everyone concede[d] that the plan
was really a palliative for white parents worried about [the] interracial
dating and marriage that they saw coming from integration," the Christian
Science Monitor noted in 1972.114
What was different about these new sex segregation schemes was that
they were now susceptible to legal challenge. School boards had to deny
in court that their sex segregation schemes were racially motivated, even
as they acknowledged privately the plans' true impetus. The State of
Georgia accomplished this feat of verbal gymnastics simply by insisting
that there was no evidence of racial motivation behind the separation
plans." 5 Refuting the plaintiffs' contention that, in the School Board's
words, its plan was "suspect simply because of the times and
Ill. Id.
112. Roy Reed, Full Integration Worries and Angers Mississippi, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1969, at
I. In Louisiana, Governor John J. McKeithen fomented such speculation by suggesting publicly that
the state legislature would henceforth refuse to appropriate funds to the school system. Id. McKeithen
also predicted that integration would "bring civil disobedience by tens of thousands of our citizens."
Roy Reed, Pupil Integration Spurting in South, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1969, at I.
During litigation, school districts regularly argued that their own plans constituted the only means
of preventing complete white withdrawal from the public schools. See, e.g., I RACE REL. L. SuRv. 65
(July 1969) ("Once again, the threat of wholesale withdrawal from the public schools in which
Negroes heavily predominate was declared [by the Fifth Circuit] not to be a justification for sustaining
constitutionally unacceptable desegregation plans .. "); id. at 70 (noting an Arkansas school board's
contention that "no feasible alternative to freedom of choice exists . . . because if any kind of
compulsory integration plan were to be implemented, most of the white students would be withdrawn
from the public schools to avoid attending schools in which Negroes are in the majority"); I RACE
REL. L. SURV. 113 (Sept. 1969) (describing similar arguments in a Tennessee case); I RACE REL. L.
SURV. 156 (Nov. 1969) (describing similar argument in a Virginia case).
113. Tom Herman, Evasive Action: Schools in Deep South Slow Integration Tide with Subtler
Tactics, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1970, at 1.
114. John Dillin, To Integrate, Set Boys, Girls Apart?, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Apr. 8, 1972, at
1. Indeed, segregationist publications like The Citizen kept up the drumbeat against "race mixing" well
into the 1970s. Private school teacher Bob Weems opined in 1972 that historically, the "emotional
question,"
Would you want your daughter to marry a Negro? . . . has been the most effective single
argument against the social intermingling of the races .... [lI]n spite of attempted satire by
integrationists it is still the best weapon in our arsenal, for it goes straight to the heart of the race
problem.
Bob Weems, Interracial Marriage, Etc., THE CITIZEN, Feb. 1972, at 4.
115. Brief of the State of Georgia, et al., United States v. Georgia, Nos. 71-2563 and 12972 (5th
Cir. Sept. 16, 1971) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 6148, 71:2563-
71:2569) (asserting a lack of racial motivation except perhaps for Taylor County plan).
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circumstances under which it was adopted," school officials in Concordia
Parish, Louisiana contended that their ability to implement sex segregation
prior to racial desegregation mandates had been constrained by court-
ordered freedom-of-choice plans and by the lack of adequate facilities." 
6
Sex segregation proponents also questioned the racial motivation
standard itself. At first they did so indirectly, arguing that regardless of
intent, sex separation could not be discriminatory since it applied equally
to both races. "If any parent or student, white or Negro, has some feeling
of inferiority and such a vivid imagination," attorneys for the Concordia
Parish officials wrote, "the School Board should not be held accountable
for it.""'  School boards mustered additional ammunition against the
requirement that they prove the absence of racial motivation from the
Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Palmer v. Thompson."8 A closely
divided Court had ruled in Palmer that the decision of Jackson,
Mississippi to close its municipal pool rather than allow racially integrated
swimming did not violate the equal protection clause. According to the
attorney general of Georgia, Palmer thereby "laid to rest the erroneous
notion that 'motivation' is a proper subject of judicial inquiry."'' 19
Georgia's attorneys went one step further and attacked the racial
motivation standard head on: "Even . . . assuming further that the
separation by sex was 'racially motivated,' the proper response is so what!
Most everything in public education is racially motivated today. This is
what the federal courts require" by pushing districts to desegregate, the
state's brief declared. 2° "Is it not reasonable to assume that local school
officials, faced with massive racial integration, desiring that it work, and
116. Brief of Appellees at 6, Smith v. Concordia Parish School Board, No. 28342 (5th Cir. Nov.
13, 1969) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 4235, 28342-28349).
Furthermore, the board's brief argued, if racial motivation were at the root of the sex separation
scheme, the district would have separated all boys and girls in the parish, not just those in two
particular geographic areas. Id. at 7. The brief neglected to mention what District Court Judge
Dawkins had emphasized in his decision approving the plan-namely, that these areas were the only
ones in the parish where black students outnumbered whites by a substantial margin. Plaintiffs'
attorney Norman Chachkin wrote to Judge Charles Clark in December 1969 that the appeal in another
pair of Louisiana cases "presents the serious issue of the constitutionality of imposing sex separation
only upon that part of a Parish wherein Negro students outnumber white students." Letter from
Norman Chachkin, Attorney for Appellants, to Hon. Charles Clark, U.S. Circuit Judge, Dec. 9, 1969,
Re: No. 28573--Charles v. Ascension Parish School Bd., No. 28571-Williams v. lberville Parish
School Bd. (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 4291, 28572-28576).
117. Brief of Appellees at 8, Smith, No. 28342 (5th Cir. Nov. 13, 1969).
118. 403 U.S. 217(1971).
119. Brief of the State of Georgia, et al., at 16, Georgia, Nos. 71-2563 and 12972 (5th Cir. Sept.
14, 1971) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 6148, 71:2563-71:2569).
Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Palmer included a fairly lengthy disquisition on the "pitfalls"
of judicial inquiry into legislative motivation, beginning with the declaration that "no case in this
Court has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of
the men who voted for it." Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224.
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that meaningful public education be maintained, seize upon the device of
separation by sex as a means of reducing disciplinary problems?"'21
Opponents of sex separation scoffed at the school districts' attempts to
deny invidious racial motivations. Plaintiffs in Concordia Parish,
Louisiana pointed out that the school superintendent himself had testified
before the trial court that "'the coeducational system in effect in
Concordia was educationally sound as long as schools are racially
segregated.' When, however, racial integration becomes inevitable, then
sexual segregation suddenly is 'most educationally sound."" 22  Such
testimony made "plain what must become obvious to black parents and
their children" if the sex separation plan went into effect: "[T]o the school
officials of Concordia, black boys are simply not good enough to be in
schools with white girls, and black girls are simply not good enough to be
in schools with white boys."'2 3 Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs'
attorney, George Strickler, argued, the practice imposed a "badge of
inferiority" similar to that endured under Jim Crow. Plaintiffs also
contended that segregation denied members of the disadvantaged group
the opportunity to "develop relationships with members of the dominant
class."' 24 When implemented solely to avoid the dreaded specter of
interracial sexual contact, plaintiffs in Concordia Parish declared, sex
separation did nothing more than "perpetuate racial segregation by
subterfuge."'25 It was not enough, insisted lawyers for African American
families in Georgia, "that assignments based upon sex do not produce
unsound education or inequities resulting in racial discrimination."' 2 6




122. Brief of Appellants at 9, Smith, No. 28342 (5th Cir. Oct. 1, 1969) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div.,
RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 4235, 28342-28349).
123. Id. at 10. It remains unclear to what extent concerns about relationships between white boys
and black girls, as opposed to between black boys and white girls, underlay sex segregation. Given the
history of white men's and boys' sexual exploitation of black women and girls, African American
parents might have supported sex segregation as a means of reducing white access to their daughters,
but I have not found any sources indicating that this concern outweighed their indignation at the racial
insult of sex segregation. For more on the legal status of interracial intimacy between white men and
black women, see Adrienne Davis, Loving Against the Law: The History and Jurisprudence of
Interracial Sex (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). Whites' opposition to interracial
dating and marriage did not always specify the composition of the couples that concerned them,
although when it did, black male/white female dyads always dominated anti-miscegenation rhetoric.
For a historical perspective, see MARTHA HODES, WHITE WOMEN/BLACK MEN: ILLICIT SEX IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH (1997).
124. Brief of Appellants at 12, Smith, No. 28342 (5th Cir. Oct. 1, 1969).
125. Id. at 9.
126. Brief of Private Appellants at 3, Georgia, No. 71-2563 (5th Cir. Sept. 7, 1971) (NARA,
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Using the Supreme Court's 'recent decision in Loving v. Virginia,1 28
plaintiffs and their lawyers also attempted to debunk the school districts'
argument that sex separation could not be racially discriminatory since it
affected both races equally. Quoting Loving, attorney Strickler noted that
"'the fact of equal application does not immunize the statute from the very
heavy burden of justification' required of race-related statutes.1 29
Strickler suggested that "the same rule should apply to facially non-racial
classifications which are nonetheless racially motivated."' 3 ° In one of
several interventions by the federal government in sex segregation
controversies, the United States similarly used Loving to rebut Georgia's
contention that "equal application" immunized sex separation from
constitutional challenge.131 "[T]he subtle implications of sex separation as
a required factor of racial desegregation are not lost on black children,"
government lawyers concluded.'32
However compelling these legal arguments may have been, it was the
testimony of African American citizens themselves that apparently
convinced several courts to see sex separation as racially discriminatory.
After Alexander A. Lawrence, Jr., a federal district court judge in
Augusta, Georgia, held a hearing in early 1970 to evaluate a sex
separation plan, he declared, "[I]t is difficult for me to conclude other than
that racial undertones to some degree exist. Separation by sex was never
proposed until complete desegregation was ordered under the plan
proposed by HEW." He had come away from the hearing, he noted, "with
the distinct impression that the Negro population-school and general-
regard the proposal as racially belittling."'33 Tennessee federal district
court Judge Robert M. McRae, Jr. similarly characterized African
Americans' perceptions of another sex separation arrangement:
128. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating Virginia's prohibition on interracial
marriage).
129. Brief of Appellants at 12, Smith, No. 28342 (5th Cir. Oct. 1, 1969) (quoting Loving, 388
U.S. at 9).
130. Id.
131. Brief of the United States at 27-28, Georgia, No. 71-2563 (5th Cir. Sept 3, 1971) (NARA,
S.W. Reg. Div., RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 6148, 71-2563-71-2569). The U.S. brief
refuted the state's reliance on Palmer v. Thompson, distinguishing that case on its facts: in Palmer,
defendants ceased to operate their swimming pools, while in seven Georgia school districts, schools
remained open under a racially-motivated scheme of sex separation. Id. at 28 n.25.
The U.S. also intervened in a proposed sex segregation scheme in Richmond County, Virginia, in
1970, arguing that the plan was "devoid of any . . . educational necessity for segregation by sex,"
which raised an inference that "the plan stems from... racially discriminatory purposes." Segregation
of Pupils By Sex Opposed, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1970, at 15. Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr. allowed the
sex separation plan to go into effect despite the government's objections. See U.S. v. Richmond
County Sch. Bd. (E.D. Va. June 10, 1970), discussed in 2 RACE REL. L. SuRv. 90 (Sept. 1970). For
more on Judge Merhige, see RONALD J. BACIGAL, MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: A BIOGRAPHY OF
JUDGE ROBERT R. MERHIGE, JR. (1992).
132. Brief of the United States at 29, Georgia, No. 71-2563 (5th Cir. Sept 3, 1971).
133. Order, United States v. Lincoln County. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 1400 and 1420 (S.D. Ga. Apr.
27, 1970) (Library of Congress, Records of the NAACP, V:2819, Folder: Schools, Georgia, Legal
Cases, 1970-1978). See also 2 RACE REL. L. SURv. 54 (July 1970) (describing decision).
[Vol. 18:187
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"[W]hether the defendants admit it, or whether that is the purpose of it...
it is inescapable that to the Negro citizens it appears racial." '34 Mississippi
federal judge William C. Keady recalled in his memoir that he "employed
an ingenuous plan of segregating students by sex" in the Coffeeville
school district, but that this "remedy [was] vigorously objected to by
blacks, who organized and maintained a school and merchant boycott of a
thousand students for most of the first semester. Necessarily, such a
protest induced the court to eliminate assignment by sex!"' 35 And even the
skeptical Judge Dawkins eventually became convinced that sex separation
in Concordia Parish represented "merely a sham or device to avoid mixing
members of the opposite sex and opposite race."' 36 In these cases, African
Americans' vocal opposition to Jane Crow apparently persuaded judges to
invalidate sex separation schemes.
C. "Each of Us Is Aware of These Great Differences ": The Educational
Purposes Defense
Because the racial motivation standard had the potential to ensnare
school officials who candidly announced the reasons behind their sudden
renunciation of coeducation, school districts increasingly turned to the
other prong of the Fifth Circuit's standard-the "educational purposes"
defense. Despite the overwhelming predominance of coeducational
pedagogy in American public schools, sex separation still enjoyed an aura
of respectability and even refinement as a venerable tradition that evoked
nostalgia for an earlier, less complicated era of gender relations. Many
elite private and public institutions historically had separated students by
sex, augmenting the practice's stature. Sex-segregating school districts
drew on these positive associations, as well as sociological assessments of
single-sex education's benefits, to defend their plans as motivated by valid
educational purposes. Significantly, while it placed a premium on racially
134. McFerren v. Fayette County Bd. of Educ., No. C-65-136 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 10, 1969),
quoted in Order, Lincoln County, Nos. 1400 and 1420, at 3 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 27, 1970); see also 1 RACE
REL. L. SuRv. 256 (Feb. 1970) (noting Judge McRae's rejection of proposal to segregate high school
students by sex).
135. WILLIAM C. KEADY, ALL RISE: MEMOIRS OF A MiSSiSSIPpI FEDERAL JUDGE 106 (1988); see
also 2 RACE REL. L. SuRv. 18 (May 1970) (describing details of the Coffeeville sex separation plan,
approved in March 1970, which included grades 1-12); 2 RACE REL. L. SuRv. 175-76 (Jan. 1971)
(noting that the Coffeeville sex separation plan "was found by the same court to be unacceptable for
further use" in October 1970, and that the court "ordered that a bi-racial advisory committee be
created, made up of five Negro members to be selected by the plaintiffs in the present litigation, and
five white members to be selected by the defendant school board"); Boycott Fails as North Carolina
City Begins Busing Program, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 10, 1970, at 8 (describing arrest of one hundred
African American marchers protesting sex segregation in Coffeeville). Judge Keady, who took his seat
on the bench in 1968, remarked twenty years later, "Had I known the Green decision was just around
the comer, my eagerness for the federal bench would have been considerably diminished." KEADY,
supra, at 104.
136. See 2 RACE REL. L. SuRV. 174 (Jan. 1971) (citing Judge Dawkins' August 1970 order
rejecting Concordia Parish's sex separation plan).
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neutral rationales, the educational purposes defense initially remained
untouched by any qualms about discrimination based on sex.
Southern school districts relied on four primary justifications for their
sex separation plans: the accommodation of sex differences in learning
styles and curricular interests; the enhancement of male leadership and
reduction of competition from females; the financial benefits of avoiding
the "needless duplication" of sex-specific resources and facilities; and the
minimization of distractions and discipline problems caused by adolescent
cross-sex contact. Many if not most of the pedagogical theories on which
school districts relied in the late 1960s and early 1970s unabashedly
flouted emerging anti-sex-discrimination norms, underscoring that these
norms had yet to penetrate the debate over Jane Crow.
For many of Jane Crow's defenders, sex differences between males and
females were so self-evident that they hardly required explanation. "[O]ur
school system overlooks one of the ageless and most fundamental
complications of teaching-the fact that boys are different from girls.
Each of us is aware of these great differences and there is no valid reason
to enumerate them at this time," wrote St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana
school official Joseph Davies in 1969.137 Accepting the justifications of
the Carroll County, Mississippi school district, district court Judge
William Keady affirmed that "According to good authority, opponents of
coeducation ... have argued that girl's nature is so different from that of
boy's that a different kind of education is required, especially from the age
of 12." '' 38 The school board of Iberville Parish, Louisiana contended,
"There are differences in boys and girls, differences in maturation rates, in
vulnerability to stress, in learning styles .... It does make a significant
difference whether the person we are teaching is a boy pupil or a girl pupil
and instruction provisions should be made accordingly."1 39 Sex separation,
in this view, was a natural, healthy response to real differences.
Significantly, most of the benefits sex segregation proponents cited
accrued to boys. Sex separation assuaged the concerns of educators who
believed that boys suffered severe disadvantages vis-d-vis girls in primary
and secondary schools. Boys, according to "A Case for the Separation of
the Sexes in Schools," relied upon by several Louisiana school boards,
"have more trouble with reading and speech and account for 90% of the
discipline problems." 14' Rather than attributing these differences to the
"traditional" assumption that boys mature more slowly than girls, the
experts cited by the school boards "have wondered if the real reason was
137. Joseph J. Davies, Jr., A Case for the Separation of the Sexes in Schools, THE BOARDMAN,
Jan. 1969, at 4, 5.
138. United States v. Carroll County, No. 6541K (N.D. Miss. 1969), quoted in Order, Lincoln
County, Nos. 1400 and 1420 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 27, 1970).
139. A Case for the Separation of the Sexes in Schools, in Appendix, Brief of Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 114, Williams v. lberville Parish Scb. Bd, No. 28571 (5th Cir. [date unavailable])
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that boys entering school are forced to conform to feminine standards of
behavior."'41  Sure enough, experiments in single-sex education
demonstrated that, in the absence of girls, boys "showed more excitement
and real interest in school," "were found to speak more freely taught by a
man than in a class with girls taught by a woman," and were "more
thoughtful and considerate of each other."' 42 Other studies showed that
"boys in separate classes have made better progress in language arts and
math than boys in control [co-ed] classes. Group morale developed as the
boys bec[a]me aware of their common interests and problems and began
to accept themselves and one another."' 43 Similarly, one of the only judges
to make concrete factual findings regarding educational outcomes in sex-
segregated schools found that "the achievement level of the male students
had shown substantial improvement with no lessening in the level of the
female students' improvement," and identified "measurably improved
leadership qualities on the part of the male students," but no similar
enhancement of female leadership.' 44
In fact, sex segregation proponents cited female leadership as a
drawback of coeducational schools. These educators were not hostile to
female assertiveness in a single-sex context; in fact, they speculated that
girls would benefit from "an environment which permits them to view
men and boys as colleagues, not competitors."' 45 Rather, school officials
worried about the female "domination of positions of leadership" in
coeducational schools and expressed concern that "[i]n coeducational
schools girls generally are more interested in excelling academically and
boys have a tendency to withdraw when placed in competition with
girls."' 46 Fortunately, according to Superintendent Davies, girls did not
forsake the aesthetic benefits of coeducational schools when they
converted to single-sex status: in St. Bernard Parish, "[g]irls continue to
dress... appropriately although there are no boys to dress up for."' 147 In
Taylor County, Georgia, where sex segregation persisted until the late
1970s, some teachers were less satisfied with their male students' sartorial
and academic showing, reporting that high school boys in all-male
environments "became careless about their appearance" and "apathetic
about their schoolwork," while the girls continued to outperform their
male counterparts academically.'48 Nevertheless, the consensus among
proponents of sex separation was that single-sex schools would assuage
the problem of female domination and academic superiority, by giving
141. Id.
142. Id. at 114, 117.
143. Id. at 116.
144. United States v. Hinds County Seh. Bd., 560 F.2d 619, 621 n.3 (1977) (quoting District
Court Judge Dan M. Russell, Jr.).
145. A Case for the Separation, supra note 139, at 117.
146. Davies, supra note 137, at 6.
147. Id.
148. Dillin, supra note 114, at 10.
2006]
33
Mayeri: The Strange Career of Jane Crow
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
boys an opportunity to excel and participate without feeling browbeaten
by intersexual competition or alienated from the "feminine" environment
of the coeducational classroom. 149
Some school districts also touted the pedagogical and financial benefits
of sex-specific curricular specialization. Most if not all of the Jane Crow
districts maintained different course offerings at the boys' and girls'
schools, especially when it came to vocational studies. For instance, one
Georgia school board explained that under its sex segregation scheme,
"[c]ourses in Homemaking, Business Education, Family Living would be
emphasized for the female students, whereby on the other campus,
Vocational Agriculture, Industrial Arts, Shop programs, Brick Masonry,
Electrical Work and Mechanics would be emphasized in the school
serving the male students."' 5° Further, in their zeal to prove that economic,
and not racial, considerations underlay the decision to segregate by sex,
school officials boasted that separate boys' and girls' campuses obviated
the need for unnecessary duplication of facilities. Describing St. Bernard
Parish's initial foray into sex separation, Superintendent Davies admitted
that school officials "felt that certain problems which might arise in newly
integrated schools would be lessened if the sexes were separated," but
claimed that economic frugality was the predominant consideration in
converting from coeducational to single-sex schools.'5 ' Increasing
enrollment, Davies explained, had created the need for two additional
secondary schools in the parish. Of the two existing high schools, only one
had a high-quality athletic facility; if the schools were to remain
coeducational, two brand-new, top-flight athletic facilities would be
necessary, and the district would have to upgrade the second high school's
sub-par accommodations. A brilliant solution struck parish officials:
separate the sexes! "Instead of spending money for four first rate athletic
149. These ideas also had currency outside the courts during the 1960s. Roanoke and Fairfax
Counties in Virginia experimented with sex segregated classrooms in the early 1960s, for the express
purpose of improving boys' academic performance. See Segregating Pupils By Sex Is Termed Virginia
Success, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1963, at B4. Washington Post columnist Dorothy Rich wrote in 1966
of a growing movement toward experimentation with single-sex learning environments in order to
ameliorate achievement gaps between boys and girls. She cited benefits to boys including fewer
discipline problems, greater interest in learning, "tremendous spirit," and curricular tailoring,
including a greater emphasis on "science and transportation study that often doesn't interest girls." She
opined that "[i]f grouping the boys together will help them combat the overwhelming 'momism' of the
early school years (almost all elementary school teachers are women), then it is all for the good."
Dorothy Rich, Separating the Boys and Girls, WASH. POST, May 15, 1966, at F26. In 1968, Professor
Patricia Caye Sexton of New York University published a study concluding that the "feminine"
environment of elementary schools had deleterious effects on boys, particularly "lower class" boys,
who she said tended to be "more masculine" than middle-class males. Professor Sexton recommended
that "schools become more masculine with more technological and independent work-study programs
and more male teachers-real he-men types." Dorothy Rich, Schools Versus Boys, WASH. POST, Feb.
18, 1968, at G16.
150. Order, United States v. Lincoln County. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 1400 and 1420 (S.D. Ga. Apr.
27, 1970) (Library of Congress, Records of the NAACP, V:2819, Folder: Schools, Georgia, Legal
Cases, 1970-1978).
151. Davies, supra note 137, at 6.
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plants," Davies related triumphantly, "only two were necessary if the
sexes were separated and on the basis of the cost of these, the Board saved
a million and half dollars by eliminating needless duplication of athletic
plants."' 15
2
Finally, school districts argued that coeducation distracted boys and girls
from their studies during the turbulent, sexualized adolescent years, and
that single-sex schools would mitigate resulting discipline problems. "A
Case for the Separation of the Sexes," for instance, cited studies showing
that "the lack of distractions from the opposite sex" resulted in "better
work habits" for both boys and girls and "fewer discipline problems."' 53
Wrote Davies, "It is generally agreed that the ages of twelve to fifteen are
the worst years for boys and girls to be educated together. .. '[P]utting
girls and boys together in the same school is not necessarily the normal,
healthy thing to do."" 54 When the Jefferson Parish, Louisiana school
board proposed reinstating coeducation in the parish's high schools in
1973 after more than a decade of sex segregation, supporters of
maintaining single-sex campuses often cited unspecified "disciplinary
problems" as among the "innumerable difficulties" coeducation would
produce.'55 One newspaper account alluded to a school board meeting
discussion where "references [were] made to young men as animals who
would destroy" the girls' schools.'56
The arguments for single-sex schools that highlighted sexual distractions
and discipline problems dovetailed nicely with underlying fears about
interracial sexual contact and social intimacy, without referring directly to
race. The equation of racial integration with sexual and social disorder had
long been a prominent theme in segregationist ideology, and as
desegregation proceeded, its opponents seized every opportunity to
trumpet the vindication of their worst fears. The mid- 1 950s saw an uproar
over "disciplinary and sex problems" in the newly desegregated District of
Columbia schools, as congressional hearings featured testimony
concerning the alleged "manhandling" of girls in the hallways, a spike in
pregnancies and venereal disease, a general increase in physical
altercations, and the distribution of pornography among students. 5 7 A
congressional report blamed integration for these ills, and recommended
152. Id. at 5.
153. A Case for the Separation, supra note 139, at 117.
154. Davies, supra note 137, at 4-5 (quoting James S. Coleman of Johns Hopkins University).
155. Mrs. Edward Groner & Mrs. E.J. LaCombe, Metairie Women's Club, Letter to the Editor,
Against Jeff Coeducation, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 14, 1973, §2, at 2; see also Emile
LaFourcade, Jr., Harahan Board Opposes Sex Integration in Schools, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, §1, at 9 (noting the observations of an alderman and former school bus-driver that "a
school busload of girls or of boys is much easier to control than when boys and girls are on the same
bus").
156. Fred Barry, Jeff to Vote on Coed Issue, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 18, 1973.
157. Integration Setbacks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1956, at 186; Sex Problems Bob Up in Wake of
Integration, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 20, 1956, at C3; Teachers Tell Integration's Sex Problems, CHI.
DAILY TRiB., Sept. 27, 1956, at A2.
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restoring racial segregation to prevent white flight from the nation's
capital.158 Whites' exodus to the suburbs continued, but the District began
a "pioneer program of sex education" in several elementary schools in
1959, citing the need to curb unwed motherhood. 159
By the late 1960s, concerns about desegregation combined with anxiety
over the sexual revolution that many conservatives believed was
corrupting the nation's youth and undermining traditional morality. 60
Resistance to sex education and busing often became twin causes for
parents suspicious of education policies that ceded control of school
assignment and curricula to what many saw as a dangerous liberal plot to
impose the counterculture on innocent children. Advocates sometimes
connected their campaign against sex education with their opposition to
busing, identifying both as reactions to what one Virginia mother called "a
whole new morality ... sensitivity training and social planners with their
philosophy.' 16 1  Racial fears did not necessarily underpin parents'
reactions, and indeed some African American parents may have shared
these concerns about sex education. White supremacists, however, made
the link between integration and sex education explicit: in a 1969 editorial,
The Citizen asserted that white parents' real concern was not just about
inappropriate curricula, or even about sex education as a Communist
conspiracy, as the John Birch Society charged.162 Rather, the problem was
that "sex education was taking place in integrated classes!" "Integration
plus sex education equals miscegenation," the editors warned. 163 Anxieties
about integration mixed with apprehension about growing sexual
158. Eve Edstrom, Davis Unit Report Hits Fast School Integration, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1956,
at A1; Willard Edwards, Resegregation of Washington Schools Urged, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 29,
1956, at 3; Bess Furman, Four in House Urge Capital Segregation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1956, at 1.
But see Richard L. Lyons & Eve Edstrom, Integration Called Miracle of Social Adjustment Here,
WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1957, at B7 (describing Anti-Defamation League report that applauded the
transition to racially integrated schooling in Washington, D.C.).
159. Roger Greene, Unwed Mothers- What Can We Do?, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 9, 1959, at E6.
160. See Neil Ulman, A Delicate Subject: Sex Education Courses Are Suddenly Assailed by Many
Parent Groups, WALL ST. J., Apr. H1, 1969, at l.
161. In 1970, the Virginia House of Delegates considered anti-busing and sex education bills
simultaneously. See Busing, Sex Bills Gain in Virginia, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1970, at Cl. See also
Bart Bames, Prince George's Busing Foes Change Tactics, WASH. POST, June 10, 1973, at B 1.
162. On the John Birch Society's involvement in the anti-sex education campaign, see Ulman,
supra note 160, at I.
163. Editorial, I + SE = M, THE CITIZEN, June 1969, at 2. See also Medford Evans, Sex
Education in Integrated Schools, THE CITIZEN, June 1969, at 12. By the early 1970s, white
supremacists had taken their argument one step further: if only interracial marriage were the worst
outcome imaginable, lamented Robert Kuttner. But Kuttner's forays into Harlem convinced him that
white Southerners' apprehension was desperately naive. In fact, "the average ghetto Black had [no]
intentions as respectable as marriage" for the young white middle-class women he allegedly seduced
into prostitution to finance his drug habit. Robert E. Kuttner, Northern Light on the Southern Scene,
THE CITIZEN, Nov. 1972, at 26. Indeed, Kuttner warned, the daughters of white liberal upper middle-
class families were the most vulnerable to what he called "remote-control integration": teaching
children that integration was good without exposing them to its horrors could be the downfall of well-
meaning white girls. Id. at 25-26.
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permissiveness and parents' perceived loss of control over their children's
education. 164
Theories of adolescent sexual distraction provided a race-neutral
language with which to express the concerns that had animated sex
separation in the first place. Indeed, the Louisiana school districts that
made "A Case for the Separation of the Sexes" had, just a few years
earlier, been racial battlegrounds. The New Orleans suburb of St. Bernard
Parish, for instance, had long been controlled by the fanatical and
autocratic politician Leander Perez. Perez, with the help of Superintendent
Davies and others, had conspired to create an all-white public school
"annex" in St. Bernard for white children assigned to the two New Orleans
schools where violent mobs accosted black six-year-olds attempting to
integrate in 1960.165 Notwithstanding his later enthusiasm for economy in
the construction of school facilities, Davies apparently had been less
concerned about thrift in 1961, when he announced that the parish,
"already operating its schools in the red, would find a means of paying the
certified teachers" employed to teach the white refugees from New
Orleans in a converted automobile plant in Arabi.166 Then again, he had
had ample financial assistance in setting up the annex-from the state of
Louisiana, which supplied free textbooks and lunches and later
appropriated $300,000 to assist the school board; from volunteers who
constructed classrooms using donated materials; and from a network of
private buses leased by a parents' cooperative.167 Other Jane Crow districts
in Louisiana had also experienced racial turbulence in the 1960s. Iberville
Parish, just south of Baton Rouge, had been the site of racial unrest in
1963, and the target of a lawsuit by black parents and the NAACP
demanding immediate racial desegregation. 168 Federal district court judge
E. Gordon West had ordered the Iberville Parish schools to desegregate in
1964, despite his professed agreement with school board attorneys that
court-ordered desegregation did more harm than good, and that white
164. For a fascinating sociological study of the larger debate over sex education in schools,
irrespective of its racial implications, see KRISTIN LUKER, WHEN SEX GOES TO SCHOOL: WARRING
VIEWS ON SEX-AND SEX EDUCATION-SINCE THE SIXTIES (2006).
165. On the peculiar politics of St. Bernard Parish, see Fairclough, supra note 88, at 57.
166. Louisiana: Court Refuses Return to School Segregation, SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS, Jan.
1961, at 1, 10. The converted factory housed a makeshift school for first- through third-graders, while
fourth- through sixth-graders from New Orleans attended the regular, segregated public schools of St.
Bernard Parish. In February 1961, New Orleans superintendent James F. Redmond estimated that of
the 1,019 white students who previously attended the two schools at which desegregation had been
attempted, only forty-nine remained in New Orleans public schools, and at least six hundred were
attending school in St. Bernard Parish. Where Have Withdrawn Pupils Gone?, SOUTHERN SCHOOL
NEWS, Feb. 1961, at 6.
167. Louisiana: Court Refuses Return, supra note 166, at 10; Louisiana: Court Postpones
Hearing on Complete Desegregation, SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS, June 1961, at 9.
168. Southern School News described the unrest as follows: "Negro students of Plaquemines's
Iberville High School staged a boisterous book-throwing melee Oct. 4, sparking a series of events that
included closing of the school, a systemwide boycott of Negro schools and several street
demonstrations that were dispersed by tear gas." New Orleans Negroes Petition Board for More
Desegregation, SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS, Nov. 1963, at 9.
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children were likely to suffer psychological damage from attending
integrated schools.169
Skeptics could thus be forgiven their doubts that the "educational
purposes" cited by school boards were the genuine rationales motivating
sex segregation. By the end of the decade, critics enjoyed some success in
convincing judges that sex separation schemes were motivated by racial
discrimination. At the same time, however, none of them suggested that
separate schools for boys and girls posed any problem of sex
discrimination. School districts could cite sex segregation's educational
benefits to boys and trumpet the virtues of sex-specific curricular
specialization with impunity. As Part III shows, the women's rights
revolution would change all that.
III. "SEPARATE CAN NEVER BE EQUAL": THE RISE OF THE SEX
DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT AGAINST JANE CROW
The educational justifications for sex separation enumerated by school
districts in the late 1960s and early 1970s reveal a gaping sex
discrimination lacuna in the Jane Crow discourse. Indeed, all parties to
Jane Crow litigation during this period assumed that sex separation did
not, in the absence of racially discriminatory motivation, pose a
constitutional question. Thus the Concordia Parish School Board could
argue unabashedly that because the "advantages and disadvantages
attendant upon a separation by sex plan are all related to sex and not to
race," there was no constitutional issue to be resolved.17° Similarly,
Georgia's brief in United States v. Georgia declared:
Separation by sex may well help in making racial integration work in
some school systems. In any event, decisions on such matters
obviously do not on their face directly and sharply implicate any
basic constitutional values and hence should be left to the affected
169. lberville Parish Schools Ordered to be Desegregated, SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS, Aug.
1964, at 4 ("Judge West agreed with school board attorneys that more harm than good has been done
the public school system through desegregation rulings, but he said, 'Be that as it may, the court has to
follow the law and will follow the law.' Defense counsel, in responding to the petition, had held that
psychological damage would be done to white children placed in desegregated schools. West said he
personally felt there was merit in this defense but higher courts had ruled otherwise."). Judge West
was not much more enthusiastic by 1969. See I RACE REL. L. SuRv. 109 (Sept. 1969) ("Though
acknowledging his duty to carry out the mandate of the court of appeals, [Judge West] expressed his
opinion that the mandate 'is both ill-advised and legally wrong."'); I RACE REL. L. SuRv. 164-65
(Nov. 1969) ("To require attempts to bring about complete desegregation by September, 1969, would,
in [Judge West's] opinion, 'cause nothing but complete disruption of the entire system."').
170. See Brief of Appellees at 8, Smith v. Concordia Parish Sch. Bd., No. 28342 (5th Cir. Nov.
11, 1969) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 4235, 28342-28349)
(emphasis added). Notably, C.J. Duckworth, executive director of the all-black Mississippi Teachers
Association, apparently did not believe that African American parents had legal recourse against sex
segregation. "As long as black boys and white boys are in class together, I don't think they have a
legitimate complaint," he remarked in reference to a 1970s boycott against sex segregation in
Coffeeville, Mississippi. "I'm sorry [the students are boycotting] because it's simply a boy versus girl
thing." Quoted in Boycott Sex Bias, CHICAGO DAILY DEFENDER, Sept. 3, 1970, at 12.
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local school boards ....
The school boards were not the only parties operating under this
assumption. When Fifth Circuit judges Griffin Bell, Homer Thornberry,
and Lewis Morgan held a question-and-answer session for school
desegregation attorneys in November 1969, Judge Bell made clear that the
court's primary concern about plans that called for sex separation was
whether the boys' and girls' schools would each have a racial balance
proportional to the school population.'72 Federal District Judge William
Keady of Mississippi opined that "the concept [of sex separation]
embraces a philosophy that has not been held contrary to the United States
Constitution and must, therefore, be approved."' 73 The Concordia Parish
board could therefore assert with confidence a "complete absence of any
legal authority for an attack on separation of the sexes."' 7 4 School districts
had merely to assert a legitimate "educational purpose" for segregating
boys and girls and hope that their fervent disavowals or tacit admissions of
racial motivation would win over the courts--or at least not draw
unwanted judicial attention.
Just a few short years transformed the legal landscape. By 1974,
feminist efforts in the legislative arena and in the courtroom had produced
powerful statutory and constitutional weapons against sex discrimination.
By 1977, when advocates sought to root out the last vestiges of sex
segregation in the South, a sex discrimination paradigm based largely on
an analogy to race had come to dominate an anti-segregation campaign
that, before 1970, had been utterly silent on the subject of sex-based
inequality.
171. Brief of the State of Georgia, et al., at 18, United States v. Georgia, Nos. 71-2563 & 12972
(5th Cir. Sept. 16, 1971) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 6148,
71:2563-71:2569) (emphasis added).
172. Proceedings at 79-80, United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd, Nos. 28030 & 28042 (5th Cir.
Nov. 6, 1969) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 4163, Nov. 1969 (pt.)-
March 1970). In fact, the Fifth Circuit panel ordered the Wilkinson County, Mississippi, school district
to implement the HEW proposal after the board failed to make a showing regarding the racial
composition of the proposed girls' schools. Order, United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd. and United
States v. Wilkinson County Sch. Dist., Nos. 28030 & 28042 (5th Cir. Dec. 22, 1969) (NARA, S.W.
Reg. Div., RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 4163, Nov. 1969 (pt.)-March 1970). Around this
time, one newspaper report quoted Judge Bell as responding to a civil rights attorney's claim that sex
segregation was racially insulting with the comment, "You're trying to get the last ounce of flesh out
of these people, aren't you?" Peter Milius, Desegregation Case Appears Dim to Counsel, WASH.
POST, Nov. 19, 1969, at A2.
173. United States v. Carroll County, No. 6541K (N.D. Miss. 1969), quoted in Order, United
States v. Lincoln County. Sch. Bd., Nos. 1400 and 1420, at 3 (Apr. 27, 1970) (Library of Congress,
Records of the NAACP, V:2819, Folder: Schools: Georgia, Legal Cases, 1970-1978).
174. Brief of Appellees at 6, Smith v. Concordia Parish Sch. Bd., No. 28342 (5th Cir. Nov. 13,
1969) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., RG 276, Fifth Circuit. Case Files, Box 4235, 28342-28349).
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A. "Sex Separation as Sex Discrimination ": The Revolution in Sex
Equality Law
Advocates of women's rights had little success in mounting legal
challenges to sex-segregated education in the fifteen years after Brown. As
we saw in Part I.B., feminists' 1950s attempts to apply race precedents
like Sweatt, McLaurin, and Brown to end the exclusion of women from
public universities were unsuccessful. Feminists achieved two significant
breakthroughs in 1969, revitalizing the race-sex analogy as a rhetorical
and constitutional weapon. 17 5  Alice de Rivera, a thirteen-year-old
Brooklyn girl, sued for admission to the prestigious Stuyvesant High
School in New York City, arguing that "[s]ex, as race, is a form of
segregation that is not tolerated by the 1 4 th amendment," '17 6 and that
maintaining all-male elite public schools made girls "second-class
citizens." '77 When a ruling in DeRivera's favor appeared likely, the Board
of Education-headed by John Doar, former Assistant Attorney General
for Civil Rights-voted to admit her to Stuyvesant. "78 Several months
later, a federal district court gave tentative approval to a coeducation plan
for the formerly all-male undergraduate division of the University of
Virginia. Like the DeRivera case, Kirstein v. Board of Rectors of the
University of Virginia relied heavily on an analogy between sex and race
segregation. The court's initial ruling reflected this close relationship: as
Judge Robert Merhige wrote, "If racial segregation in State supported
institutions is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the
Constitution, as indeed it is, then the allegations ... [are] indeed a patent
denial of due process and equal treatment required by law.-1 79 A three-
judge district court went on to declare in 1970 that the exclusion of
women from the college violated equal protection, though the court
175. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, coeducation increasingly began to supplant single-sex
schooling in elite colleges and secondary schools. For instance, coeducation began at Yale and
Princeton in 1969, at Brown in 1971, and at Dartmouth in 1972. Harvard and Radcliffe Colleges
effectively merged in 1972. New York's Stuyvesant High School first admitted girls in 1969; Boston
Latin in 1972, Phillips Academy (Andover) and Phillips Exeter in 1973.
176. Associated Press, Girl, 13, Wins Entry to All-Male School, EVENING STAR (Washington,
D.C.), May 3, 1969, at A-2 (on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University, Catherine East Papers, MC 477, Box 9, Folder 44) (quoting DeRivera's attorney Eleanor
Jackson Piel).
177. United Press International, Sex Makes Difference in Legal Disputes, FAYETTEVILLE (N.C.)
OBSERVER, Apr. 10, 1969 (Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Catherine
East Papers, MC 477, Box 9, Folder 44). DeRivera's attorneys relied heavily on a race-sex analogy.
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition 4-9, DeRivera v. Fliedner, No. 00938-69 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. June 5, 1969) (Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Catherine East Papers,
MC 477, Box 9, Folder 44).
178. Associated Press, Girl, 13, Wins Entry, supra note 176, at A-2. John Sandifer, the judge
hearing DeRivera's case was African American, and according to one observer, "appreciated the
relationship to the Brown case." Memorandum from Catherine East to Elizabeth Duncan Koontz, May
2, 1969, Re: New Developments in the De Rivera Case (Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute,
Harvard University, Catherine East Papers, MC 477, Box 9, Folder 44).
179. Memorandum, Kirstein v. Univ. of Virginia, No. 220-69-R, Sept. 8, 1969, at 2 (Schlesinger
Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Catherine East Papers, MC 477, Box 10, Folder 7).
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"declined to go further and to hold that Virginia may not operate any
educational institution separated according to the sexes."'1 80 In other
words, sex-segregated education might not, like racial segregation, be
"inherently unequal." Philip Hirschkop, who argued the case for the
Virginia ACLU, wrote to fellow women's rights lawyers, "While we
managed to desegregate the University of Virginia, which is what we set
out to do, I had hoped for more. At any rate, we must accept our
victories."18' Ruth Bader Ginsburg was more upbeat, calling the decision a
"landmark" and a "path-breaker."' 182
Meanwhile, feminists expressed dismay over the renewed enthusiasm
for sex segregation as an accompaniment to racial desegregation, and
encouraged the Justice Department to intervene in the Jane Crow cases.183
Catherine East, technical secretary to the Citizens' Advisory Council on
the Status of Women, offered a typical analysis: "Separate education
based on either sex or race has never been equal and is undoubtedly
inherently unequal."' 184 But although women's rights advocates tried to
enter the debate over sex segregation in racial desegregation plans,185 the
plaintiffs and attorneys who challenged these plans in 1969-70 were not
yet incorporating arguments about sex discrimination into their rhetorical
or legal arsenal. A University of Chicago Law Review student note by
Robert Barnett helped to disseminate such arguments on the eve of a
revolution in constitutional sex equality doctrine.' 86 "The Constitutionality
of Sex Separation in School Desegregation Plans," which circulated
among desegregation lawyers before and after its publication in 1970,
advanced three approaches to challenging sex separation schemes. The
180. Kirstein v. Univ. of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184, 187 (D.C. Va. Feb. 9, 1970). Judge Merhige
did not apply a full-blown race-sex parallel to Jane Crow, either, when he considered a sex segregation
plan in Richmond County the following year. See supra note 131.
181. Letter from Philip J. Hirschkop to Mel Wulf, Re: Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia (Feb. 12, 1970) (on file with Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University, Human Rights for Women Papers, 83-M229, Box 1, Folder: Kirstein).
182. Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Bernice Sandier (Sept. 8, 1970) (on file with the Library
of Congress, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, Container 7, Folder: Rutgers College, New Brunswick, NJ,
Coeducation, 1970).
183. Citizens Advisory Council on the Status of Women, U.S. Department of Labor, Separation
of the Sexes in School Desegregation Plans, May 27, 1969 (Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute,
Harvard University, Catherine East Papers, MC 477, Box 9, Folder 37) (noting decisions upholding
sex segregation in St. James Parish, Louisiana and Carroll County, Mississippi, and urging women's
advocates to write to the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights).
184. Id. East continued: "At best, the girls whose talents lay in science and math would have an
inferior education and boys whose talents lay in verbal areas would likewise be slighted. The best
teachers would go to boys and the best equipment. Sociologically, boys and girls need this opportunity
to establish relationships to each other as human beings. Separation of the sexes in education can only
lead to greater polarization in adult lives." Id.
185. Women's rights advocate Dorothy Kenyon was aware of (and indignant about) sex
segregation proposals in the 1950s. See Letter from Dorothy Kenyon to Rowland Watts, Staff
Attorney, ACLU (Apr. 24, 1959) (Mudd Library, Princeton University, ACLU Records, Box 1142,
Folder 22).
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first concerned "sex separation as racial discrimination," another
addressed "sex separation as limiting freedom of association"-but
Barnett took his analysis a step further and argued for "sex separation as
sex discrimination."
Significantly, Barnett based his sex discrimination argument on "a
parallel to the harms found in race separation," relying on "evidence
pointing to the conclusion that the same psychological detriments, alleged
to harm the segregated black, may also harm the separated female."' 7 In
developing his argument that "[t]he status and problems of the woman in
America present a curious parallel to those of the black,"' 88 Barnett could
cite a growing literature developing an analogy between race and sex
inequality, including works by sociologist Gunnar Myrdal, social
psychologist Helen Mayer Hacker, anthropologist Ashley Montagu, and
lawyers Blanche Crozier, Pauli Murray, and Mary Eastwood18 9 Like
racial segregation, Barnett extrapolated, sex separation would also lead to
material and educational harms, "resulting in an atmosphere which
inadequately prepares one for the realities of social life in a world of two
sexes."' 9 ° Barnett also saw strategic potential in the Jane Crow cases. "It
may be," he suggested, "that sex separation in school desegregation plans.
. presents an ideal situation for a challenge to the validity and viability"
of the Supreme Court's refusal to regard sex classifications as
constitutionally suspect. 191
While the Jane Crow controversy did not play the prominent test case
role Barnett foresaw, his sex discrimination argument nevertheless
anticipated a revolution in sex equality law between 1970 and 1974.192
187. Id. at 315.
188. Barnett continued:
Women, like blacks, are characterized by a high social visibility expressed in physical
appearance, dress, and patterns of behavior setting them apart as a distinct 'class.' Besides a
high degree of visibility, women and blacks also share the dubious distinction of being the
victims of very similar arguments used by the dominant group to justify the inferior position
accorded them, including inferior intelligence, scarcity of geniuses, freedom in instinctual
gratifications, and emotionalism. Both groups were assigned a 'place' in society, whether it be
the field or the home, and were barred from education, suffrage, certain jobs, and political
office. Most significantly, the actions of the dominant groups toward both blacks and women
were thought to be in the best interest of the subordinate groups.
Id. at 312-13.
189. On the race-sex analogy, Barnett cited ASHLEY MONTAGU, MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS
MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE (1948); MYRDAL, supra note 19; Blanche Crozier, Constitutionality of
Discrimination Based on Sex, 15 B.U. L. REV. 723 (1935); Helen Mayer Hacker, Women as a
Minority Group, 30 SOCIAL FORCES 60 (1951); and Murray & Eastwood, supra note 3. I have
discussed the development of legal race-sex analogies in Serena Mayeri, Note, "A Common Fate of
Discrimination ": Race/Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045
(2001).
190. Barnett, Note, supra note 186, at 316.
191. Id.
192. Barnett's note circulated within the women's rights advocacy community after its
publication. See, e.g., Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Barbara Esposito (Mar. 29, 1971) (Library
of Congress, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, Container 7, Folder: Rutgers College, New Brunswick, NJ,
Coeducation, Mar.-Apr. 1971) (citing Barnett note).
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Almost a half-century after it was first proposed, Congress passed the
Equal Rights Amendment and sent it to the states for ratification in 1972.
The same year, the Education Amendments to the Civil Rights Act
mandated equality of educational opportunity for women and girls.'93
Known as Title IX, the provision prohibiting sex discrimination in
education passed with relatively little fanfare, as heated debates over
busing dominated coverage of the bill. Wall Street Journal reporter
Jonathan Spivak presciently predicted, "Overshadowed by the busing fuss
... [the] strict ban against sex discrimination [in education] ... could be a
major source of contention in the future."' 94
Title IX was not the only piece of sex discrimination legislation to slide
through Congress without prolonged public debate. Two years later, a
little-noticed provision of the Equal Educational Opportunity Act (EEOA)
prohibited pupil assignments based on sex as well as race, color, religion,
and national origin.'95 The busing controversy again overshadowed the sex
discrimination issue: press coverage of the EEOA's passage mentioned the
inclusion of sex only in passing, and no legislative history survives to
explain its origins. Two years earlier, though, Dr. Bernice Sandler of the
Women's Equity Action League (WEAL) had voiced the suspicion that
Nixon's proposed anti-busing bill had purposely omitted sex from the
prohibited categories of pupil assignment in order to "permit the operation
of sex segregated schools as a means of maintaining partial racial
segregation-'the segregation of black boys and white girls."" 96 Sandler
also expressed sex discrimination concerns. She told the New York Times
that she "doubt[ed] very much that the girls' schools would have equal
science facilities, physical education programs and vocational
programs."'1 97 The final bill, passed in 1974, was responsive to Sandler's
objection, despite a lack of legislative history confirming the EEOA's
intended applicability to Jane Crow.
In the meantime, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the ACLU Women's Rights
Project convinced four Supreme Court Justices to accept a constitutional
analogy between race and sex discrimination in the 1973 case Frontiero v.
Richardson.'98 Frontiero was, as it turned out, the high-water mark for the
193. 20 U.S.C. §1681 (2005).
194. Jonathan Spivak, New Higher-Education Bill Provides More Funds, but Sex-Bias Section
Could Spark Controversy, WALL ST. J., Jul. 13, 1972, at 36. For more on the stealthy passage and
thorny implementation of Title IX, see JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION
230-62 (2002).
195. See supra note 10.
196. Eileen Shanahan, Nixon Aid Sought on Equal Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1972, at 15.
197. Id.
198. 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) ("[T]hroughout much of the 19th
century the position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks
under the pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or
bring suit in their own names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold
or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children. And although blacks were
guaranteed the right to vote in 1870, women were denied even that right-which is itself 'preservative
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constitutional race-sex analogy, but it confirmed the rapid ascendance of a
theory that the Court had soundly rejected a dozen years earlier.' 99 Sex-
based legal classifications no longer were subject to the lax rational basis
standard of review;200 instead, lower courts argued over how strictly to
scrutinize laws that distinguished between males and females. It was far
from clear what the women's rights revolution would mean for sex-
segregated education, but a new universe of legal theories and precedents
unquestionably was available to sex segregation's foes by the time that
ACLU attorney Jack Peebles filed a complaint on behalf of Kenlee Helwig
and other plaintiffs in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, in 1974.201
B. "Inherently Discriminatory Toward Women ": Helwig v. Jefferson
Parish School Board
Helwig v. Jefferson Parish School Board was the first Jane Crow
lawsuit to place sex discrimination at the center of the case against sex
segregation. Jefferson Parish, a rapidly growing middle-class community
adjacent to New Orleans, had not gained the notoriety of its neighboring
parishes, Orleans and St. Bernard, in the early 1960s struggle against
racial desegregation. Unlike many of the school districts that later turned
to Jane Crow, Jefferson Parish was predominantly white-African
Americans comprised a little over twenty percent of the student
population. Nevertheless, Jefferson could hardly boast a racially
harmonious past. Like St. Bernard, Jefferson Parish had segregated its
high schools by sex in the early 1960s in anticipation of possible racial
desegregation, though none initially occurred.20 2 In 1962, demonstrations
greeted the arrival of black children at Our Lady of Prompt Succor in
Westwego, and enrollment at the private Catholic school plummeted from
a high of almost eight hundred students before desegregation, to about five
hundred after desegregation was announced, and to a low of 118 after
of other basic civil and political rights'-until adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment half a century
later .. ")
199. In Hoyt v. Florida, the Court rejected the notion that exempting women from jury service
degraded their citizenship rights. Justice Harlan wrote: "Despite the enlightened emancipation of
women from the restrictions and protections of bygone years, and their entry into many parts of
community life formerly considered to be reserved for men, woman is still regarded as the center of
home and family life." 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961).
200. The rational basis standard of review required only that laws classifying individuals on the
basis of sex be reasonably related to a legitimate government objective. Until 1971, the Supreme Court
never invalidated a sex-based legal classification under this standard. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971) (finding an Idaho law preferring male estate administrators unconstitutional).
201. The suit was filed on behalf of Kenlee Helwig by her parents, Carl and Jeanne Helwig, and
William Helis by his parents, Kathleen and James Helis. Sex Separation in Schools Hit, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 2, 1974, §1, at 6. Later, Peebles filed another suit on behalf of
Nancy Birgit Anderson and Laura Ellen Tracy, challenging the constitutionality of the Louisiana
statute authorizing sex-segregated school assignments. Suit Attacks Jeff Non-Coed School Setup, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jul. 20, 1976, § 1, at 1.
202. See, e.g., Editorial, Boys and Girls Together, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 1,
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angry protests rocked the community.203 Undeterred, in July 1964, twenty-
five African American students appeared at West Jefferson High School, a
public school, to request enrollment for the coming year.20 4 They were
rebuffed, and shortly thereafter, a suit was filed on behalf of Lena Vern
Dandridge and fifteen other students. In 1965, Dandridge was one of
twenty African American girls to desegregate the all-female and formerly
all-white Riverdale High School under a freedom-of-choice plan.205
Sex segregation in Jefferson Parish high schools did not go uncontested
in the 1960s. In 1966-67, when the school district announced plans to
build two new high schools, the Jefferson Parish Committee for Better
Schools called for the reinstatement of coeducation.20 6 The committee
cited education experts from Loyola, Tulane, and Louisiana State
University, who testified to coeducation's pedagogical superiority.20 7 In
October 1969, several months after Judge Herbert Christenberry approved
a school board plan involving sex separation in grades 9-12,2°s over one
hundred African American students protested sex segregation in a
demonstration at West Jefferson High School.20 9
White school officials, however, remained convinced that racial
desegregation could not proceed without sex segregation. Interviews
conducted by concerned members of the Jefferson Parish chapter of the
National Organization for Women (NOW) in late 1969 reveal that the
superintendent and school board members did not dispute coeducation's
general pedagogical merits, but they believed sex segregation in the
parish's public high schools to be indispensable to white parents'
acceptance of integration. As one of the interviewers wrote,
Superintendent Bertucci "began by stating that he, in general, approved of
mixing the sexes, but .. .[h]e unequivocally feels that separation was
203. Louisiana: Baton Rouge Desegregated Without Trouble, SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS, Sept.
1963, at 12. Local State Rep. John Rau took a prominent stand against the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Louisiana: Opposition to Federal Rights Program Increases in State, SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS, Sept.
1963, at 13.
204. Desegregation Sought in Jefferson Parish, SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS, Aug. 1964, at 4.
205. Brian Thevenot & Matthew Brown, From Resistance to Acceptance, NEW ORLEANS TiMES-
PICAYUNE, May 19, 2004, at 1. See also Dandridge v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., 332 F. Supp. 590,
593 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 1971) (Christenberry, J.).
206. Report, American Friends Service Committee, Almost as Fairly: The First Year of Title IX
Implementation in Six Southern States [hereinafter "AFSC Report"] 94 (1977) (on file with the
author).
207. See Education Committee Report, Re: Coeducation or Sex Segregation in Jefferson Parish
Schools (Nov. 1969) (on file with Newcomb Archives, Newcomb College Center for Research on
Women [hereinafter "NCCRW"], Tulane University, Mindy Milam Papers, Box 1-NAC 284); Letter
from Edward A. Fontaine, President, Louisiana Federation of Teachers, to G.D. Gregson, President,
Jefferson Parish Committee for Better Schools (June 19, 1967) (Newcomb Archives, NCCRW, Tulane
University, Mindy Milam Papers, Box 1-NAC 284).
208. See 1 RACE REL. L. SURv. 110 (Sept. 1969).
209. The only reference I have found to this demonstration is in a 1969 interview with the
Jefferson Parish superintendent of schools. See Joyce Trotter, Interview with Superintendent Bertucci
(conducted by Ellen Russell and Joyce Trotter) (Oct. 13, 1969) (Newcomb Archives, NCCRW, Tulane
University, Mindy Milam Papers, Box 1-NAC 284).
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necessary to accomplish racial integration-that it is still necessary for
that same purpose-and that it will continue to be necessary for a number
of years longer."21 The superintendent was convinced that "white parents
would not accept the integration of races and the mixing of sexes at the
high school level at the same time," ' and warned of a "massive pull-out
of white pupils" similar to white flight from neighboring New Orleans
should coeducation take place. 2 ' Still, he expressed hope that "in ten
years we will look back and wonder what the fuss was all about," and
predicted that "Jefferson Parish will be looked upon as a model of
successful integration."2 3
The superintendent downplayed any detrimental effects of sex
segregation on the quality of education. NOW interviewer Joyce Trotter
sensed his feeling that "the general behavior and morals of the girls
improved," though he "admitted that boys might be influenced
behaviorwise to their betterment by co-education." ' 4 Bertucci sidestepped
questions about the comparability of curricular offerings by insisting that
"the very numbers of students in each school provides insurance that all
necessary courses will be taught in each school."2 5 School board member
Robert Murphy agreed with the superintendent that "[s]eparation was
necessary to effect peaceful integration, and is still necessary," though he
too agreed that coeducation was "both less expensive and superior to a
system which separates boys from girls."2 6
In 1969, NOW interviewers noted Superintendent Bertucci's view that
"[t]he time will be ripe for co-ed[ucation] in Jefferson when sufficient new
schools have been built to ease . . . overcrowding, and when the
emotionalism about desegregation has gone away."21 7 In 1973, it seemed
as if that day had arrived. As overcrowding necessitated the building of
new school facilities, an organization called the "Group for Coeducation"
pushed for the abolition of sex segregation. In response, the school board
considered, and initially accepted, a plan to reinstate coeducation in parish
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Education Committee Report, supra note 207.
213. Trotter, Interview with Superintendent Bertucci, supra note 209.
214. Id. An earlier draft of Trotter's notes described how Bertucci had cited Jefferson Parish's
comparatively low divorce rate as evidence of sex segregation's possible positive impact.
215. Id.
216. Interview with Mr. Robert Murphy, School Board Member (Oct. 23, 1969) (Newcomb
Archives, NCCRW, Tulane University, Mindy Milam Papers, Box I-NAC 284). On the other hand,
at least one member of the board viewed sex segregation as pedagogically beneficial, especially to
boys: Paul Pope considered sex-separated high schools "a distinct advantage," citing "differences in
leaming ability between high school boys and girls," and observing that "children... compete better
against members of their own sex, this being especially true in the case of boys." Education
Committee Report, supra note 207. Further, Pope believed there were "fewer disciplinary problems"
and "greater participation in school activities" in sex-segregated schools. Id.
217. Trotter, Interview with Superintendent Bertucci, supra note 209.
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high schools.218 Outcry over the projected expense caused the board to
reconsider, however. Converting to coeducation would involve, among
other costs, "building separate restrooms and lockers, revamping
curriculum, revising athletic programs and installing home economics
facilities in the currently all-male schools and shop equipment in the all-
female ones. 219 Some community groups opposed coeducation on other
grounds, citing potential "discipline problems., 220 References at one board
meeting to boys as "animals that would destroy the girls' schools"
prompted Mrs. Mauna P. Brooke to chide the board for obscuring what
she saw as the real impetus for maintaining sex segregation. Financial
concerns, she declared, were "nothing more than a smoke screen . . .
[T]hese... people are not so much concerned with how much in the red
the system may be, but how much black is in the system., 221
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, then, conflicts over racial integration
and its social implications lurked not far beneath the surface of discussions
about reinstating coeducation in Jefferson Parish. But prior to 1974, the
possibility that sex segregation might discriminate against girls rarely if
ever penetrated the Jefferson Parish debate. Those who argued in favor of
coeducation did so on the basis of its general pedagogical superiority and
its promotion of "natural" or "healthy" relationships between boys and
girls. Partisans of coeducation did not deny that there were significant, and
even desirable, differences between the sexes. For instance, E.C. Hunter of
Tulane University wrote in a 1963 article frequently cited by proponents
of coeducation that significant sex differences existed, not in "average
intelligence," but in "physiological and social maturation," "interests and
attitudes involving sex consciousness," "in the interests, occupations and
pursuits which become culturally sex differentiated," and in "activities
where strength, energy, and emotional steadiness are involved." He
insisted, however, that "[t]hese differences, large or small, do not justify
218. Ira Harkey III, Change Policies, Jeff Board Told, NEW ORLEANS STATES-ITEM, Feb. 8, 1973
(Newcomb Archives, NCCRW, Tulane University, Mindy Milam Papers, Box 1-NAC 284); Jeff
Parish High Schools Going Coed Once Again, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 15, 1973, §1, at
18.
219. Sex Separation Suit Promised, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 5, 1974, §1, at 20.
220. The Metairie Woman's Club cited the "very few disciplinary problems with the present
system," and expressed the belief that "there would be innumerable difficulties if the high schools
revert to co-education." Mrs. Edward Groner & Mrs. E.J. Lacombe, Letter to the Editor, Against Jeff
Co-Education, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 14, 1973, §2, at 3. The Harahan Board of
Alderman agreed, calling the capital improvements that would be required an "unneeded expense."
Emile LaFourcade, Jr., Harahan Board Opposes Sex Integration in Schools, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Feb. 2, 1973, §1, at 9.
221. Fred Barry, Jefferson Board Tables Coed Vote, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 8,
1973, §1, at 3. Mrs. Brooke said, "I find it ironic that the many who have been deaf and blind for at
least the last five years to the desperate need for monies for both the operation and construction of
schools are suddenly and acutely aware of the lack." Id. A local women's magazine raised similar
questions, noting that despite the passage of a thirty-seven million dollar bond issue for public
education, "the schools remain segregated by sex. It appears that money is not the basic issue." M.G.,
School Segregation Challenged, DISTAFF, Dec. 1974, at 4 (Newcomb Archives, NCCRW, Tulane
University, Mindy Milam Papers, Box 1-NAC 284).
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separate schools for boys and girls," although separate classes for subjects
like science, home economics, shop, and physical education remained
appropriate.222 Hunter also argued that "coeducation . . . is essential to
good heterosexual adjustment." '223 Indeed, coeducation proponents during
this period often cast sex segregation as "unnatural" and "unhealthy."
Louisiana Federation of Teachers President Edward Fontaine, writing in
1967, excoriated the "unnatural and, for mid-twentieth century America,
unprecedented, separation of boys and girls," arguing that "the school
environment should mirror the actual environment boys and girls will
have to adjust to in adult life. 2 24 Ralph Past, chairman of the Group for
Coeducation echoed this sentiment several years later: "Coeducation
would be a great boost to public education and the students. Youth would
be afforded a healthy, natural male-female environment," he told the New
Orleans States-Item in 1973.225
The lawsuit filed in 1974 dramatically shifted the terrain of contestation.
In contrast to the earlier debates and litigation over Jane Crow, Helwig v.
Jefferson Parish School Board cast sex segregation primarily as sex
discrimination, and only secondarily as race discrimination. Implicitly, the
case challenged the efficacy of the racial motivation standard, which asked
whether a sex segregation scheme was motivated by "racial
discrimination" or by legitimate "educational purposes," including
educational benefits to boys, sex-based disparities in curricular interests,
and discipline problems allegedly inherent in coeducation. The Helwig
plaintiffs in effect attacked the very legitimacy of these educational
purposes, a legitimacy assumed by courts that had considered Jane Crow
arrangements in the past. Rather than asserting that sex segregation was
merely "racial segregation by subterfuge," as the Concordia Parish
plaintiffs had argued a few years earlier, the plaintiffs in Helwig
contended that sex segregation was like racial segregation, inflicting harm
on girls comparable to that imposed on black children by Jim Crow.
The plaintiffs in Helwig were a girl and a boy, represented by local
ACLU attorney Jack Peebles, who argued that sex separation harmed
female students and ran afoul of the Supreme Court's new constitutional
sex equality jurisprudence.226 They contended that sex segregation in
222. E.C. Hunter, Coeducation in Public High Schools, LOUISIANA SCHOOLS, May 1963, at 13,
54.
223. Id. at 14. Hunter continued:
[T]hose who make this adjustment succeed better in their relations with the opposite sex in adult
life and in marriage .... It would appear that nearly everyone now has come to accept the idea
that if positive heterosexual attitudes and behavior adjustments are to be promoted, boys and
girls must be encouraged to be together in work and in play with arbitrary restrictions reduced to
a minimum.
Id.
224. Letter from Fontaine to Gregson, supra note 207, at 1.
225. Harkey, supra note 218.
226. The purpose of having a male student among the plaintiffs apparently was to represent the
freedom of association claim. Attorney Peebles had hoped to find a black child to protest the racial
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public high schools was "inherently discriminatory toward women,"
presented sociological and psychological data to support the conclusion
that separation inculcated feelings of inferiority, and enlisted extensive
testimony from Melvin Gruwell, a Tulane University professor, to that
effect. 2 7 Gruwell also asserted that sex separation resulted in material
inequities of opportunity for young women, arguing that curricular and
counseling disparities steered girls in single-sex schools toward certain
fields of study and away from traditionally male careers.228 Indeed,
testimony offered by school superintendent Larry Sisung revealed that
advanced math, science, and Latin courses, as well as shop and other
traditionally male vocational training, were offered to boys but not to
girls.229 In addition to using social science evidence and Brown's
"inherently unequal" language, Peebles relied on the recently decided
Frontiero v. Richardson, in which a plurality of the Court had accepted a
race-sex analogy for purposes of scrutinizing laws that classified
individuals on the basis of sex. 230 According to the plaintiffs, sex
segregation was wrong because it harmed girls, materially and
psychologically, in much the same way that racial segregation injured
African American children.
The Helwig plaintiffs used sex discrimination arguments not only out of
expedience; they conceived of their case as part of a larger struggle for
women's rights. Peebles told a local reporter that the suit stemmed from
research by the ACLU Women's Rights Project. 231 Kathleen Helis, mother
of plaintiff William Helis, served as education chairman of the local
League of Women Voters chapter, which announced its support for
coeducation in May 1974,232 on the ground that "sex segregation in the
schools perpetuates discrimination in job opportunities. ' 233 The Helwigs
and the Helises also invoked Title IX's prohibition on sex discrimination
in education. Shortly after filing suit, they wrote to the Office for Civil
motivations behind Jane Crow, but in the end, both plaintiffs were white. See Barry W. Zander, Jeff
Schools May Be Target of Injunctions, EAST BANK GUIDE (1974) (Newcomb Archives, NCCRW,
Tulane University, Mindy Milam Papers, Box I-NAC 284); Susan Finch, Sex Segregation Target of
JeffSuit, NEW ORLEANS STATES-ITEM, July 28, 1974.
227. Complainant's Memorandum, Helwig v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., quoted in AFSC Report,
supra note 206, at 100.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 99-100. Itemized estimates of the cost of converting to coeducation reveal the material
differences between the boys' and girls' facilities: where girls' schools had food preparation, sewing,
and stenography labs, boys' campuses instead featured industrial arts buildings, chemistry, biology,
and electrical labs, mechanical drafting stations, and athletic equipment. See Letter from Jack A. Grant
to Jack Peebles, Re: Coeducational School System (Sept. 13, 1974) (Newcomb Archives, NCCRW,
Tulane University, Mindy Milam Papers, Box 1-NAC 284).
230. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
231. Zander, supra note 226. It appears that research conducted by one of Ruth Bader Ginsburg's
students at Columbia Law School led the organization to investigate Jefferson Parish as a possible test
case. See id.
232. Barry W. Zander, Board Opts for 'Priority Projects' Rather Than Coeducation in Autumn,
EAST BANK GUIDE, May 8, 1974, § 1, at 4; Finch, supra note 226.
233. Finch, supra note 226.
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Rights (OCR) to request an investigation of Jefferson Parish for possible
Title IX violations in the maintenance of separate schools for male and
female students.234 Regional education chief John A. Bell replied that Title
IX guidelines had not yet issued, and that in the interim, his office could
only intervene where there was clear evidence of educational
disparities.235 Peebles immediately responded, sending Bell the Sisung
interrogatories, whose answers revealed curricular discrepancies between
the boys' and girls' schools. 236
Women's rights advocates received unsatisfying responses from the
government and from parish school officials. It was not until 1976 that a
Title IX coordinator began to monitor Jefferson Parish schools.237 In that
year, a report by Jefferson Parish NOW's Education Task Force
announced the organization's intention to "make the public aware of what
is happening in the schools," through a campaign that included "a
formalized program of slide shows and speakers to appear in schools and
to parent-teacher groups" to "help to raise consciousness levels and help
combat old, out-moded ideas about educational differences between the
sexes." "Girls," the report declared, "must be offered professional training
as well as boys. They must have viable career alternatives presented to
them to allow for emotional and economic independence instead of being
locked into a life of total dependence." '238 In an attempt at Title IX
compliance, the school district officially made all course offerings
available to all students, but girls had to travel to boys' schools and vice-
versa in order to avail themselves of non-traditional curricular options.239
234. Letter from James & Mary Kathleen Helis to Dr. John A. Bell, Chief, Education Branch,
Region 6, Office for Civil Rights (Sept. 18, 1974) (Newcomb Archives, NCCRW, Tulane University,
Mindy Milam Papers, Box 1-NAC 284); Letter from Jeanne & Carl Helwig to Dr. John A. Bell
(Sept. 19, 1974) (Newcomb Archives, NCCRW, Tulane University, Mindy Milam Papers, Box I-
NAC 284).
235. Letter from John A. Bell to Mr. & Mrs. James Helis (Oct. 31, 1974) (Newcomb Archives,
NCCRW, Tulane University, Mindy Milam Papers, Box 1-NAC 284); see also Letter from John A.
Bell to Alexander C. Ross, Chief, Education Section, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice
(Newcomb Archives, NCCRW, Tulane University, Mindy Milam Papers, Box I-NAC 284).
236. Letter from Jack Peebles to John A. Bell (Nov. 6, 1974) (Newcomb Archives, NCCRW,
Tulane University, Mindy Milam Papers, Box 1-NAC 284).
237. Sexism in Education Task Force 1 (1976) (Newcomb Archives, NCCRW, Tulane
University, Mindy Milam Papers, Box I-NAC 284).
238. Id. at 2-3.
239. See id. at 3 ("Supposedly all courses are offered to all students in the system, but
transportation is still a major factor in who takes what."); see also Memorandum from Elaine W.
Duvic to Faculty Members (Apr. 20, 1976) (Newcomb Archives, NCCRW, Tulane University, Mindy
Milam Papers, Box I-NAC 284) (announcing new policy to effect that "[a]ll students in the parish
and their parents must have the same course information .... Electives will be taught where there is a
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Three years after the Helwig lawsuit first was filed,24 ° Jeanne Helwig,
the mother of plaintiff Kenlee Helwig and a member of NOW, wrote to
the New Orleans Times-Picayune to argue that the continued sex
segregation of Jefferson Parish students demonstrated the dire need for an
Equal Rights Amendment.2 41 "Girls," she charged, were "steered into
traditional home economics and secretarial courses while the boys were
offered mechanical drawing, drafting, architecture, advanced math II and
advanced Latin. Is it any wonder that 62.7% of the girls do not go to
college? '242 Ms. Helwig also lamented the lack of "real world"
socialization under sex segregation, and argued that since there was "little
opportunity for students to meet persons of the opposite sex in socially
acceptable situations," parents
should not be surprised to find their children latching on to the first
person they meet of the opposite sex and hanging on to them for four
years. Nor should they be shocked at the natural consequences of this
situation, which manifests itself in early marriages and tragic
unplanned pregnancies.243
Moreover, Helwig wrote, her daughter had graduated without receiving
relief--or any word at all-from the three-judge district court to which the
plaintiffs had petitioned. "It is hard now to convince our daughter that
justice is available if one asks for it .... [O]ur healthy, normal daughter
now has a four-year handicap to deal with-simply because she was born
female." 2"
C. "A Parallel Between Racial and Sex Segregation ": The AFSC Report
From 1974 on, legal advocates who opposed Jane Crow increasingly
emphasized its sex discriminatory aspect, focusing on psychological and
material harm to girls-injuries they often compared to the iniquities of
racial segregation. As we saw in the previous section, the Helwig case
presented just such a sex discrimination argument. The most
comprehensive critique of sex segregation as a form of sex discrimination
parallel to Jim Crow came in a 1977 report by the American Friends
Service Committee (AFSC) on Title IX implementation in Southern public
240. New plaintiffs filed substantially the same suit in 1976, fending off mootness when the
original plaintiffs graduated. See Suit Attacks Jeff Non-Coed School Setup, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, July 20, 1976, §1, at 1. The new plaintiffs were Mr. and Mrs. Frederic S. Anderson, on
behalf of their daughter Nancy, and Else Peters Tracy, mother of Laura. See also Letter from Jack
Peebles to Judge Jack M. Gordon (Oct. 31, 1975) (Newcomb Archives, NCCRW, Tulane University,
Mindy Milam Papers, Box I-NAC 284) (expressing the Helwigs' and Helises' concern that their
case would be become moot if the court did not soon render a decision).
241. Jeanne Helwig, Letter to the Editor, Artificial Segregation, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-






Mayeri: The Strange Career of Jane Crow
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
schools.245 The AFSC, which had long been involved in local and regional
civil rights struggles, had formalized its anti-sex discrimination activities
in a Title IX compliance program at around the same time that the
ACLU's Peebles filed the Helwig suit. 46 The report, funded by a Ford
Foundation grant, reflected more than a year of monitoring by AFSC's
Southeastern Public Education Program in six states-Alabama, Arkansas,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina-and was styled as a
formal complaint to the Office for Civil Rights. Local and national
chapters of organizations including the League of Women Voters, the
American Association of University Women, NOW, the Council of Jewish
Women, the Louisiana State Bureau on the Status of Women, the ACLU,
and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law assisted the
AFSC with the monitoring project. Monitors distributed detailed
questionnaires to students, teachers, parents, administrators, coaches,
guidance counselors, athletic instructors, Title IX compliance officers, and
community members, in twenty-one school districts. 2 47
In addition to detailing violations in curriculum, school policies,
athletics, and employment, the report devoted a chapter to districts that
still maintained sex-segregated schools and made the "firm contention"
that HEW "should not allow these schools to exist. 2 48 The "requirement
of comparable programs and services," like Plessy's "separate-but-equal"
standard, "does not diminish the effects of inequalities in such schools,"
the AFSC Report concluded. Merely enforcing Title IX's requirement of
comparable programs and services could not obviate the simple truth:
"Separate can never be equal. 249
The AFSC report drew an extended and deliberate "parallel between
racial and sex segregation,, 250 comparing single-sex schools to the
"freedom-of-choice" desegregation plans of the 1960s. "Sex
discrimination will never be abolished so long as the burden of equality of
opportunity must be borne by the recipients of discrimination," the authors
argued.251 "As in racial desegregation, the test of a [compliance] plan must
be whether or not it works. 252 The report quoted extensively from
Peebles' briefs in the Helwig case, which relied heavily on a race-sex
analogy. The authors emphasized the disparities in curricular and
extracurricular offerings at the single-sex schools in two Louisiana
245. AFSC Report, supra note 206.
246. Background Paper for Regional/National Task Force (1976) (on file with American Friends
Service Committee Archives [hereinafter "AFSC Archives"], CRD 1976: Education Program #2,
Folder: Regional Offices: SERO-SEPEP Administration).
247. Handbook for Title IX Monitoring, 1976, Southeastern Public Education Program, AFSC,
Atlanta, Georgia (AFSC Archives, CRD Education Program 1976 #3, Folder: Regional Offices:
SERO-SEPEP Projects-Sex Discrimination Project).




252. Id. at Recommendations.
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parishes and in Amite County, Mississippi. Similar patterns emerged in
each of the districts: courses in subjects like engineering, advanced
mathematics, physics, Latin, vocational agriculture, ROTC, and industrial
arts would only be offered at the boys' schools, while home economics
and secretarial skills were emphasized at the girls' schools and unavailable
to boys.253 In Tangipahoa Parish, there allegedly was "unanimous
agreement among principals, teachers, parents and students that texts were
sex stereotyped and biased." '254 Monitors also cited vast disparities in
athletic programs, with girls' coaches earning just twenty percent of the
salaries received by the coaches of boys' teams.255 In Jefferson Parish,
they alleged, girls' schools had no gymnasium and no buses to transport
them to athletic events.256 The Amite County school system, monitors
concluded, was in noncompliance with Title IX in every way possible.257
On the eve of the monitors' arrival, some schools instituted "last minute
plan[s] to equalize curricula," but the monitors found that "everything
possible was being done to subtly and indirectly discourage students and
teachers from following any non-traditional courses of action. 255 Often
the proposed solution was to bus students from one school to another to
partake of courses not offered on their own campuses. The report quoted a
female student as saying, "My teachers said it's silly to want to take a
boy's course like mechanical drawing, but I still want to. Taking the bus
(to the boys' school) is complicated, though-so maybe I won't." 259 Like
African American children victimized by Jim Crow, girls, the AFSC
report suggested, bore the brunt of Jane Crow's complications. Moreover,
like the victims of Jim Crow, "[f]emale students interviewed repeatedly
expressed feelings of vague inferiority, unease at their segregated status,
apprehension about their future., 26° Sex separation, as the Helwig
plaintiffs' brief contended, was "a badge of inferiority which must be
borne by women." 26
1
Significantly, these sex discrimination arguments precipitated a shift in
the arguments marshaled by Jane Crow's defenders. Now school officials
253. See also Bias in Schools Target in Jeff, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 10, 1974, § 1,
at 10 (reporting that attorney Jack Peebles submitted to federal district court evidence that "male
students are treated differently from the female students by way of curriculum and activities").
254. AFSC Report, supra note 206, at 108.
255. Id. at 98.
256. Id. The Jefferson Parish School Board's vice president denied that the girls' school's athletic
facilities were inferior, or that girls were forbidden to take industrial arts courses and boys to take
home economics. Sex Bias Report Blasted, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 2, 1977, § 1, at 12.
257. AFSC Report, supra note 206, at 109.
258. Id. at 96. The report detailed the difficulties monitors encountered when they attempted to
gather information on single-sex schools-recalcitrant school officials, intimidated teachers, elusive
documentation. "Particularly reticent," according to the monitors, were black teachers who feared they
would lose promotion opportunities, be denied tenure, or even lose their jobs, if they expressed their
objections to sex segregation. Id. at 95.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 94.
261. Id. at 101.
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began to argue that single-sex education benefited girls, giving them
greater opportunities to assume leadership roles in the classroom and in
extracurricular activities. The AFSC report discounted this possibility,
arguing that "expectations for women" in single-sex schools "reinforce
attitudes of female inferiority." Even if "a female in a sex-segregated
situation has more opportunity to become school president-the election
to school office hardly equates with one's life chances to become a
scientist. '  Still, this mode of argumentation on the part of school
officials marked a significant shift in emphasis on the part of sex-
segregation proponents. Boys' fragile gender identities and special
educational needs were no longer the focus of attention. If plaintiffs were
speaking in terms of girls' subordination, then school districts seeking to
maintain sex separation policies had to respond in kind with arguments
that emphasized how single-sex education benefited girls. To feminists,
this was merely the old wine of subordination in new bottles deceptively
labeled "empowerment."
Sex discrimination arguments had transformed Jane Crow discourse. A
practice whose harm seemed to consist primarily in its racial implications
now appeared to inflict a particular injustice on girls. Sex-specific
curricula that dictated the placement of girls in home economics and
clerical courses and boys in vocational and industrial education, and in
advanced math and science courses, had once seemed a benign and even
salutary reflection of social reality. Now such customs were recast as a
denial of equal opportunity that injured female students. Separating pupils
by sex, a practice previously considered harmless and even healthy, now
was deemed a "badge of inferiority" that psychologically and materially
damaged girls just as Jim Crow had degraded African American children.
IV. JANE CROW'S STRANGE CAREER: THE LIMITATIONS OF THE LAW
Parts 1-111 detailed the transformation in legal discourse from pre-Brown
analogies between the legitimacy of sex separation and the
constitutionality of racial segregation, to post-Brown enthusiasm for sex
segregation as a palliative for white Southern fears of "amalgamation," to
late-1960s concerns with racially discriminatory motivation, to the 1970s
emergence of a sex discrimination paradigm that drew an analogy between
the unconstitutionality of racial segregation and the illegitimacy of sex
segregation. Part IV explores some of the limitations of this evolving body
of legal arguments, discussing how neither the racial motivation standard
nor the sex discrimination paradigm fully captured what was at stake for
African American communities in sex-segregated school districts.
Two legal paradigms were available to Jane Crow's challengers by the
early 1970s. The racial motivation standard, in theory, asked whether
262. Id. at 97.
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"racial discrimination" or "educational purposes" underpinned sex
segregation. As we have seen, that standard helped some African
American communities effectively dismantle Jane Crow through vocal
opposition in and out of court. But in many school districts, the racial
motivation standard allowed school boards to disguise their motives in
race-neutral language: the standard encouraged them to speak in terms of
benefit to boys, sex differences, and "discipline problems." As this Part
suggests, though, the motivations underlying sex segregation may have
been less important than the circumstances under which sex segregation
was implemented. In Taylor County, Georgia, where whites kept their
children and tax dollars in the public schools, and where African
American teachers and administrators held positions of responsibility
alongside their white colleagues, African Americans overcame their initial
opposition to Jane Crow. In contrast, in Amite County, Mississippi, where
many whites withdrew their students and financial resources from the
schools, and where whites retained almost total control over school
administration, African Americans' discontent with sex segregation only
increased. Even so, the evolving legal discourse did not capture what
black families saw as the primary problems with sex segregation. A sex
discrimination argument based upon an analogy to racial segregation
proved ill-equipped to express what Jane Crow meant to Amite County
African Americans.
A. "To Minimize the Problems People Have Adjusting": Taylor County's
Pragmatic Trade-off
Many African Americans perceived sex segregation as an affront to their
dignity: in the words of the Concordia Parish plaintiffs' attorney, they saw
Jane Crow as "perpetuat[ing] racial segregation by subterfuge." '63 C.J.
Duckworth, executive secretary of the Mississippi Teachers Association,
an African American group, similarly declared in 1970, "Sex segregation
is a damned clear way of telling our people that they are inferior to
whites." 2" As we saw in Part II, some judges measured racially
discriminatory motivation according to African Americans' perceptions of
its purpose and effect.265 As implemented by judges sympathetic to their
indignation, the racial motivation standard was responsive to what many
African American communities viewed as the primary harm of sex
segregation.
263. Brief of Appellants at 9, Smith v. Concordia Parish Sch. Bd., No. 28342 (5th Cir. Oct. 1,
1969) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 4235, 28342-28349).
264. Tom Herman, Evasive Action: Schools in Deep South Slow Integration Tide with Subtler
Tactics, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1970, at 1. Duckworth was ambivalent about the legality of sex
segregation. See supra note 170.
265. McFerren v. Fayette County Bd. of Educ., No. C-65-136 (W.D. Tenn., Dec. 10, 1969),
quoted in Order, United States v. Lincoln County Bd. of Educ., Nos. 1400 and 1420, at 3 (S.D. Ga.
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The racial motivation standard had limitations, however, both in terms
of the realities of its selective judicial application and in its ability to
capture how some black communities came to view Jane Crow. Some
courts "pretermitted" the sex segregation question pending the
achievement of a racially unitary school system; others allowed school
districts to justify separating the sexes for "educational purposes,"
variations permitted by the standard's indeterminacy. Moreover, in school
districts that implemented sex separation plans, the longer-term reactions
of different communities varied significantly. This section examines Jane
Crow's career in Taylor County, Georgia, where, despite their initial
opposition to sex segregation, African American families and school
officials eventually proved willing to accept separate schools for the sexes.
In exchange for this concession, African Americans expected genuine
racial desegregation, commitment by whites to remain in and financially
maintain the public schools, and significant black leadership in the racially
integrated single-sex schools.
Taylor County was a small, relatively poor, rural farming community of
less than ten thousand residents, approximately half white and half black.
The county had a long history of anti-black violence, most infamously, the
murder of Malcolm X's father, an itinerant minister who espoused the
radical views of Marcus Garvey, in the 1920s.266 As in most Southern
school districts, the "freedom of choice" policy of the mid- to late-1960s
resulted in almost no desegregation,2 67 and the integration that did occur
was prompted by federal threats to withdraw funding. 268 Federal
ultimatums ordering massive desegregation in the summer and fall of
1969 did not inspire action, despite the withdrawal of funding. But a
December 1969 federal court order enjoining the Georgia Department of
Education from financing still-segregated schools forced the local board to
develop a plan for racial integration.269 White school officials continued to
resist; they submitted another freedom-of-choice plan to the court and
sought an injunction to prevent the federal government from ordering
266. STEPHEN G.N. TUCK, BEYOND ATLANTA: THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY IN
GEORGIA, 1940-1980, at 22 (2001). African American efforts at enfranchisement later in the century
also met with violence. For instance, Macio Snipes, a young black veteran of World War II, was
murdered on his porch in Taylor County by ten white men, three days after voting in the 1946 primary
election. Id. at 71.
267. The term "freedom of choice" refers to desegregation policies that nominally allowed
students and their parents to choose between formerly all-white and formerly all-black schools. In
practice, these policies allowed a few intrepid African Americans to attend formerly white schools, but
they resulted in, at most, only token desegregation.
268. Brief for the United States at 18-19 & n. 18, United States v. Georgia, No. 71-2563 (5th Cir.
Sept. 3, 1971) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 6148, 71-2563-71-2569;
Brown, supra note 90, at 86. Based on interviews with Taylor County residents, conducted in the early
1990s, Brown suggests that many African American parents were reluctant to send their children to
white schools, both because they feared unfair treatment and even violence, and because they worried
that integration would sever the strong ties between black schools and the black community. Id. at 88.
269. Id. at 99.
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further desegregation.27° When integration appeared inevitable, however,
the school board voted to convert the black elementary and secondary
schools into boys' campuses and to reopen the two white schools as girls'
domains.271 In April 1970, the federal courts approved six Georgia plans
involving sex segregation.2 72 The courts' application of the Fifth Circuit's
racial motivation standard focused on results rather than intent. Their
review of the plans had "not indicated that the assignments based on sex
produced educationally unsound consequences or inequities resulting in
racial discrimination. 273
The reaction of Taylor County's African Americans was similar to that
of many other black communities faced with the prospect of replacing Jim
Crow with Jane. Students staged protests and a boycott, emphasizing their
concern that black teachers and administrators would lose their jobs as the
schools desegregated. 274 African American plaintiffs (unsuccessfully)
sought a hearing on whether sex separation constituted race
discrimination, and persuaded the federal government to intervene on their
behalf.275 When the Christian Science Monitor reported on Taylor
County's desegregation experience in 1972, both black and white students
complained about sex separation. 276 But overall, officials and community
leaders of both races deemed sex segregation a qualified success. Black
high school principal Albert O'Bryant told the Monitor that while the sex-
segregated arrangement "left something to be desired," it was a policy that
"seemed to minimize the problems that people have adjusting" to racial
desegregation.277 As such, he and other African Americans apparently
were willing to accept Jane Crow as a condition of successful racial
integration: sex segregation remained in place in Taylor County until
1978.278
Three related factors distinguished Taylor County from other school
districts where African Americans' resentment toward Jane Crow
persisted or intensified during the 1970s: continuing white presence in the
public schools, financial commitment to those schools, and opportunities
270. Id. at 102.
271. Id. at 102-03.
272. Order of the Court, Georgia, No. 71-2563 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 19705, quoted in Brown, supra
note 90, at 106 n. 11. The six plans involved Pelham city, and the counties of Baker, LaGrange, Lamar,
Meriweather, and Miller. See id.; see also 2 RACE REL. L. SURVEY 54 (July 1970).
273. Order of the Court, Georgia, No. 71-2563 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 1970), quoted in Brown, supra
note 90, at 106 n.l 1; 2 RACE REL. L. SURVEY 54 (July 1970). At the time of the court's ruling, Taylor
County was listed as one of about a dozen counties in non-compliance with desegregation orders. See
id.
274. Brown, supra note 90, at 106.
275. See Brief for the United States, Georgia, No. 71-2563 (5th Cir. Sept. 3, 1971) (NARA, S.W.
Reg. Div., Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 6148, 71-2563-71-2569); Brief for Private Appellants,
Georgia, No. 71-2563 (5th Cir. Sept. 7, 1971) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box
6148, 71-2563-71-2569).
276. Dillin, supra note 114, at 1, 10.
277. Id. at 10.
278. Brown, supra note 90, at 113.
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for black leadership in the integrated school system. Stanford Maxwell
Brown's comparative study of desegregation in Taylor and Baker
Counties reveals that in Baker County, where whites fled the public
schools after desegregation was enforced and devoted monies to
establishing private all-white academies, sex segregation lasted only one
year. In Taylor County, by contrast, white citizens kept their children and
their tax dollars in the public schools. Also, Taylor County's
desegregation plan, unlike Baker County's, divided administrative
positions equitably between black and white educators. Black Principal
O'Bryant headed one of the boys' schools, joined by a white assistant
principal, while Mrs. Jewel McDougald, an African American teacher,
became principal of one of the girls' schools. The other boys' school,
headed by a white principal, gained a black assistant principal.279 Almost
all of the teachers of both races kept their jobs in Taylor County, whereas
many black teachers in Baker County were forced out and white teachers
defected to the private "seg academies. '"280 The balanced racial
composition of the Taylor County public schools held steady throughout
the sex segregation period and beyond.
Taylor County's African Americans did not hesitate to stand their
ground and insist upon racial equality in the newly integrated school
system. When white school officials decreed that only white drivers could
transport girls on schoolbuses, while black drivers could transport boys,
black families launched a boycott in the spring of 1971, keeping one-third
of the district's students out of school for more than two weeks.28' The list
of demands black leaders presented to the county's school superintendent
included amnesty for students who participated in the boycott, assignment
of drivers to buses without regard to race, abolition of race-based seating
assignments, and "humane treatment" for all student bus-riders.282 "All we
really want is equal opportunity for our bus drivers," boycott spokesperson
Sara Mathis told the Atlanta Constitution. "What they are really saying is
279. Id. at 108.
280. Id.
281. Tom Linthicum, Taylor Blacks Extend School Buses Boycott, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION,
Apr. 27, 1971 (Library of Congress, Records of the NAACP, V: 2819, Folder: Schools: Georgia,
Correspondence, 1965-71). See also Letter from Rufus Huffman to Norman Carter, Taylor County
School Superintendent, Butler, Georgia (Apr. 27, 1971) (Library of Congress, Records of the NAACP,
V: 2819, Folder: Schools: Georgia, Correspondence, 1965-71) ("Please be advised that [the NAACP]
has been informed of your school bus transportation arrangement, which is that white girls are only
transported on buses that are driven by white persons and black boys are only transported on buses
that are driven by black persons .... The NAACP is concerned and appalled when supposedly sane
individuals, especially school officials, demonstrate their bigotry and racism by inflicting injustices or
allowing injustices to be inflicted upon individuals and especially students."); Letter from Norman
Carter to Rufus Huffman, Education Field Director, Tuskegee Institute, Alabama (Apr. 29, 1971)
(NAACP Papers, V: 2819, Folder: Schools: Georgia, Correspondence, 1965-71) ("Please be advised
that all girls, black and white, are transported by white drivers; and that all boys, black and white, are
transported by black drivers. The Taylor County Board of Education gives all drivers the authority to
assign seats when in the judgment of the driver this is necessary to maintain order on the buses.").
282. Linthicum, supra note 281.
[Vol. 18:187
58
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol18/iss2/2
2006]
that black drivers aren't good enough to drive white girls to school. Our
children won't go back to school until our drivers get equal
opportunity. 283
The community's steadfastness on the bus-driver issue suggests that
African Americans were not simply cowed into accepting sex segregation,
but rather that they made a conscious decision to trade Jim Crow for Jane.
The calculation implicit in this trade-off suggests the complexity of "racial
motivations" at work in the Jane Crow cases. On the one hand, sex
separation unquestionably reflected invidious beliefs about the dangers
and evils of "race-mixing" and "amalgamation" that perpetuated the racial
and sexual stigmas of Jim Crow. On the other hand, to the extent that sex
separation fulfilled its promise of stemming white flight to private schools
and the withdrawal of tax revenues from public education, Jane Crow
could function as an effective transitional measure, easing a path to racial
integration that few communities traversed successfully.
B. "We Don't Live in a Sexually-Segregated World": Amite County
Confronts Jane Crow
Jane Crow had a much more troubled career in Amite County,
Mississippi, despite the area's demographic similarities to Taylor County,
Georgia. Like Taylor, Amite was a rural, relatively poor county of less
than fifteen thousand residents, approximately half black and half white,
with a lengthy history of racial violence and oppression.284 But unlike
Taylor County whites, Amite County's white citizens left the public
schools in large numbers, withdrew financial resources from the public
schools, and maintained a stranglehold on power within the school district
administration.2 85 Amite County African Americans' discontent with sex
separation only increased over the course of the 1970s, culminating in a
month-long boycott of the public schools in the fall of 1977. As this
section describes, neither the racial motivation standard nor a sex
discrimination argument based upon an analogy to race fully captured the
objections of Amite County's African American community to sex
segregation.
Sex separation in Amite County began in much the same way as it did in
many other Jane Crow school districts. In late 1969, after a Fifth Circuit
panel ordered Amite County to implement the desegregation plan
proposed by HEW, the school district moved to amend HEW's plan in
order to permit the separation of children by sex in grades one through
283. Id.
284. John Dittmer calls mid-1960s Liberty, Mississippi, the county seat, an "embattled outpost"
of the civil rights movement. JOHN DITTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN
MISSISSIPPI 280 (1994). Amite County had been the site of a number of brutal murders of African
Americans by whites, including the slaying of Herbert Lee by state legislator E.H. Hurst in 1961, and
the subsequent murder of Louis Allen, a witness to that shooting, in 1964. Id. at 215.
285. In the immediate aftermath of desegregation, almost all of Amite County's white parents
withdrew their children from the public schools. See infra note 288 and accompanying text.
Mayeri
59
Mayeri: The Strange Career of Jane Crow
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 18:187
twelve. Notably, the four African American members of the court-
mandated biracial review committee signed an affidavit memorializing
their unanimous approval of the sex separation scheme.286 The Fifth
Circuit panel approved this modified plan as an "interim emergency
measure," noting that its long-term validity depended upon the school
district's intent. The panel ordered the district court to investigate whether
racial discrimination or educational purposes motivated the sex
segregation plan.287 Meanwhile, most of Amite County's white parents
withdrew their children from the public schools in late 1969 and early
1970, enrolling them in hastily created private academies.288
In June 1970, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi held a hearing at which Annie Andrews, the Amite County
superintendent of schools, was the sole witness. In light of the evidence,
Chief Judge Dan M. Russell, Jr. concluded that "the separation by sex plan
stems from sound educational purposes as distinguished from racially
discriminatory purposes. ' 289 Judge Russell found that the sex separation
had produced a racially unitary school system, that male students'
academic performance and leadership qualities had improved
substantially, that disciplinary problems had declined, and that the
"stability of the entire school operation under the modified plan resulted in
increased attendance by white students and in better cooperation of the
community as a whole.,
29 °
286. Motion of Defendants-Appellees for Approval of Amended Desegregation Order as
Approved by Bi-Racial Committee, United States v. Amite County Sch. Dist., Nos. 28030 & 28042
(5th Cir. Nov. 28, 1969) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div., RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Box 4163, Nov. 1969 (pt.)-
March 1970). For a discussion of the use of biracial committees in Mississippi, see BOLTON, supra
note 29, at 195-98. The circumstances under which the African American committee members
approved Amite County's sex separation plan are not entirely clear. Minutes of the committee meeting
submitted by the school district to the court indicate that a number of community members appeared at
the meeting to express their opinions, but were asked to leave. One of the five African American
committee members tendered his resignation before the meeting began, so that white members were in
the majority when the vote on sex segregation was taken. The minutes do not record any objections to
the plan. See Exhibit "A," Recess Meeting, Nov. 26, 1969, appended to Motion of Defendants-
Appellees, supra.
287. Quoted in United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., 560 F.2d 619, 621 (5th Cir. 1977). See
also 1 RACE REL. L. SURVEY 253 (Feb. 1970) ("The court expressed some reluctance to approve the
change without hearing to determine whether the board's request was motivated by racial
discrimination or by bona fide educational considerations.").
288. See James T. Wooten, Exodus Seen as Threat to the System on Eve of Integration Move,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1970, at I (reporting that nine hundred white students in Amite County had
enrolled in a segregated private academy); Roy Reed, Both Sides in South Mistrust Nixon Actions on
School Integration, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1970, at 22 (stating that eighty-eight percent of Amite's
white students had left the public schools).
289. Quoted in Hinds County, 560 F.2d at 621. Civil rights attorney Fred Banks remembers the
Southern District of Mississippi, where Judge Russell sat, as being particularly resistant to school
desegregation, in contrast to the Northern District, which included Judge Keady, discussed supra note
135. See Fred L. Banks, Jr., The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: A Personal
Perspective, 16 MISS. COLL. L. REV. 275, 278 (1996). The United States Courthouse in Gulfport,
Mississippi is now named for Judge Russell.
290. Hinds County, 560 F.2d at 621 n.3.
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But almost from the start, some African American families had
expressed displeasure with the Amite County sex separation plan. In 1969,
an advisory committee of African Americans, headed by the prominent
educator Roosevelt Steptoe, formed to protest sex segregation.291 In
August 1970, more than 300 black parents signed a petition "express[ing]
opposition to the plan of desegregation presently in force in Amite
County. Separation of children by sex is but another way to keep our
children segregated and but another example of white resistance and
opposition to integration," the petitioners declared. 92 The NAACP Legal
Defense Fund filed a successful motion to supplement the court record,
but received no other response to the parents' petition from the court.293
Rufus C. Huffman, educational director for the NAACP's Special
Contribution Fund, communicated African Americans' grievances in a
letter to NAACP Legal Defense Fund attorney Mel Leventhal in October.
African American parents were disturbed that sex segregation limited their
children's curricular choices: "[T]here are some boys who desire to take
Home Economics and some girls want some vocational training, but they
are denied this opportunity because of sex segregation."2 94 The parents
also complained of classroom and bus segregation by race, and of rules
that prevented them from visiting the schools to investigate these
abuses.295 Huffman declared, "The aforementioned acts and conditions are
in direct violation of the constitutional rights of American citizens," and
requested that "immediate corrective actions be taken." '296 In addition to
seeking legal assistance, Amite County's African American community
participated in a 1970 boycott of white businesses that gave financial
support to segregationist private academies.297 Nevertheless, the district
court continued annually to approve the school board's sex-segregated
school assignments.298
As Part III described, in 1974 Congress passed the Equal Educational
Opportunity Act, which contained several provisions mentioning "sex"
alongside race, color, and national origin as a prohibited basis for school
291. AFSC Report, supra note 206, at 109.
292. Attachment to Motion to Supplement the Record, United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd.
and Amite County Sch. Dist., Nos. 28030 & 28042 (5th Cir. July 8, 1970) (NARA, S.W. Reg. Div.,
RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 4164, Apr.-Nov. 1970). Roosevelt Steptoe, who had since
become vice-president of Southern University, put it more bluntly to AFSC monitors in 1977: "A fear
of throwing those young ladies in with those black boys prompted the sex segregation system." AFSC
Report, supra note 206, at 109.
293. Hinds County, 560 F.2d 619, 621 n.4.
294. Letter from Rufus C. Huffman, Education Field Director, NAACP Special Contribution
Fund, to Attorney Melvin Leventhal at 1-2 (Oct. 14, 1970) (Library of Congress, Records of the
NAACP, V: 2823, Folder: Schools: Mississippi, 1963-1971, n.d).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See Thomas A. Johnson, Mississippi Faces Negroes' Boycott: Their Leaders Act Against
Merchants Who Support NewAll-White Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1970, at 1.
298. Hinds County, 560 F.2d at 621.
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assignment.299 In late December of that year, the federal government filed
a supplemental brief with the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the EEOA
proscribed Amite County's sex segregation policy." 0 Six months later, the
court required Amite County "to show cause why the EEOA did not
mandate discontinuance of their sex-segregated assignment plan."3 1 The
school district argued that, for various reasons, the EEOA was
inapplicable, and that racial motivation remained the appropriate standard
for evaluating sex separation. Apparently under the impression that the
federal government had entered into settlement negotiations with the
school board, the court did not act on the supplemental briefs for over two
years. 30
2
In the meantime, African Americans in Amite County were losing
patience. After seven years of sex segregation, white flight had left Amite
County's schools with a student body that was more than eighty percent
black, but the school board remained firmly under white control.30 3 In
1976, after the school board reiterated its unwillingness to act without a
court order, local NAACP members went to their state branch director in
Jackson to discuss the black parents' concerns. Again, the parents
complained that their children were receiving an "inferior education"
because "boys are not permitted to take certain courses, such as Home
Economics, and girls are not able to take certain courses, such as shop and
the vocational courses," and that the black students' frustration manifested
itself in a "lack of interest" in their studies.304 Parents also worried that
their children were being deprived of healthy heterosocial interaction, and
they "sounded a special alarm about the tendency of boys to
homosexuality in the system.'"305 After a series of mass meetings with
African American parents in Amite County, the state NAACP chairman
Emmett Burns wrote a letter to the Fifth Circuit panel responsible for
overseeing school desegregation in Mississippi, emphasizing that
pervasive dissatisfaction with sex segregation among African American
299. See supra note 10.
300. Hinds County, 560 F.2d at 621-22.
301. Id. at 622.
302. Id.
303. The schools in Amite County had been even more overwhelmingly black during the first
couple of years of desegregation. See supra note 288; Report of School Organization as of April 15,
1970, United States v. Amite County School District, Nos. 28042 & 28030 (5th Cir. 1970) (NARA,
S.W. Reg. Div., RG 276, Fifth Circuit, Case Files, Box 4163, Nov. 1969 (pt.)-March 1970) (reporting
that less than 200 of the more than 2700 students in the county's public schools were white). By 1973,
the number of white students had increased to almost 500. Opposition of Amite County School
District to Plaintiffs Motion for New Plan of Pupil Assignment, United States v. Hinds County School
Board and Amite County School District, Nos. 28030 & 28042 (5th Cir. Oct 31, 1973) (NARA, S.W.
Reg. Div., RG 276, Box 4167, USCA 5th Cir. Case Files, 28030 & 28042, Box 4167, Sept. 1972-
1973).
304. Letter from Emmett C. Bums to Judges Griffin Bell, Homer Thomberry, & Lewis Morgan,
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Aug. 4, 1976) (on file with the Library of
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students and parents should override the objections of a minority of whites
to coeducation. 30 6 After all, Burns reasoned, the public school population
in Amite County was now over eighty percent black. Furthermore, Bums
told the Jackson Daily News, the single-sex system "doesn't properly
prepare students to function in society because 'we don't live in a sexually
segregated world. " 307
By 1977, the rhetoric and stakes of the controversy had escalated. In
August, the Amite County and Mississippi state branches of the NAACP
issued a joint press release in which they
again deplore[d] the South African, Rhodesian type apartheid system
of strict school segregation by sex in the Amite County School
System. The elements of apartheid are principally present: Minority
rule (only twenty (20) percent of the school system's children are
white) yet the minority opinion absolutely determines policy; the
races are segregated by sex in an attempt to keep Black males and
white females separated, but in the process Black males are denied
co-education with Black females; and, a total disregard for the
feelings, wishes, and thoughts of the Black majority.30 8
If remedial action was not forthcoming, "the only alternative left" was for
"the NAACP to pull the Black students out of school in an act of protest
come fall. 309 The statement acknowledged that such an action "would
seriously hamper the educational progress of Black students specifically,
and the school system in Amite County generally, but the continued
apartheid system is more serious. We cannot and will not participate in a
system that works to our detriment," the press release declared, for "a
school system that contributes to zombi-ism and homosexuality is both
pedagogically and racially unsound. 310
The NAACP and the black community of Amite County followed
through on their pledge, successfully launching a boycott that kept the vast
majority of students in the district at home. As the school year began, only
391 white students and forty-four black students were in class, out of a
projected enrollment of 2,400. Several hundred protesters gathered on the
steps of the county courthouse to protest sex segregation, and black
leaders vowed to continue the boycott for as long as was necessary to
convince the school board to ask the Fifth Circuit for a coeducational
306. Id.
307. Jerry Oglethorpe, Boycott in Amite Threatened, JACKSON DAILY NEWS (JACKSON, MISS.),
Aug. 4, 1977 (Library of Congress, Records of the NAACP, V: 2570, Folder: Branches-States-
Mississippi: A-J Misc., 1956-81).
308. Press Release, Amite County NAACP and Mississippi State Conference, NAACP (Aug. 3,
1977) (Library of Congress, Records of the NAACP, V: 2570, Folder: Branches-States-





Mayeri: The Strange Career of Jane Crow
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
assignment plan.311 Robert Wilson, the only African American member of
the school board-and the only elected black official in the county-made
no secret of his disdain for sex segregation, but he initially stopped short
of endorsing the boycott. Wilson urged parents to "put the concern of your
children first--do not allow a few illiterate people to destroy your
children's lives forever." '312 Boycott leaders were steadfast, however. "We
know some will get hurt by this," said Rosie Wilson, whose own children
were missing school. "[B]ut ... [w]e want the boys and girls in the same
school this year. We're going at this, step by step." '3 13
At a contentious school board meeting held several days after the
boycott commenced, a delegation of about seventy African Americans
confronted the three white school board members in attendance. Dorothy
Chesser read a letter asking for their resignation on the grounds that the
members "steadfastly refuse to serve the needs of the majority of the
people you represent." '314 The white board members expressed satisfaction
with the single-sex system, asserting that sex segregation was instituted at
the suggestion of HEW, a recollection that black parents and their
attorneys did not share. The proposed HEW plan of 1969 had not called
for sex segregation, and there is no evidence that HEW officials
affirmatively suggested such an arrangement at any time.315 For his part,
Maurice Foreman, the white superintendent of schools, insisted that he
had no power to express an opinion on sex segregation, much less ask the
courts to take legal action.316 Board member Bernard Dunaway challenged
African American parents to vote him and the other white members out of
office if they were dissatisfied with their performance, and defended sex
311. Daniel Sheridan, School Boycott Leader Vows to Continue, NATCHEZ DEMOCRAT
(NATCHEZ, MISS.), Aug. 31, 1977.
312. Sex-Segregated Schools Boycotted, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1977.
313. Id. It is not clear whether Robert and Rosie Wilson were related; one newspaper report
suggested that they may have been husband and wife. See Boycott Continues at Amite School,
GLOSTER WEEKLY (GLOSTER, MISS.), Sept. 2, 1977 (Library of Congress, Records of the NAACP, V:
2570, Folder: Branches-States-Mississippi: A-J Misc., 1956-81 (referring to "Rosa Wilson" as the
wife of school board member Robert Wilson).
314. Associated Press, Black Parents in Amite County Vow to Continue Boycott of Schools,
HATTIESBURG AMERICAN, Sept. 2, 1977 (Library of Congress, Records of the NAACP, V: 2570,
Folder: Branches-States-Mississippi: A-J Misc., 1956-81); Associated Press, School Boycott Vowed
over Sexual Segregation, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1977, at 28.
315. It is true that in some instances HEW declined to take a position on sex segregation in
school district-drawn desegregation plans. In 1977, former Judge Griffin Bell recalled, in the words of
an aide, that the "segregation-by-sex plan was drafted by the school board and was accepted by the
court with the consent of black plaintiffs." Helen Dewar, Blacks Boycott Sex-Segregated Schools,
WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1977, at 32; see also Emmett C. Burns, Director's Report, 1976, Mississippi
State Conference, NAACP (Library of Congress, Records of the NAACP, Container 2570, Folder:
Branches-States: Mississippi, Mississippi State Conference, 1964-76) (correcting misapprehension
that sex segregation was part of HEW plan).
316. Boycott Continues at Amite School, GLOSTER WEEKLY (GLOSTER, MISS.), Sept. 2, 1977
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segregation as legitimate. 317 "Are you insinuating there's something wrong
with black boys-that they shouldn't go to school with white girls?"
Chesser asked Dunaway at one point. "I didn't say anything to insinuate
that," Dunaway answered. "I just said we had different schools for the
whites and for the coloreds" before coeducation ended in 1969.18
The school board meeting made clear that neither side was prepared to
give an inch. Almost two weeks later, the boycott was still in full force,
with picketers greeting the few students still attending each of the county's
four schools. Many wore signs reading, "End Sex Discrimination." By this
time, black board member Robert Wilson no longer expressed reluctance
about the boycott, telling the New York Times that this was "only 'a first
step' toward gaining equality for Amite blacks, who for the most part are
poor and lack political organization., 31 9 For some, these concerted actions
marked a milestone in local African American mobilization. The eighty-
seven-year-old aunt of picketer Mrs. A.M. Tobias attended a mass
demonstration in her wheelchair; as this lifelong Amite County resident,
Ms. Pinkie Griffin, told the Jackson Clarion-Ledger, she "never thought
she would see this in Amite County. Yes," she declared, "this is history
being made."32
As these protests suggest, neither the racial motivation standard nor the
analogy-based sex discrimination argument was capacious enough to
capture what was at stake for Amite County's African American
community in confronting Jane Crow. It was apparent to African
American parents from the start that the white school board's motives
were suspect, but equally important to them was autonomy and control
over their children's education. Jane Crow had not worked: it had not kept
white students or financial resources in the public schools. Nor had Amite
County's white leaders allowed African Americans to share equally in the
administration of the school system. Those failures rendered the sex
separation policy an apartheid-like regime imposed by a minority on the
majority, in contrast to its function in Taylor County as a pragmatic, if
offensive, solution for phasing out Jim Crow.
Further, although Amite County protesters held signs proclaiming "End
Sex Discrimination," they defined "sex discrimination" somewhat
differently from those who advanced the legal theory that sex separation in
school desegregation plans discriminated on the basis of sex. As Part III
317. Daniel Sheridan, Amite Trustees Refuse to End Sex Segregation, NATCHEZ DEMOCRAT
(NATCHEZ, MISS.), Sept. 2, 1977 (Library of Congress, Records of the NAACP, V: 2570, Folder:
Branches-States-Mississippi: A-J Misc., 1956-81).
318. Mike Williamson, Amite Board Endorses System, ENTERPRISE-JOURNAL, Sept. 1977
(Library of Congress, Records of the NAACP, V: 2570, Folder: Branches-States-Mississippi: A-J
Misc., 1956-81).
319. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Blacks Boycott Schools Segregated By Sex, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
1977, at 16.
320. Lonnie Wheeler, Race Underlying Issue in Liberty, JACKSON CLARION-LEDGER (JACKSON,
MISS.), Sept. 3, 1977 (Library of Congress, Records of the NAACP, V: 2570, Folder: Branches-
States-Mississippi: A-J Misc., 1956-81).
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described, Robert Barnett, the ACLU attorneys in Helwig, and the AFSC
constructed an analogy-based sex discrimination argument that
emphasized the psychological and material harm imposed upon girls by
sex segregation. In this view, Jane Crow subordinated girls just as Jim
Crow had subordinated African Americans, offering girls an inferior
education and stigmatizing them as less academically able than boys.
African Americans in Amite County articulated the harm of sex
segregation as a restriction on the freedom of both boys and girls to make
curricular choices-boys to choose home economics, girls to choose
vocational training. This lack of choice meant, to them, that their children
were receiving an "inferior education" as a result of sex segregation.
African Americans complained that single-sex education did not
adequately prepare their children for post-schooling life: "[W]e don't live
in a sex-segregated world," they emphasized.3"' Finally, if Jane Crow
imposed on one sex more than the other, it arguably was boys who
suffered most. After all, no one doubted that a primary impetus behind sex
segregation from whites' perspective was the desire to keep black boys
away from their white daughters. And this was not merely a stigmatic
distinction, but a material one in many Jane Crow districts: both Amite
and Taylor Counties adopted the common policy of converting the
formerly black campuses into boys' schools, and the formerly white
campuses into girls' schools. As Taylor County Girls School principal
Jerry Partain put it, "In the South, we have always been very protective of
our women.
322
African American families also worried that sex segregation deprived
young people of the "normal," heterosocial relationships fostered by a
coeducational environment. Black parents and students apparently valued
coeducational schools as an opportunity to cultivate heterosexual
relationships among African Americans and saw single-sex schools as
hindering healthy interactions between boys and girls. As sixteen-year-old
Victor Powell, an African American junior at the Central Attendance
Center for Boys, just outside the town of Liberty, Mississippi, told the
New York Times: "It's the worst kind of arrangement. You don't have a
normal relationship. You get to see girls only after school, or maybe not at
all if you live way out on a farm. 3 23 And if many white parents feared that
biracial coeducation was a slippery slope toward "amalgamation," some
black parents worried that single-sex education encouraged
homosexuality.
Neither of the legal paradigms developed to address Jane Crow captured
the stakes of sex segregation for the African American communities of
321. Jerry Oglethorpe, Boycott in Amite Threatened, JACKSON DAILY NEWS (JACKSON, MISS.),
Aug. 4, 1977 (Library of Congress, Records of the NAACP, V: 2570, Folder: Branches-States-
Mississippi: A-J Misc., 1956-81).
322. Quoted in Brown, supra note 90, at iii.
323. Ayres, supra note 319, at 16.
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Taylor and Amite Counties. Notably, the legal discourse also obscured the
assumptions about children's sociability and sexuality that were so central
to arguments for and against sex segregation. Part VI will address this
subject further, but first, Part V describes the legal fate of sex-segregated
public schooling in the 1970s.
V. NOT "THE CASE THAT COULD HAVE BEEN":
SEX SEGREGATION'S LEGAL RESOLUTION
The issue of sex-segregated public primary and secondary education
moved through the courts along two separate tracks. The Jane Crow
lawsuits, most of which originated in the Fifth Circuit, were filed between
1969 and 1974; some were resolved by district courts, others awaited
resolution for anywhere from three to eight years. The sex segregation suit
that reached the Supreme Court, Vorchheimer v. School District of
Philadelphia, was not a Jane Crow case. That is, the sex segregation
policy challenged in Vorchheimer had nothing to do with racial
desegregation; rather, it was an artifact of elite public single-sex schooling
that dated back to the nineteenth century. Vorchheimer was filed in 1974,
significantly later than most of the Jane Crow cases,32 4 but moved much
more expeditiously through the courts, reaching the Supreme Court for
oral argument by early 1977. The Jane Crow cases never reached the high
court. Instead, the Fifth Circuit sidestepped the thorny constitutional
questions implicated in these suits and resolved them through a
straightforward application of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act
(EEOA), the anti-busing measure that incidentally prohibited school
assignments on the basis of sex as well as race, color, and national
origin. 325
This Part addresses the legal fate of each strand of the 1970s sex
segregation litigation. The first section describes the anti-climactic but
unambiguous resolution of the Jane Crow cases, a resolution that not only
killed Jane Crow but also contributed to its constitutional and historical
obscurity. The second section analyzes the Vorchheimer litigation and
reveals how the case highlighted the strategic shortcomings of a sex
discrimination argument based on an analogy to racial segregation.
A. "To Comply with the Statutorily Mandated Scheme ": Jane Crow's
Legal Fate
As we saw in Part IV, African Americans' perspective on sex
segregation revealed the limitations of both of the dominant legal
paradigms-race discrimination and sex discrimination-used by
advocates and judges to assess the constitutionality of sex segregation. In
324. Most of the legal challenges to Jane Crow arose in 1969-70; the Helwig case, also filed in
1974, is an exception.
325. See supra note 10.
2006]
67
Mayeri: The Strange Career of Jane Crow
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
the end, though, neither of these theories governed Jane Crow's legal fate.
Instead, after years of silence, the Fifth Circuit avoided passing judgment
on the constitutionality of sex segregation, deciding the Amite County
case as a clear violation of the EEOA's statutory ban on school
assignments based on race or sex. This statutory resolution in a lower
court meant that the Jane Crow cases not only evaded the Supreme
Court's notice, but also escaped constitutional review altogether.
The decision that killed Jane Crow came several weeks into the 1977
Amite County school boycott when the Fifth Circuit finally issued a ruling
on the district's sex separation policy, seven years after African
Americans first petitioned the district court for relief. The legal landscape
had changed since the Circuit had last addressed a sex segregation
scheme, in the 1972 case United States v. Georgia.326 Then, the court had
affirmed earlier hints that the standard for evaluating such plans was
whether they were motivated by racial discrimination or by valid
educational purposes.327 Now, the racial motivation standard appeared
especially congenial to the Amite County School Board, when compared
with the EEOA, and they clung to it. 328 The school district's lawyers
apparently believed that they would have a better chance enumerating the
educational purposes behind sex segregation than finessing the clear
language of the EEOA. Lawyers for the school district also argued that the
EEOA should be interpreted to allow sex segregation, as it was practiced
in Amite County. Any other interpretation, they asserted, would rest on
the erroneous assumption that Congress intended to safeguard rights
beyond the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's protections.329
By the fall of 1977, the Amite County appeal was before a reconfigured
circuit court panel. Griffin Bell, who previously presided over the
Mississippi desegregation cases, left the court in early 1976 and became
President Jimmy Carter's attorney general in 1977. His replacement on the
panel, Charles Clark, had been President Nixon's first nominee to the Fifth
Circuit. Clark was no stranger to desegregation controversies, having
represented the University of Mississippi Board of Trustees in the dispute
over James Meredith's attempt to integrate Ole Miss in 1961-63.33o
According to historians Frank Read and Lucy McGough, Clark had been
"a vigorous defender of his client's policies of segregation," but had
"earned the respect of the Court's membership in the forthright manner he
disassociated his clients from the intransigent Governor Barnett. '' 331 By
1977, Clark had become "perhaps the most articulate and powerful
spokesman" for judicial restraint on the court, and "as the only member
326. United States v. Georgia, 466 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1972).
327. Id. at 200.
328. United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., 560 F.2d 619, 623 (5th Cir. 1977).
329. Id. at 624.
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. . .with school-age children," he was "acutely aware of some of the
troubling academic and disciplinary problems that can follow forced
integration. 332
In keeping with this philosophy of restraint, Clark avoided the
constitutional question of whether sex segregation violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. Writing for himself and his colleagues Lewis Morgan and
Homer Thornberry, Clark sidestepped questions of Jane Crow's intent and
effect, ruling that the plain language of the EEOA prohibited pupil
assignments based on sex.333 The panel concluded that the EEOA
superseded previous Fifth Circuit doctrine on sex segregation, rendering
the racial motivation standard obsolete. Whether or not the school board
could manufacture "educational purposes" was irrelevant: the language of
the Act, on its face, prohibited pupil assignments based on sex. Further,
Clark argued that Congress had indeed intended the EEOA to supplement
constitutional protections, not merely to vindicate existing rights.334
Though no legislative history concerning the "sex" provisions of the
EEOA existed, the court believed that the act "incorporate[d] a judgment
that a sex-segregated school district is a dual rather than a unitary school
system and results in a similar if not equivalent injury to school children
as would occur if a racially segregated school system were imposed." '335
This was as close as the panel came to addressing the relationship between
race and sex segregation, and it did so not as a constitutional matter, but as
a problem of statutory interpretation.
One week later, Louisiana federal district judge Jack M. Gordon ordered
Jefferson Parish schools to end sex segregation and to develop a
desegregation plan in compliance with federal law.336 In the months to
332. Id. Clark's children were attending the public schools of Jackson, Mississippi, when court-
ordered desegregation commenced. Id.
333. Hinds County, 560 F.2d 619. Clark began by reviewing the procedural history of the case,
describing without comment the factual findings made by district court judge Dan M. Russell back in
1970. Id. at 621 & n.3 ("[C]oncluding that 'the separation by sex plan stems from sound educational
purposes as distinguished from racially discriminatory purposes' .... [t]he district court entered
specific findings that: (1) the separation of the students by sex has produced a unitary school system;
(2) the achievement level of the male students had shown substantial improvement with no lessening
in the level of the female students' improvement; (3) attendance levels of all students had improved;
(4) normal disciplinary problems in school buildings and on busses and playgrounds had declined; (5)
motivation of students and teachers had improved, with measurably improved leadership qualities on
the part of the male students; and (6) the stability of the entire school operation ...resulted in
increased attendance by white students and in better cooperation of the community as a whole.").
Clark then noted that when the court "permitted the temporary use of [this] modified plan, we
expressly noted that our order was 'an interim emergency measure to stabilize the education process in
this school district ... and is not to be construed as a precedent." Id. at 622. He continued, "Nothing
this court has done before or since may be construed as permanently approving this type of student
assignment." Id.
334. Two decades later, the Supreme Court would more narrowly define Congress's enforcement
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in a series of cases beginning with City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
335. Hinds County, 560 F.2d at 623.
336. Sex Segregation Banned in 2d Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1977, at 18; Gordon Gsell, Sex
Segregation Illegal? NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 29, 1977, § 1, at 1. The Jefferson Parish
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follow, the remaining Jane Crow districts began the process of reinstating
coeducation. But although the Fifth Circuit had finally put an end to Jane
Crow, the court declined to mediate the heated disputes over the intent and
effects of sex segregation that the parties and their lawyers had waged for
the better part of a decade. The court did not explore why Congress might
have concluded that sex segregation "results in a similar if not equivalent
injury" to racial segregation, nor did it address the constitutionality of sex
segregation as a tool of racial desegregation. As the next section shows,
the sex segregation case that did reach the Supreme Court produced a
result even less satisfying to opponents of segregation; moreover, it
demonstrated the strategic shortcomings of a sex discrimination argument
based upon an analogy to Jim Crow.
B. "As Orderly a Retreat as Possible": Sex Segregation in the Supreme
Court
In conventional legal narratives of sex separation in public elementary
and secondary schools, the leading case of the 1970s is Vorchheimer v.
School District, which the Supreme Court considered several months
before protests erupted in Amite County, Mississippi.33 7 In Vorchheimer, a
white female student challenged her exclusion from Central High School,
a venerable all-male Philadelphia institution, arguing that Girls' High,
Central's female counterpart, offered a materially inferior and less
prestigious academic experience. A federal district court judge ordered
Susan Vorchheimer's admission to Central, but the Third Circuit reversed,
and the Supreme Court split 4-4, letting the lower court's ruling stand
without passing judgment on the constitutionality of public single-sex
education.
We saw earlier that despite its understandable appeal to feminists, the
sex discrimination argument failed to capture fully the substance of
African Americans' objections to Jane Crow, This section examines the
sex segregation case that did reach the Supreme Court, which as we can
now see, was not representative of much of the sex segregation litigation
of the late 1960s and 1970s. Philadelphia's sex segregation policy was
long-standing, confined to the district's most prestigious high schools, and
unrelated to racial desegregation. In other words, the relationship of sex
segregation to racial segregation in Vorchheimer was more purely
School Board set out a five-year plan for compliance with the court's decision. The plan called for
coeducation in two of the parish's schools in 1978-79, two more in 1979-80, and the final two by the
fall of 1981. Plaintiff Laura Tracy expressed displeasure with the plan's length, noting that she herself
would graduate in 1981. But her mother, Dr. Else Tracy, and their attorney, Jack Peebles, agreed that
more litigation would only prolong the process further. See AFSC Southeastern Public Education
Program, School Board Plan Stands, CREATED EQUAL, Jan. 1978, at 2.
337. Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3rd Cir. 1976), affid by an equally divided court,
430 U.S. 703 (1977) (per curiam).
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analogical, rather than intersectional.338 Vorchheimer illustrates how
even-or perhaps especially-in such a case, a sex discrimination
argument based on an analogy to Jim Crow had its pitfalls as a legal
strategy. As Susan Vorchheimer and her lawyers discovered, positing that
sex segregation was like racial segregation set the constitutional bar
unreachably high for plaintiffs.
In its language and substance, Susan Vorchheimer's class action lawsuit
against the Philadelphia school district echoed the concerns animating
Brown. Filed in the spring of 1974 by local attorney and Girls' High
alumna Sharon Wallis, the complaint asserted that the "sexual segregation
of Philadelphia's academic high schools imposes upon female students a
badge of inferiority, teaching them expressly and by example that they are
not qualified to compete with male students in academic pursuits."33 9
Susan's testimony before federal district court Judge Clarence C.
Newcomer similarly indicated that she feared psychological damage and
material harm if she attended Girls' rather than Central.34 ° Wallis also
cited Central High's long and distinguished history, its large private
endowment, and its record of producing alumni who assumed local and
national leadership positions.3 41 Girls' High, on the other hand, was "less
prestigious," its alumni were "less influential," and its educational
program "traditionally suffered from sexual stereotyping attributing lower
career aspirations to women. ' '342 In contrast to the meticulously assembled
social science evidence in Brown, though, Wallis presented no
psychological or sociological data on the effects of sex segregation on
girls. For its part, the school district called two experts to testify about the
purported educational benefits of single-sex education.
District Judge Newcomer was persuaded neither by Wallis's analogy to
Brown nor by the school district's assertion of single-sex education's
pedagogical rewards. Oddly, the judge opined that the substantially equal
education offered by Central and Girls' High Schools took the case "out of
the realm of Brown v. Board of Education."343 Moreover, he explicitly
rejected Wallis's argument that the exclusion of girls from Central High
created a feeling of inferiority in female students, noting that even if the
338. The origins of sex-segregated education in the North were hardly free of racial, ethnic, and
class undertones; in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, single-sex schools assuaged nativist
fears about mixing with immigrants and middle-class aversion to the "rough" ways of poor boys and
girls. See DAVID TYACK & ELIZABETH HANSOT, LEARNING TOGETHER: A HISTORY OF COEDUCATION
IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 95 (1992).
339. Appendix at 9a, Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (No. 76-37) [hereinafter
"Vorchheimer Appendix"].
340. Id. at 9a-10a; Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1975) ("1 didn't
think I would be able to go there for three years and not be harmed in any way by it.").
341. Vorchheimer Appendix, supra note 339, at 9a.
342. Id.
343. This statement is odd because the import of Brown rested on the very fact that the decision
did not depend upon a showing that school facilities provided to black and white children were
materially unequal. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("Separate but equal educational
facilities are inherently unequal.") (emphasis added).
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much-criticized sociological evidence cited in Brown was legitimate, the
plaintiff had not presented any evidence of psychological detriment here.
Instead, Newcomer staked the outcome of the case on the appropriate
equal protection standard of review, and after concluding that heightened
scrutiny applied, he found that no legitimate educational objectives
justified Central's refusal to admit girls. If the district's true purpose was
to protect girls from the disadvantages of coeducation, then all of
Philadelphia's schools should be sex-segregated, he argued. "[M]ales, and
not females, are the intended beneficiaries of defendants' exclusionary
policy," he concluded.34 4 When the court ordered Central High to admit
female students, the district initially moved to comply with the ruling, but
irate alumni convinced the school board to appeal.345
The Third Circuit, like the lower court, rejected the plaintiff's analogy to
racial segregation. But unlike Judge Newcomer, the panel's majority
concluded that not even the Supreme Court's new sex discrimination
jurisprudence could redeem Susan Vorchheimer's claim. Judge Joseph
Francis Weis, Jr. wrote for the court that the "substantial equality" of
Central and Girls' High Schools took the case not only out of realm of
Brown, but also out of the realm of heightened scrutiny. Even if
heightened scrutiny were applicable, Weis contended, the school district
had presented "sufficient evidence to establish that a legitimate
educational policy may be served by utilizing single-sex high schools. 346
Significantly, Weis suggested that the intent underlying the maintenance
of single-sex schools was of primary importance. Although sex separation
"has limited acceptance on its merit," the judge wrote, "it does have its
basis in a theory of equal benefit and not discriminatory denial. 3 47 Unlike
racial segregation, the majority asserted, sex separation was born of
benign intentions.
344. Vorchheimer, 400 F. Supp. at 342.
345. Superintendent Michael Marcase declared himself a "proponent of coeducational schools,"
stating that he was "more concerned about maintaining the academic standards than the composition
of the school." Ewart Rouse and Steve Twomey, Judge Tells Central High to Go Co-ed,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 8, 1975, at 1-A. Board of Education President Arthur Thomas opined
that appealing to a higher court "would be an exercise in futility." Id. The editorial board of the
Philadelphia Inquirer heartily approved Judge Newcomer's ruling, declaring that "[t]o require
separation of students by sex, as a matter of public school policy, may have seemed normal in the 19th
century but is an anachronism in this day and age." Editorial, Central High Will Survive,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 15, 1975. Some alumni also were resigned to the admission of girls to
Central. Philadelphia's African American mayoral candidate, Charles Bowser, himself a Central
alumnus, acknowledged that though he found the change "uncomfortable," he was "sure there are
talented young women that will benefit from [Central] as much as I did." Robert Fowler, Central
Alumni Taken By Surprise, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 8, 1975, at 2-C. However, many Central
alumni, and some school board members, expressed their displeasure. Tobyann Boonin, a Girls' High
graduate whose husband and three sons were Central alumni, urged her fellow board members to
appeal Judge Newcomer's decision, while 1959 Central graduate Barry Bannett lamented that the
admission of girls would "destroy[] the integrity of the school." By the end of August, opponents of
coeducation in Philadelphia's elite public high schools had convinced the school board to appeal the
judge's ruling. Rouse and Twomey, supra at 2-A; Fowler, supra at 2-C.
346. Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 887-88 (3d Cir. 1976).
347. Id. at 887.
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Dissenting Judge John J. Gibbons strongly disagreed, opening his
opinion with an extended comparison of Weis's reasoning to Plessy v.
Ferguson.348 Noting the majority's emphasis on the voluntary nature of
Susan Vorchheimer's choice of an "academic" high school over other
educational alternatives, Gibbons retorted:
It was "voluntary," but only in the same sense that Mr. Plessy
voluntarily chose to ride the train in Louisiana. The train
Vorchheimer wants to ride is that of a rigorous academic program
among her intellectual peers. Philadelphia, like the state of Louisiana
in 1896, offers the service but only if Vorchheimer is willing to
submit to segregation. Her choice, like Plessy's, is to submit to that
segregation or refrain from availing herself of the service.349
For the first and only time in the Vorchheimer litigation, the analogy
between sex separation and racial segregation gained a judicial adherent.
The content of the certiorari petition and briefs filed in Vorchheimer
have led some scholars to surmise that Ruth Bader Ginsburg, then head of
the ACLU Women's Rights Project (WRP), pursued a strategy based on a
full-blown parallel between race and sex segregation, using Brown as a
model for arguing the Philadelphia case."' In fact, Ginsburg's papers
reveal that she recognized the strategic pitfalls of such an approach, and
worked actively to downplay the analogy that Susan Vorchheimer's
original attorney had promoted in the lower courts and in her draft
certiorari petition. Many judges, Ginsburg realized, saw sex separation as
benignly intended, devoid of the invidious purposes and hostile
motivations of racial segregation. Framing the Vorchheimer case as
analogous to Brown, she anticipated, could be interpreted as a broad-based
attack on single-sex education as inherently unequal in all
circumstances-a position the Supreme Court was unlikely to embrace.
As we shall see, records of the Court's internal deliberations vindicate
Ginsburg's concern.
Ginsburg's Women's Rights Project, enlisted to help Wallis with
Vorchheimer's Supreme Court appeal, was anxious to avoid the bold
parallel embraced by Judge Gibbons's dissent. WRP attorneys initially
348. Gibbons wrote:
I was under the distinct impression ... that "separate but equal" analysis, especially in the field
of public education, passed from the fourteenth amendment jurisprudential scene over twenty
years ago. The majority opinion in establishing a twentieth-century sexual equivalent to the
Plessy decision, reminds us that the doctrine can and will be invoked to support sexual
discrimination in the same manner that it supported discrimination prior to Brown.
Id. at 888-89 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Gibbons, like Newcomer and Weis, was a Nixon appointee.
349. Id. at 889.
350. See, e.g., Michael Heise, Are Single-Sex Schools Inherently Unequal?, 102 MICH. L. REV.
1219, 1228-29 (2004) (reviewing ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, SAME, DIFFERENT, EQUAL: RETHINKING
SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLING (2004)). Before examining archival sources, I too assumed that the WRP was
in control of the Vorchheimer litigation. See Mayeri, supra note 189, at 1078 n.162 ("Unlike most
post-Frontiero cases, the WRP utilized race-sex analogies in Vorchheimer.").
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expressed optimism that they could forge a cooperative relationship with
Wallis, and Ginsburg declared herself "[g]lad all of us agree that separate
and unequal is the position we should push."35' But their collaboration
eventually deteriorated. The problems began with Wallis's draft petition
for certiorari, which Ginsburg thought, among other problems,
"overplay[ed] the sex/race analogy" and got "into hot water" on the issue
of whether schools that excluded whites or males were constitutionally
problematic." 2 Deficiencies in the factual record also dismayed WRP
lawyers as they attempted to help Wallis with her submissions to the
Court.353 The high quality of the Philadelphia school district's brief
"convince[d]" Ginsburg that the WRP was "on the right track" in
proceeding cautiously.354 The school district refuted the race parallel and
emphasized the possibly fatal consequences for single-sex education if the
plaintiffs prevailed. "Now," Ginsburg wrote to her colleagues, "we must
go even further to make it plain that our class seeks no 'sweeping' change,
leaves 'the system' intact, and 'freedom of choice' an open question." '355
But the WRP lost control over Vorchheimer's reply brief after a dispute
with Wallis over its content.356
Before the WRP and Wallis parted ways, Ginsburg drafted her own
reply brief, which contrasted with Wallis's eventual submission to the
Court in its treatment of the race analogy, among other issues of form and
substance. Though Wallis's brief disclaimed any contention "that gender
based classifications in education are totally analogous to those based on
race," she quoted extensively from Brown, including the decision's
"inherently unequal" language. Ginsburg's draft, instead, invited the Court
to consider sex segregation on its own terms, and in a particular historical
context. She wanted to assure the Justices that petitioners were not
351. Memorandum from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Jill Goodman (May 11, 1976) (on file with the
Library of Congress, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, Container 9, Folder: Vorchheimer v. School Dist,
Correspondence, 1976).
352. Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Jill Goodman 1-2 (June 11, 1976) (Library of Congress,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, Container 9, Folder: Vorchheimer v. School Dist., Correspondence,
1976).
353. Id.
354. Memorandum from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Sharon K. Wallis, Jill Laurie Goodman, &
Lynn Hecht Schafran 1 (Jan. 11, 1977) (Library of Congress, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, Container
9, Folder: Vorchheimer v. School Dist., Correspondence, 1977).
355. Id.
356. Chagrined by what its attorneys viewed as the low quality of Wallis's draft, the ACLU
conditioned its assumption of printing costs upon her acceptance of their suggested changes.
According to ACLU lawyer Spencer Coxe, Wallis told him "it was better to agree to disagree," and
that "she would go her own way." Letter from Spencer Coxe to Kathleen Peratis, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, & Lou Pollak (Feb. 23, 1977) (Library of Congress, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, Container
9, Folder: Vorchheimer v. School Dist., Correspondence, 1977). The WRP offered to assist her in the
oral argument, but Wallis "made it clear that she wanted to proceed on her own. And so," concluded
Coxe, "the sorry tale ends." Id. Justice Lewis Powell, for one, found Wallis's oral argument "entirely
confusing... no help." Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Oral Argument Notes, 76-37 Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist.
(Feb. 22, 1977) (on file with Powell Archives, Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis
F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files).
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"request[ing] an order abolishing single-sex schools as an educational
alternative," nor were they "assert[ing] that single-sex schools are per se
impermissible." Rather, the WRP's tightly written missive focused on the
history of single-sex elite education in Philadelphia, arguing that
"reservation of Central to young men has deep roots in 'sexist concepts
once and still prevalent about women."' The policy "simply perpetuat[ed]
the gender line drawn in 1836," and reinscribed in the 1890s when
feminists failed in their effort to move women into "intransigent" "male
bastions" and instead were forced to settle for separate and inferior
schools.357 Ginsburg's reply brief never reached the Court in an official
capacity, but she did distribute the document to a number of interested
parties, including New York Times reporter Lesley Oelsner, Assistant
Attorney General Drew Days, and Jerry Lynch, Ginsburg's former student
and a law clerk to Justice William Brennan.358
Records of the Court's deliberations suggest that Ginsburg's concerns
about over-zealously promoting a race analogy were well-founded. With
Justice William Rehnquist sidelined by chronic back pain, Sharon Wallis
made her argument to only eight of the nine Justices. After the Justices'
first conference, Lynch was optimistic about the plaintiffs prospects: four
members of the Court-Brennan, Potter Stewart, Thurgood Marshall, and
Lewis Powell-"agreed that while the findings of the district court
regarding the equality of the boys' and girls' schools were somewhat
ambiguous, they could and should be read to mean that the schools were
not in fact of equal prestige and quality." Consequently, they agreed that
"the court of appeals' judgment upholding the sex segregation should be
reversed." '359 Three Justices-Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, and
Chief Justice Warren Burger-"found that the two schools were
substantially equivalent, that complete equality was unnecessary, and that
the state should have freedom to experiment." These three would therefore
affirm the Third Circuit's judgment.36° Justice Byron White felt the factual
record on inequalities between the boys' and girls' schools was
insufficiently developed, and thus tentatively voted to remand the case for
further fact-finding. 361
By the Justices' second conference vote, however, Chief Justice Burger
was concerned that the Court would find itself equally divided on
357. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 7-11, Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., No.
76-37 (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, Container 10, Folder:
Vorchheimer v. School Dist. Pleadings, 1976-1977) (draft: never filed).
358. See letters contained in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Papers, Container 9, Folder: Vorchheimer v. School Dist., Correspondence, 1977.
359. Memorandum from J.L. [Jerry Lynch] to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. 1, Re: The Line-up
in Vorchheimer, 76-37 (on file with the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, Part
:421, Folder: Vorchheimer v. School Dist.).
360. Id.
361. Id. This was also the position of the United States. See Memorandum for the United States
as Amicus Curiae, Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (No. 76-37).
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Vorchheimer.362 "In my view," he wrote, "action by an equally divided
Court would be open to valid criticism as an institutional failure to meet
our obligations." '363 Therefore, Burger told his colleagues, his preference
would be to canvass Justice Rehnquist's view, or, alternatively, to have
the case reargued in the presence of all nine Justices. 31 "Obviously,"
Burger declared, "we did not take this case to evaluate findings against the
record but only to decide whether gender separated equal schools are
'inherently unequal,' and that issue should neither be evaded nor
delayed."365
Defining the issue presented by Vorchheimer this broadly was exactly
the pitfall Ginsburg and her WRP colleagues had sought to avoid.366 If
Burger could frame Vorchheimer as a question of whether separate but
equal was "inherently unequal" in the context of single-sex education, he
was assured victory. And Burger could safely call for reargument without
jeopardizing his position, knowing that it was highly unlikely that
Rehnquist would vote to reverse. Burger did not succeed, however, in
convincing five of his colleagues to vote for reargument, so the 4-4 split
meant that the Third Circuit's ruling against Vorchheimer would stand.367
362. When neither remand nor reargument commanded a majority of Justices, White voted to
affirm. See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Conference Notes, 76-37 Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. (Mar. 25, 1977)
(Powell Archives, Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers,
Supreme Court Case Files).
363. Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the Conference (Apr. 11, 1977)
(Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, Part 1:421, Folder: Vorchheimer v. School
Dist.). The Chief Justice was still smarting from criticism the Court suffered three years earlier for
failing to resolve the questions raised by the University of Washington Law School affirmative action
case DeFunis v. Odegaard. Id. ("I have an uneasy feeling that the DeFunis case will be linked with
this--erroneously, of course; but it may appear even to some thoughtful people that the Court had
evaded the issue at a time when the addition of one hour to the argument session would produce a
definitive result.").
364. Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the Conference, Re: Vorchheimer v.
Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia (Mar. 9, 1977) (Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, Part
1:421, Folder: Vorchheimer v. School Dist.).
365. Id.
366. Justice Powell noted that four Justices disagreed with Chief Justice Burger's judgment that
the "separate is inherently unequal" question was properly presented. See Memorandum from Warren
E. Burger to the Conference, Re: 76-37 Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia (Mar. 9, 1977)
(Powell Archives, Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers,
Supreme Court Case Files) (Powell wrote in the margin: "But 4 Justices are convinced this question is
not fairly presented by this case"). The Justices who might vote to reverse the Third Circuit's decision
were not doing so on the grounds that all sex separation was unconstitutional per se. Rather, they were
confining themselves to the specific facts of the Philadelphia case, where girls were excluded from a
school with superior tangible and intangible qualities.
367. Blackmun, also on the side of the school district, agreed that "the Court will look bad, or at
least awkward" if an equally divided vote were the result, and thus voted to reargue. Memorandum
from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Re: Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of
Philadelphia (Apr. 18, 1977) (Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, Part 1:421, Folder:
Vorchheimer v. School Dist.). White, too, favored reargument. Memorandum from Justice Byron R.
White to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (Apr. 18, 1977) (Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr.
Papers, Part 1:421, Folder: Vorchheimer v. School Dist.). Stevens did not, however, and apparently
only one other Justice did. Memorandum from Justice John Paul Stevens to Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger (Apr. 18, 1977) (Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, Part 1:421, Folder:
Vorchheimer v. School Dist.); Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice Harry A.
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The Chief Justice wrote to Blackmun that he was resigned to the
inconclusive result. "[U]ntil the Court gives me two votes as in ancient
English law when a court is equally divided, I find it difficult to cope with
four unregenerate, unreconstructed 'rebels'! In which case I conduct as
orderly a retreat as possible. 368
To the Court's critics, it was jurisprudential coherence that appeared to
be in retreat. WRP director Kathleen Willert Peratis expressed her
frustration with the Court's capriciousness, complaining that "[e]very case
seems to be decided on its own facts, depending on how the Court felt that
day," and Ginsburg agreed that "the Court is not giving courts and lawyers
the guidance" they needed.369 The following year, Ginsburg reflected that
perhaps the sex segregation issue had reached the Court too soon, without
the "generation of litigation" that had laid the legal and sociological
groundwork for Brown.370 In a speech several months later, she noted
wistfully "the case that could have been"-Helwig v. Jefferson Parish
School Board.37 1
Though Ginsburg did not elaborate on her reference to "the case that
could have been," it is not difficult to imagine why Helwig seemed a
better sex segregation test case than Vorchheimer. First and foremost,
Helwig supplied the invidious intent missing from Vorchheimer. While the
Third Circuit had found Philadelphia's policy to be based in a "theory of
equal benefit" rather than "discriminatory denial," there was little question
that racial motivations tainted the origins of sex segregation in Louisiana.
As Tulane Law Professor and Helwig's expert witness Melvin Gruwell
put it, "there was a very, very definite tie between the policy of
segregation by sex and the problems of racial desegregation. '"372 Further,
Blackmun, Re: Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia (Apr. 18, 1977) (Library of Congress,
William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, Part 1:421, Folder: Vorchheimer v. School Dist.) ("We will look 'bad'
and the four who voted to reargue need not waive the ancient right to say 'What did we tell you!"').
See also Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Warren E. Burger, Re: No. 76-37 Vorchheimer v. Sch.
Dist. (Apr. 18, 1977) (Powell Archives, Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files) ("As I view the case as involving unique facts, I am
content to 'let the chips lie where they fell.'").
368. Id.
369. Lesley Oelsner, Recent Supreme Court Rulings Have Set Back Women's Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Jul. 7, 1977. Reflecting on the 1976-77 Term as a whole, Times reporter Lesley Oelsner declared that
the Supreme Court's year "went against women-heavily," quoting an anonymous law clerk who
summarized the Term similarly: "This was the year the women lost." Quoted in id.
370. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, George Abel Dreyfus Lecture on Civil Liberties, Tulane University
School of Law, at 39 (Feb. 13, 1978) (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Papers, Container 13, Folder: Speech File, Feb. 13, 1978).
371. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Chapel Hill Address, at 22-23 (Sept. 22, 1978) (Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, Container 14, Folder: Speech File, Sept. 22, 1978)
("Briefly, before turning to Vorchheimer, I should note the case that could have been. The Louisiana
ACLU filed it in 197[4]. Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, segregated its high schools by sex the very day
the schools were integrated by race. Separate and unequal opportunities were shown, and race
discrimination in the background was apparent. But the trial court sat on the case for years, and
refused to decide it.").
372. AFSC Report, supra note 206, at 101. The editorial board of the New Orleans Times-
Picayune expressed the same view of sex segregation's origins in a pair of 1977 editorials praising the
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in contrast to the sparse Vorchheimer record, the plaintiffs' attorney had
compiled more compelling evidence in the Helwig case, replete with
psychological and sociological assessments of sex segregation's harmful
effects on girls and assertions of material disparities between the boys'
and girls' schools. As Ginsburg reflected in 1978, "Brown v. Board of
Education had been preceded by a generation of litigation in which
decisions turned on the markedly inferior opportunities afforded blacks,
on inequalities solidly demonstrated at trial .... Vorchheimer may have
been a case brought to the Court too soon, and with too spare a record. 373
Vorchheimer thus failed to live up to the demands of a race analogy on
multiple levels. The case had not showcased a well-developed factual and
social science record comparable to that presented in Brown. That
deficiency, as Ginsburg's comments suggest, might have been
preventable. The strategic shortcomings of an analogy to racial
segregation were more difficult to overcome. If sex segregation had to
look just like racial segregation to be recognized as a constitutional harm,
the battle was over before it began. If, as Ginsburg believed, the courts
had trouble seeing the resemblance between sex separation and racial
segregation when feminists framed their relationship as abstractly
analogous, perhaps they would have been more willing to find
constitutional harm when, as in the Jane Crow cases, the two phenomena
were concretely interrelated. Instead, the Jane Crow cases remained
doomed to constitutional obscurity.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
DISCOURSE
The post-Brown debate over sex-segregated education provides an
example of an evolving legal discourse, in which historical actors
repeatedly redefined the social benefits of, and the legal and constitutional
harms perpetuated by, a single social practice. The transformation of anti-
discrimination discourse proceeded in overlapping stages. In the first
phase, sex segregation remained relatively immune from legal challenge.
In the second, disputants evaluated Jane Crow as a question of race
discrimination. In the third stage, while race discrimination did not
disappear from sight, sex discrimination became the primary lens through
which participants in the debate viewed sex segregation. Each of these
legal paradigms-non-discrimination, race discrimination, and sex
discrimination--offered certain substantive and strategic advantages to
those seeking to define the harm of segregation and fashion a remedy to
imminent return of coeducation. See Editorial, Boys and Girls Together, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Oct. 1, 1977, § 1, at 22 ("[Sex segregation] was begun 15 years ago in response to a court
order to end racial segregation."); Editorial, Kudos for Jeff School Board, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Oct. 10, 1977, § 1, at 18 (praising the school board for "start[ing] to erase a mistake made
during emotional and difficult times," and for "refusing to give in to the prejudices of the past").
373. Ginsburg, Dreyfus Lecture, supra note 370, at 39.
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the injustice visited upon children, especially African American children,
subjected to educational apartheid. Each, however, also contained
significant flaws: each, in different ways, obscured what was at stake for
the communities affected by Jane Crow; each provided only a partial
characterization of sex segregation's harm; and each entailed strategic
dilemmas for advocates seeking legal and constitutional change.
As we saw in Part I, sex separation proposals in the period from 1954 to
the mid-1960s reflected a complicated mixture of political posturing and
pragmatism, revealing how blurry were the lines between extremism and
moderation in Southern segregation politics. The ambiguity and instability
of Jane Crow's meaning, for better or worse, were on full display during
this period. For some Southern lawmakers, calling for segregation by sex
was nothing more than an attempt to bolster one's credentials as an ardent
segregationist and opponent of "race-mixing," to endorse the hysteria
animating the angry mobs of white parents who shouted obscenities at
black children and the politicians who built careers inciting them. For
many proponents of sex segregation, though, Jane Crow was a well-
intentioned, realistic response to white Southerners' most visceral and
intractable objections to racial integration. For moderates, sex segregation
provided the elusive middle ground between steadfast resistance to and
wholehearted acceptance of an educational environment that augured the
possibility of interracial intimacy.
In the volatile climate of Southern segregation politics, the virtually
unchallenged constitutional and legal legitimacy of sex segregation was
double-edged. On the one hand, that legitimacy enabled pragmatists to
suggest a solution that they believed might save Southern public schools
from violent upheaval and ultimate destruction. Limited evidence suggests
that many African Americans were willing to overlook the racial insult
implicit in Jane Crow in order to vanquish Jim Crow: after all, it was
educational quality, not what some euphemistically called "social
equality," that they most fervently hoped integration would bring. On the
other hand, the principal obstacle to recognizing sex segregation as
racially discriminatory was not substantive but strategic. At a time when
the Supreme Court assiduously avoided linking desegregation of public
facilities to interracial marriage, proponents of school desegregation likely
were loath to imply that coeducation was a necessary ingredient of racial
equity. To do so was to lend credence to segregationists' apocalyptic
claims that racial integration paved an inexorable path to "amalgamation."
The constitutional legitimacy of sex segregation as an antidote to racial
desegregation conveyed an unspoken understanding that if the states could
ban interracial cohabitation and "miscegenation" outright, then surely they
could take steps to curb the social precursors to interracial intimacy. To
protest sex segregation as racially discriminatory would have disturbed the
tacit bargain underlying Brown itself. Jane Crow's constitutional
legitimacy thus reflected the precarious politics of education and
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interracial intimacy more than the unconstrained preferences of
communities attempting to dismantle Jim Crow.
While the motivations underlying sex segregation as a feature of racial
desegregation plans changed little between 1954 and 1968, by the time the
second phase of the Jane Crow debate began, the legal, political, and
cultural context had undergone significant transformations.374 As Part II
related, after McLaughlin and Loving, anti-miscegenation policies no
longer enjoyed constitutional legitimacy, and civil rights advocates could
more comfortably frame prophylactics against interracial intimacy as
racial discrimination designed to maintain white supremacy. 75 African
American activism was enabled by and helped to shape a race
discrimination paradigm for evaluating Jane Crow. A new legal standard
quickly emerged in the Fifth Circuit: courts launched inquiries into
whether sex segregation was motivated by "racial discrimination" or by
legitimate "educational purposes." African Americans in many school
districts, sometimes with the support of the federal government, argued
that sex segregation "perpetuate[d] racial segregation by subterfuge" and
should be disallowed. The in-court testimony and out-of-court protests of
African Americans persuaded a significant number of judges to reject Jane
Crow, including some who initially had embraced sex segregation.
The race discrimination paradigm thus proved a significant advance in
that it enabled African American communities to voice their objections to
sex segregation, and, in many instances, to end the practice once and for
all. However, the racial motivation standard entailed significant
drawbacks. First, by allowing school districts to advance "educational
purposes" as a defense, the standard encouraged the manufacture of race-
neutral explanations that obscured the true impetus behind sex
segregation. School districts had a strong incentive-if not a tactical
imperative-to turn litigation over Jane Crow into a dispute over the
virtues of single-sex- versus co-education. Despite their continuing
conviction that sex separation was necessary to stem white flight and the
withdrawal of public school funding, school officials began to downplay
sex segregation's origins in racial desegregation panic, focusing instead on
the merits of single-sex schooling and the shortcomings of coeducation.
Second, the racial motivation standard focused attention on the purpose
or motivation underlying sex segregation, but the longer-term
determinants of African Americans' attitudes toward Jane Crow turned out
374. Guess Who's Coming to Dinner, the Sidney Poitier film depicting the reaction of a white
woman's liberal parents to her decision to wed an African American man, is perhaps the best-known
reflection of changing views of interracial marriage in mainstream American culture. GUESS WHO'S
COMING TO DINNER (Columbia Pictures, 1967). For more on the changing cultural context during this
period, see ROMANO, supra note 27, at 175-215.
375. On the nature of the constitutional harm identified in McLaughlin and Loving, as opposed to
the harm addressed in Brown, see Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
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to be more complicated, as we saw in Part IV. A comparison between two
demographically similar school districts in Georgia and Mississippi
suggests that in communities where whites kept their children and
financial resources in the schools and where black and white teachers and
administrators successfully cooperated in a racially integrated
environment, African Americans tolerated sex segregation as a long-term
transitional measure. In contrast, where whites fled the public schools and
withdrew their financial support, but retained administrative control over
now-predominantly black schools, African American opposition to Jane
Crow escalated during the 1970s. Thus the animating purpose or intent of
sex segregation-the primary object of the racial motivation standard's
inquiry-may have been less important in the long run than its practical
effects on white behavior and on black educational self-determination.376
Finally, the racial motivation standard, untouched as it was by any
recognition of emerging anti-sex discrimination norms, enabled school
districts to utilize a set of gender-based assumptions about the proper
education of boys and girls in their enumeration of the valid "educational
purposes" underlying sex segregation. This second phase of the Jane Crow
debate provides a striking example of how accepted gender norms could
stand in for discredited, or at least sharply contested, racial beliefs. In
constructing "educational purposes," school districts reached for rationales
that reflected widely-held attitudes regarding sex differences, gender roles,
and sexuality. They suggested, in effect, that even if Americans disagreed
about the merits of racial segregation, all could agree that girls and boys
differed in important ways, that providing sex-specific training to students
was sensible and economically efficient, and that separating the sexes
could help to mitigate "disciplinary" and "sex" "problems" in the schools.
Jane Crow's defenders hoped that as racial barriers fell, a gender
consensus might stem the tide of social change, or at least save public
education from white flight and financial insolvency.377
The race-neutral justifications offered by school districts evinced no
concern whatever about the possibility of a sex discrimination challenge to
Jane Crow, although in hindsight, the "educational purposes" justifications
appear to invite such a challenge. That challenge soon came, for the very
gender consensus that defendant school districts had relied upon was
unraveling rapidly. The third phase of the sex segregation debate,
described in Part III, witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of legal
tools with which to combat discrimination based on sex, including a new
376. On the gap between the goals of civil rights lawyers and those of their clients with respect to
educational desegregation, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
377. For fascinating discussions of the interplay between gender and race in the emergence of
railroad segregation, see BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE,
LAW, AND THE RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 1865-1920 (2001); and Barbara Y. Welke, When All the
Women Were White and All the Blacks Were Men: Gender, Class, Race, and the Road to Plessy, 1855-
1914, 13 L. &HIST. REV. 261 (1995).
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constitutional sex equality jurisprudence and statutory weapons like Title
IX and the EEOA. Significantly, the feminist legal arsenal relied heavily
on an analogy between sex and race discrimination, and the battle over
Jane Crow was no exception. The first widely-read treatment of the
"Constitutionality of Sex Separation in School Desegregation Plans,"
published in 1970, argued that sex segregation inflicted psychological and
material harms on girls similar to those imposed upon African American
children by Jim Crow. Organizations like the ACLU, NOW, and the
League of Women Voters followed suit. Helwig v. Jefferson Parish
School Board, filed in 1974, made sex discrimination the centerpiece of an
assault on sex segregation that eventually broadened to include school
districts throughout the South. By the time the AFSC issued its report on
Title IX implementation in Southern schools in 1977, a fully-developed
sex discrimination argument, based upon a deliberate parallel to racial
segregation, had become the centerpiece of the legal discourse on Jane
Crow.
The sex discrimination argument against Jane Crow had considerable
appeal. First, it made legally cognizable the objections that local women's
rights advocates in communities like Jefferson Parish raised against sex
segregation. There, local activists had been concerned about sex
segregation's effects on girls since at least the late 1960s, and saw their
efforts as part of a wider effort to eradicate sex discrimination in education
and other realms. Notably, the sex discrimination argument enjoyed a
potentially large and powerful constituency-white women-whose
grievances might move white school officials to action where African
American protests had not. Even without this grassroots impetus, the mere
availability of sex discrimination theories and precedents, when race
discrimination arguments alone had failed to move courts, may well have
brought these arguments to the forefront. Lawyers challenging sex
segregation would have been remiss had they not exploited the emerging
constitutional sex equality jurisprudence, Title IX, the EEOA, and the
other legal tools newly at their disposal.
These available sex discrimination theories drew in large part on an
analogy to race: Ginsburg's WRP had argued that sex-based
classifications should, like classifications based on race, be strictly
scrutinized as suspect; Title IX, as John David Skrentny has shown, was
the product of a race-sex analogy as well.378 Basing the sex discrimination
argument on an analogy to racial segregation offered significant
advantages. For one thing, comparing sex segregation to Jim Crow helped
to recast what had been seen as benign differences in treatment as
invidious discrimination. After all, as Robert Barnett reminded his readers
in 1970, "the actions of the dominant groups toward both blacks and
women were thought to be in the best interest of the subordinate
378. SKRENTNY, supra note 194, at 230-62.
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groups."379 Advocates had to convince legal decisionmakers that just as
these debilitating racial attitudes required exposure and deliberate
eradication, so did long-accepted principles of sex-based differentiation
and subordination.380
Further, the particular trajectory of the legal debate over sex segregation
militated in favor of arguments that focused on harm to girls, as the
analogy-based sex discrimination argument did. The racial motivation
standard encouraged school districts to emphasize the educational
rationale for single-sex education, and the justifications they cited often
relied on theories of sex difference that reinforced the very gender
stereotypes that Title IX and the Court's new sex equality jurisprudence
repudiated. The pedagogical benefits that Jane Crow school districts
attributed to sex segregation mostly accrued to boys, according to the
theory that the pressures of female competition undermined male gender
identity and academic performance. The analogy-based sex discrimination
paradigm effectively changed the subject from whether single-sex
education helped boys to whether it harmed girls, enabling advocates to
answer school districts' "educational purposes" arguments when they
were unable to prove "racial motivation" to a court's satisfaction.
If opponents of race and sex segregation could benefit from including
sex discrimination arguments in their legal arsenal, the women's
movement, conversely, had much to gain from introducing the Jane Crow
cases into sex equality doctrine. The race-sex analogy ran into trouble in
cases like Vorchheimer in large part because judges saw sex segregation
as benignly intended. The Southern sex segregation cases more vividly
presented a policy arguably based-to invert the language of the Third
Circuit majority-not on a theory of "equal benefit," but on one of
"discriminatory denial." The Jane Crow fact patterns thus supplied the
invidious intent element missing from cases like Vorchheimer, laying bare
the underbelly of sex segregation in a nation riven by racial and class
divisions. Feminists knew that they might be able to prevail Without
convincing judges to see sex segregation as exactly parallel to racial
segregation. But by the mid-1970s, they also knew that the comparison
was unavoidable. A factual context in which race and sex segregation
were deeply intertwined helped them to make the case that nefarious
purposes often lurked behind the seemingly benign faqade of social
science evidence and the "wisdom of the ages."
Like the racial motivation standard, the sex discrimination argument
against sex segregation also exhibited both substantive and strategic flaws.
As we saw in Part IV, the developing legal discourse of sex discrimination
failed to capture fully what African Americans articulated as the harm of
sex segregation. Emphasizing sex segregation's detrimental effect on girls
379. Barnett, Note, supra note 186, at 313.
380. For more on the rhetorical and persuasive power of race-sex analogies, see Mayeri, supra
note 189.
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minimized the extent to which the harm of segregation afflicted boys. The
analogy-based paradigm placed a premium on the subordination of one
group to another, rather than recognizing that segregation might harm all
students by imposing rigid sex roles on both boys and girls. For the
African American community of Amite County, Mississippi, the injury of
sex segregation extended to both sexes: Jane Crow curtailed curricular
choices for boys who wished to learn home economics as well as for girls
who wanted to take shop. If anything, the psychological stigma of sex
segregation particularly affected black boys, whose alleged propensity to
prey upon white girls animated the policy. Boys also bore many of the
material disadvantages of sex segregation, since they attended formerly
black schools while the better-equipped white facilities were reserved for
girls.38' Further, thinking about Jane Crow and Jim Crow as analogues,
like talking about the plight of girls as monolithic, obscured the extent to
which sex segregation may have affected white and black girls quite
differently.382
The dominant legal sex discrimination paradigm, based as it was on an
analogy to race, also had profound strategic drawbacks as a constitutional
argument. When the Jane Crow cases failed to reach the Supreme Court,
the Vorchheimer litigation provided the Justices' only opportunity to
address the legality of sex-segregated public secondary schools. Despite
Ginsburg's best efforts to frame sex discrimination on its own terms,
through a limited, rather than a full-blown analogy to Jim Crow, the
question of whether sex- segregated schooling was, like racial segregation,
"inherently unequal," haunted Susan Vorchheimer's supporters.
Analogical arguments about the harm of sex segregation proved too much:
most judges were unwilling to accept a full-fledged parallel between race
and sex segregation, and so long as unsympathetic jurists could frame the
question as one of analogy or dis-analogy, the sex discrimination
argument was doomed to fail.
The sex discrimination argument was not uniquely flawed: as we have
seen, each phase of the legal discourse on Jane Crow obscured, in some
way, sex segregation's harm as articulated by the affected parties.
Ironically, the race and sex discrimination paradigms that developed to
combat sex segregation also shielded certain aspects of the Jane Crow
debate itself from critical scrutiny. Perhaps the most striking way in which
the legal discourse masked the underlying issues at stake in disputants'
out-of-court discussions was the way in which the anti-discrimination
381. For an intriguing discussion of Brown's stigma rationale and its relationship to African
American ambivalence toward school desegregation, see Tomiko Brown-Nagin, An Historical Note on
the Significance of the Stigma Rationale for a Civil Rights Landmark, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 991 (2004).
382. As I have argued elsewhere, analogical arguments about race and sex discrimination did not
necessarily obscure the position of women of color; in fact, African American feminists originally
invoked such analogies for precisely the opposite purpose. See Mayeri, supra note 189. For more on
the differential effects of sex segregation on different groups of women and girls, see, for example,
sources cited supra note 4.
[Vol. 18:187
84
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol18/iss2/2
Mayeri
model failed to challenge, or even to confront, presuppositions about
children's sociability and sexuality that animated supporters and
opponents of sex segregation. In the first phase of the Jane Crow debate,
assumptions about adolescent sexuality and interracial intimacy lurked
close to the surface. Before concerns about race and sex discrimination
intervened, the entire justification for sex segregation rested upon the
notion that children who attended school together would attain the
physical and social proximity that inevitably would lead to relationships
with students of the opposite sex. But under the racial motivation standard,
it behooved Jane Crow's defenders to downplay the fears of interracial
intimacy that underpinned sex segregation schemes; instead, disputants
referred to "sex problems" and "disciplinary problems" associated with
coeducation. The sex discrimination argument, by focusing on the
subordination of girls under sex segregation, similarly distracted from
emotionally fraught issues of sexual intimacy and maturation. Anti-
discrimination discourse avoided facing head-on the deep-seated ideas
about "natural" social and sexual behavior that both opponents and
proponents of sex segregation invoked.
In contrast, disputants outside the legal arena were still engaging these
issues. For instance, proponents of coeducation frequently referred to the
education of boys and girls together as "natural" and "healthy." They
warned that children would be unable to function in the real world if they
did not learn to understand and interact with members of the opposite sex.
Some suggested that students would not find mates, or would choose
poorly, or would not learn appropriate masculine or feminine behavior, or
would resort to homosexuality as a result of sex-segregated schooling. On
this view, it was sex segregation, not racial desegregation, that disrupted
"normal" cross-sex relationships and deprived parents and communities of
control over their children's education.
The evolving anti-discrimination discourse made no mention of the
extent to which arguments both for and against sex segregation were
premised on an assumption of normative heterosexuality. Boys and girls
would be distracted by the presence of the opposite sex, argued
proponents of sex segregation, who implicitly assumed not only that
sexual attraction constituted a harmful distraction, but also that boys
would not be distracted by other boys, nor girls by other girls. Opponents,
on the other hand, warned that single-sex schools fostered homosexual
behavior and prevented boys and girls from engaging in the interactions
necessary to form healthy heterosocial ties. Such arguments implied that
heterosexual bonds were a natural part of socialization, endangered by
exclusively homosocial exposure. Of course, they also presupposed that
homosexuality was unnatural and undesirable.
The legal discourse of Jane Crow exposed and creatively redefined the
constitutional harm of sex segregation, adapting to, and in turn, shaping,
anti-segregation advocacy and strategy. But anti-discrimination discourse
2006]
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had difficulty capturing the complex interactions between racial
ideologies, gender politics, and sexuality embodied in the theory and
practice of Jane Crow. Racial motivation proved impossible to separate
from educational purposes, which were themselves inextricably linked to
assumptions about gender roles, sociability, and sexuality. Nor could legal
advocacy effectively balance principled opposition to Jane Crow with the
pragmatic calculus that led some communities to accept sex segregation as
an unfortunate but necessary alternative to racial strife and the
impoverishment of the public school system. Jane Crow, born of both
panic and practicality, profound cynicism and cautious optimism, virulent
extremism and pragmatic moderation, remained complex and multivalent
as it reflected and shaped the trajectory of anti-discrimination law and
discourse.
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